COUNCIL v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/1/2017. (tf, n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

RASAJEE W. COUNCIL,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06771(JBS-AMD)

v.
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Rasajee W. Council
Plaintiff Pro Se
P.O. Box 1241
Camden, NJ 08105
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Rasajee W. Council seeks to bring a civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Camden County
Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) for allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it should be
dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the

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Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Complaint states: “2012: I was made to sleep on

dirty floor which injured in a crowded cell [sic]. Also in 2009
was made to sleep on the floor due to overcrowding.” Complaint §
III(C).
Plaintiff contends that the events giving rise to these
allegations occurred “Sept 28, 2012, Jan 2009.” Id. § III(B).
The Complaint describes Plaintiff’s alleged injuries: “I
was treated for an ankle sprain before being incarcerated. I was
placed in a shift boot with wrappings that got dirty and got a
fungus infection. Also I was on the floor in the medical ward.”
Id. § IV.
Plaintiff “would seek maximum benefit for pain and
suffering due to the pain and injuries sustained while
incarcerated due to overcrowding and complication after the
fact. Not that I want to return back but have the condition
drastically improve.” Id. § V.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review
complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), this
Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is
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malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening
for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff
is proceeding in forma pauperis.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCCF for allegedly

unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Primarily, the
Complaint must be dismissed as the CCCF is not a “state actor”
within the meaning of § 1983. See, e.g., Grabow v. Southern
State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989)
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(correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983).
Accordingly, the claims against CCCF must be dismissed with
prejudice.
Furthermore, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to
dismissal under [§ 1915] should receive leave to amend unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies
leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred
by the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's
two-year limitations period for personal injury.1 See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983
action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014).
“Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the
action is based.” Montanez, 773 F.3d at 480 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Plaintiff contends that the events giving rise

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“Although the running of the statute of limitations is
ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious
from the face of the complaint and no development of the record
is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua
sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim.” Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111–12
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
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to the alleged claims occurred “Sept 28, 2012, Jan 2009.”
Complaint § III(B). The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement at CCCF would have been immediately apparent to
Plaintiff at the time of detention; therefore, the statutes of
limitations for Plaintiff’s claims expired on or about September
2014 and January 2011, respectively. As there are no grounds for
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations,2 the Complaint
will be dismissed with prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F.
App’x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal
with prejudice due to expiration of statute of limitations).
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed

with prejudice for failure to state a claim. An appropriate
order follows.

February 1, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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Equitable tolling “is only appropriate ‘(1) where the defendant
has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's
cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary
way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3)
where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
mistakenly in the wrong forum.’” Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App’x
162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).
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