TRINIDAD v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/2/17. (jbk, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
DAVID A. TRINIDAD,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06820(JBS-AMD)
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
OPINION
Defendant.
APPEARANCES
David A. Trinidad
Plaintiff Pro Se
310 South 27th Street
Camden, NJ 08105
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.
Plaintiff David A. Trinidad seeks to bring a civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Jail Correctional Facility (“CCJCF”) for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket
Entry 1.
2.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review
complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
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subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.
First, the Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice
as to claims made against the CCJCF because defendant is not a
“state actor” within the meaning of § 1983. See Crawford v.
McMillian, No. 16-3412, 2016 WL 6134846, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 21,
2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992
(3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F.
Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a
“person” under § 1983).
5.
Second, the Court will dismiss the Complaint without
prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(b)(ii). The present Complaint does not allege
sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a
constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this
Court’s review under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in
Plaintiff’s Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there
is not enough factual support for the Court to infer a
constitutional violation has occurred.
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6.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim1, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
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7.
With respect to alleged facts giving rise to his
claims, Plaintiff’s Complaint states that while in Camden County
Jail, he “had to sleep on the floor due to overcrowding and
unsanitary conditions.” Plaintiff contends that he had to “sleep
on dirty floors.” Complaint § III(C).
8.
With respect to dates and times of the purported
events giving rise to his claims, Plaintiff states: “Between
2000 – 2013, I was arrested for traffic and child support
warrants.” Id. § III(B).
9.
Plaintiff contends that he “broke out with rashes” for
which he “had [to] go to doctors.” Id. § IV.
10.
Plaintiff “want[s] the maximum benefits offered and I
want the conditions and the treatment of inmates in the county
jail to improve.” Id. § V.
11.
Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because the
Complaint does not set forth enough factual support for the
Court to infer that a constitutional violation has occurred.
12.
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily
in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
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one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.
13.
Finally, Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by the
statute of limitations. “[P]laintiffs who file complaints
subject to dismissal should receive leave to amend unless
amendment would be inequitable under [§ 1915] or futile.”
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir.
2002). This Court denies leave to amend at this time as
Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations,
which is governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period
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for personal injury.2 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276
(1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010). The accrual date of a § 1983 action is determined by
federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007);
Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir.
2014). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the
action is based.” Montanez, 773 F.3d at 480 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
14.
With respect to dates and times of the purported
events giving rise to his claims, Plaintiff states: “Between
2000 – 2013, I was arrested for traffic and child support
warrants.” Complaint § III(B). The allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement would have been immediately apparent
to Plaintiff at the time of his detention. Accordingly, the
statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims expired in 2015.
Plaintiff filed his complaint too late.
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“Although the running of the statute of limitations is
ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious
from the face of the complaint and no development of the record
is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua
sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim.” Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111–12
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
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15.
As there are no grounds for equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations,3 the Complaint will be dismissed with
prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 112 (3d
Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal with prejudice due
to expiration of statute of limitations).
16.
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
17.
An appropriate order follows.
February 2, 2017
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
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Equitable tolling “is only appropriate ‘(1) where the defendant
has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's
cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary
way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3)
where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
mistakenly in the wrong forum.’” Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App’x
162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).
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