KENNEDY v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL

Filing 3

OPINION FILED. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/1/17. (js)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

SHAUN MICHAEL KENNEDY,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06776(JBS-AMD)

v.
CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES
Shaun Michael Kennedy
Plaintiff Pro Se
11 Hickory Place
Bellmawr, NJ 08031
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Shaun Michael Kennedy seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Jail (“CCJ”) for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.

Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

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3.

First, the Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice

as to claims made against the CCJ because defendant is not a
“state actor” within the meaning of § 1983. See Crawford v.
McMillian, No. 16-3412, 2016 WL 6134846, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 21,
2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992
(3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F.
Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a
“person” under § 1983).
4.

Second, for the reasons set forth below, the Court

will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to
state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
5.

The present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts

to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review
under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff’s
Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not
enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional
violation has occurred.
6.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim1, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to

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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
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show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
7.

With respect to alleged facts giving rise to his

claims, Plaintiff’s Complaint states: “I was forced to sleep on
the floor of Camden County Jail. I would get splashed with

same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
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urine, throw up and stepped on because I had to sleep next to
the toilet or halfway under the beds. I got jumped and extorted
and feared for my life so I had to go into protective custody
and still remained on the floor. I am traumatized due to seeing
another inmate jump from the second floor with a sheet tied
around his neck. My stay has left me mentally and physically
messed up. Infections on my feet still have issues to this day.”
Complaint § III(C).
8.

With respect to alleged injuries from the event(s)

giving rise to claims made in his Complaint, Plaintiff states:
“Neck and back problems. I have been to doctors and hospital for
my pain. I have also been to psychiatric doctors for mental
issues I have got [sic] from being in Camden County Jail.
Infections on my feet that I am still currently dealing with. I
have been to numerous hospitals and foot doctors for this issue
which is still ongoing from the showers at Camden County Jail
because the drains are clogged with dirty nasty water.” Id. §
IV.
9.

Plaintiff does not quantify any monetary amount for

the relief he seeks: “I would like the state to fix the issue of
allowing inmates to go through such harsh conditions while
incarcerated. I would like to be compensated for all the
humiliation and abuse I went through physically, mentally and
emotionally. I still have neck and back problems, and nightmares
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due to my stay at Camden County Jail. Still dealing with health
issues in my feet due to my stay. Compensate for medical bills
and physical, mental and emotional damage that has and still
affects me to this day.” Id. § V.
10.

These claims must be dismissed because the Complaint

does not set forth enough factual support for the Court to infer
that a constitutional violation has occurred.
11.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
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to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.
12.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to

particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end,
the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint
within 30 days of the date of this order.2
13.

Plaintiff is further advised that any amended

complaint must plead specific facts regarding the conditions of
confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint,
Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable
inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order
to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
14.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the

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The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
15.

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a)

dismissed with prejudice as to the CCJ; and (b) dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
16.

An appropriate order follows.

February 1, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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