WHITE v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/2/2017. (rtm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

BARRY M. WHITE,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06824(JBS-AMD)

v.
CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES
Barry M. White
Plaintiff Pro Se
130 Martin Luther King Boulevard, Apt. 801
Camden, NJ 08103
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Barry M. White seeks to bring a civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden County
Jail (“CCJ”) for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

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3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (1)

dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against
CCJ; and (2) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure
to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

First, the Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice

as to claims made against the CCJ because defendant is not a
“state actor” within the meaning of § 1983. See Crawford v.
McMillian, No. 16-3412, 2016 WL 6134846, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 21,
2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992
(3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F.
Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a
“person” under § 1983).
5.

Second, the present Complaint does not allege

sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a
constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this
Court’s review under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in
Plaintiff’s Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there
is not enough factual support for the Court to infer a
constitutional violation has occurred.
6.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim1, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to

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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
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show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
7.

With respect to the alleged facts giving rise to his

claims, Plaintiff’s Complaint states: “I was put in holding with
like 7 – 8 people [,] two on the bench. Then I was moved to 7

same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
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day lock-up with 3 other people detoxing off of one thing or
another [and] throwing up[,] and the c/o’s took forever to let
us out to give us something to clean the cell or toilet with.”
Complaint § III(C). “I was forced in a small cell like a cage
animal.” Id. § V.
8.

With respect to dates and times of the purported

events giving rise to his claims, Plaintiff states: “2011 thru
2015.” Id. § III(B).
9.

Plaintiff does not allege any injuries from the

purported events giving rise to claims made in his Complaint.
Id. § IV (“N/A”).
10.

Plaintiff does not quantify any monetary amount for

the relief he seeks: “How much is up to them but I should get
something.” Id. § V.
11.

These claims must be dismissed because the Complaint

does not set forth enough factual support for the Court to infer
that a constitutional violation has occurred.
12.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
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one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.
13.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to

particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end,

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the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint
within 30 days of the date of this order.2
14.

Plaintiff is further advised that any amended

complaint must plead specific facts regarding the conditions of
confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint,
Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable
inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order
to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.3
15.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes

2

The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
3
To the extent the Complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered prior to October 7, 2014, those claims are
barred by the statute of limitations. Claims brought under §
1983 are governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period
for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276
(1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the
action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d
472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement at CCJ would have been immediately
apparent to Plaintiff; therefore, the statute of limitations on
some of Plaintiff’s claims expired two years after his release.
In the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, he
should limit his complaint to confinements in which he was
released after October 7, 2014.
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omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
16.

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a)

dismissed with prejudice as to the CCJ; and (b) dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
17.

An appropriate order follows.

February 2, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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