WASHINGTON v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Filing 3

OPINION FILED. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/6/17. (js)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TOBYAS WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06806 (JBS-AMD)
OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Tobyas Washington
Plaintiff Pro Se
1032 Langham Street
Camden, NJ 08105
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Tobyas Washington seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Camden
County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket
Entry 1. Plaintiff seeks “[$]5,000 or more” from CCF. Id. § V.
2.

Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is

subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3.

First, the Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice

as to claims made against the CCCF because defendant is not a
“state actor” within the meaning of § 1983. See Crawford v.
McMillian, No. 16-3412, 2016 WL 6134846 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 2016)
(“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir.
1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp.
537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a
“person” under § 1983).
4.

Second, for the reasons set forth below, the Court

will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to
state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
5.

The present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts

to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review
under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in §§ III - IV of
Plaintiff’s Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there
is not enough factual support for the Court to infer a
constitutional violation has occurred.
6.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
2

Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.”

Mala v. Crown Bay

Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
7.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “I had to sleep on the

floor with four other people to room.” Complaint § III.
Plaintiff alleges that, as a result, his “thighs and back
constantly hurts [sic].” Id. § IV.
8.

Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring an

action against “the staff and officers” (id. § III), any such
purported claims must be dismissed because the Complaint does
not set forth enough factual support for the Court to infer that
a constitutional violation has occurred.

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9.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the dates and length of
the confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, etc.
10.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to

particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
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that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end,
the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint
within 30 days of the date of this order.1
11.

Plaintiff is further advised that any amended

complaint must plead specific facts regarding the conditions of
confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint,
Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable
inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order
to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.2
12.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the

1

The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
2 To the extent the Complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered during confinement(s) prior to October 4,
2014, those claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
Claims brought under § 1983 are governed by New Jersey's twoyear limitations period for personal injury. See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under federal law, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y
Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCCF
would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of
his detention. Plaintiff’s present Complaint does not identify
specific dates regarding the event(s) giving rise to Plaintiff’s
claims, other than the events giving rise to his claims
allegedly occurred “2003 – 2016.” Complaint § III. In the event
Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff should
focus on facts of confinement that occurred within the statute
of limitations, if any.
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amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
13.

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a)

dismissed with prejudice as to the CCCF; and (b) dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
14.

An appropriate order follows.

February 6, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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