GIBSON v. WALKER et al

Filing 4

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/2/2017. (tf, n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CHARLES E. GIBSON,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
v.
CHARLES WALKER (WARDEN),
SCOTT, SGT. DAVIS, and
CAMDEN COUNTY FACILITY,

LT.

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06861 (JBS-AMD)
OPINION

Defendants.
APPEARANCES
Charles E. Gibson, Plaintiff Pro Se
722 Anna Sample Lane
Camden, NJ 08104
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Charles E. Gibson seeks to bring a civil rights

complaint against Charles Walker (Warden) (“Walker”), Lt. Scott
(“Scott”), Sgt. Davis (“Davis”), and Camden County Facility
(“CCF”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket
Entry 1.
28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that
is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

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who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua
sponte screening for dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)
because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the
Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Complaint states: “Slept on floor, unsanitation

[sic] conditions[,] walls in shower had mold growing on them.
Medical treatment was unprofessional.” Complaint § III(C).
Plaintiff claims to have suffered a “rash on knees and
elbows” for which he was “only given ointment to rub on areas.”
Id. § IV.
Plaintiff states that the alleged events giving rise to his
claims occurred “Dec 2000 to Sept 2000. March 2008 to Dec 2008.
Dec 2012 to Oct [20]13.” Id. § III(B).
Plaintiff contends that “a fair amount for these violations
would be 2,000 to 3,000.” Id. § V.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive sua sponte screening under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially
plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when
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the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster,
764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s claims against defendants for allegedly

unconstitutional conditions of confinement must be dismissed
with prejudice for the following reasons.
First, Camden County Facility is not a separate legal
entity from Camden County and is therefore not independently
subject to suit. See Bermudez v. Essex Cty. D.O.C., No. 12-6035,
2013 WL 1405263, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2013) (citing cases).
Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to impose liability on
Camden County. “There is no respondeat superior theory of
municipal liability, so a city may not be held vicariously
liable under § 1983 for the actions of its agents. Rather, a
municipality may be held liable only if its policy or custom is
the ‘moving force’ behind a constitutional violation.” Sanford
v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Monell v.
N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). See
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also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992)
(“The city is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the
constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it
can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.”).
Plaintiff must plead facts showing that the relevant Camden
County policy-makers are “responsible for either the affirmative
proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled
custom.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990).1
In other words, Plaintiff must set forth facts supporting an
inference that Camden County itself was the “moving force”
behind the alleged constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at
689. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not set forth any such facts.
Second, even construing the Complaint to assert claims
against Camden County Jail (“CCJ”) (Complaint § I(B)), the
Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice as to such claims
because Camden County Jail is not a “state actor” within the
meaning of § 1983. See Crawford v. McMillian, No. 16-3412, 2016
WL 6134846, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 2016) (“[T]he prison is not

1

“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.
Government custom can be demonstrated by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually
to constitute law.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 118 (3d
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
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an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing
Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v.
Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J.
1989) (correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983).
Third, with respect to individual defendants Walker, Scott
and Davis, the Complaint does not set forth enough factual
support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation
has occurred. The mere fact that an individual is lodged
temporarily in a cell with more persons than its intended design
does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding doublecelling by itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v.
Mulvihill, 488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere doublebunking does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one
man, one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse

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conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”).
Finally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to
dismissal should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable under [§ 1915] or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies
leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred
by the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's
two-year limitations period for personal injury.2 See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983
action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). “Under federal law, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez, 773 F.3d
at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff states that the alleged events giving rise to his
claims occurred “Dec 2000 to Sept 2000. March 2008 to Dec 2008.

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“Although the running of the statute of limitations is
ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious
from the face of the complaint and no development of the record
is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua
sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim.” Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111–12
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
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Dec 2012 to Oct [20]13.” Complaint § III(B). The allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement would have been
immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of his detention.
Accordingly, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims
expired in October 2015. As there are no grounds for equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations,3 the Complaint will be
dismissed with prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x
110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal with
prejudice due to expiration of statute of limitations).
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed

with prejudice for failure to state a claim. An appropriate
order follows.

February 2, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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Equitable tolling “is only appropriate ‘(1) where the defendant
has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's
cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary
way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3)
where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
mistakenly in the wrong forum.’” Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App’x
162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).
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