MCKEE v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL

Filing 4

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/3/2017. (tf, n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CATHY-JO McKEE,
Plaintiff,
v.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06872(JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES
Cathy-Jo McKee, Plaintiff Pro Se
2995 Mt. Ephraim Avenue
Camden, NJ 08104
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Cathy-Jo McKee seeks to bring a civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden County
Jail (“CCJ”) for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

With respect to the factual allegations giving rise to

her claims, Plaintiff’s Complaint states in its entirety: “I was
forced to sleep in a cell with 5 women and only 2 bunks. I had
to sleep on the floor.” Complaint § III(C).
5.

Plaintiff states that these events occurred: “5-23-

2006[,] and from May 20, 2011 – October 29, 2011.” Id. § III(B).
6.

Plaintiff does not identify any injuries related to

these events. Id. § IV.
7.

Plaintiff seeks “to be compensated for wrongful

housing at Camden County Jail . . . I had to sleep on the floor,
which is unhealthy living conditions. I am seeking the highest
compensation I can receive for this matter.” Id. § V.
8.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice, as

explained below.
9.

First, the Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice

as to claims made against the CCJ because defendant is not a
“state actor” within the meaning of § 1983. See Crawford v.
McMillian, No. 16-3412, 2016 WL 6134846, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 21,
2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992
(3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F.
2

Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a
“person” under § 1983).
10.

Second, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute

of limitations. “[P]laintiffs who file complaints subject to
dismissal should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable under [§ 1915] or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies
leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred
by the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's
two-year limitations period for personal injury.1 See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983
action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). “Under federal law, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez, 773 F.3d
at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted).

1

“Although the running of the statute of limitations is
ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious
from the face of the complaint and no development of the record
is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua
sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim.” Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111–12
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
3

11.

Plaintiff states that the events giving rise to the

claims in the Complaint occurred: “5-23-2006[,] and from May 20,
2011 – October 29, 2011.” Complaint § III(B). The allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement would have been
immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of detention in
CCJ. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s
claims expired in October 2013. As there are no grounds for
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations,2 the Complaint
will be dismissed with prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F.
App’x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal
with prejudice due to expiration of statute of limitations).
12.

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is

dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
13.

An appropriate order follows.

February 3, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

2

Equitable tolling “is only appropriate ‘(1) where the defendant
has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's
cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary
way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3)
where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
mistakenly in the wrong forum.’” Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App’x
162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).
4