DEEGAN v. CAMDEN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/7/2017. (tf, n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

CHRISTOPHER C. DEEGAN,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06921 (JBS-AMD)

v.
CAMDEN COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Christopher C. Deegan, Plaintiff Pro Se
466 Sunnyhill Avenue
Franklinville, NJ 08322
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Christopher C. Deegan seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint against Camden County Department of Corrections
(“CCDOC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket
Entry 1.
28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that
is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua

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sponte screening for dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)
because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the
Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Complaint states: “Every time since I was 18

being locked up in Camden Department of Corrections I would be
on the floor from booking in the holding cell [a]n[d] going to
bathroom in a holding cell with as many as 10 – 20 guys . . .
[Y]ou have to be on floor sleeping in urine with rodents [a]n[d]
bugs. And inmates that stunk and had bad mercer [sic] and
boils.” Complaint § III(C).
Plaintiff states that the alleged events giving rise to his
claims occurred: “1/29/2007; 4/3/2006; 6/26/2008; 12/11/2004.”
Id. § III(B).
Plaintiff’s alleged injuries arising from these claims are
“panic attacks” and “back problems.” Id. § IV.
Plaintiff is “asking the maximum amount of compensation
that is given for someone in the conditions that I went
through.” Id. § V.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive sua sponte screening under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially
plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster,
764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts claims against CCDOC for allegedly

unconstitutional conditions of confinement. This Court must
dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
First, the CCDOC is not a separate legal entity from Camden
County and is therefore not independently subject to suit. See
Bermudez v. Essex Cty. D.O.C., No. 12-6035, 2013 WL 1405263, at
*5 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2013) (citing cases). Plaintiff has not pled
sufficient facts to impose liability on Camden County. “There is
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no respondeat superior theory of municipal liability, so a city
may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions
of its agents. Rather, a municipality may be held liable only if
its policy or custom is the ‘moving force’ behind a
constitutional violation.” Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 314
(3d Cir. 2006) (citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). See also Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992) (“The city is not
vicariously liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of
its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that
the city itself is the wrongdoer.”). To satisfy pleading
requirements in cases such as this, Plaintiff must plead facts
showing that the relevant Camden County policy-makers are
“responsible for either the affirmative proclamation of a policy
or acquiescence in a well-settled custom.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon,
915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990).1 In other words, Plaintiff must
set forth facts supporting an inference that Camden County

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“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.
Government custom can be demonstrated by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually
to constitute law.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 118 (3d
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
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itself was the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional
violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 689.
Second, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to
dismissal should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable under [§ 1915] or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, this Court
must deny leave to amend as Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by
the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's
two-year limitations period for personal injury.2 See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983
action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). “Under federal law, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez, 773 F.3d
at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff states that the alleged events giving rise to his
claims occurred: “1/29/2007; 4/3/2006; 6/26/2008; 12/11/2004.”

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“Although the running of the statute of limitations is
ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious
from the face of the complaint and no development of the record
is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua
sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim.” Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111–12
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
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Complaint § III(B). The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at
the time of detention. Accordingly, the statute of limitations
for Plaintiff’s claims expired in June 2010. As there are no
grounds for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations,3 the
Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's
Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(affirming dismissal with prejudice due to expiration of statute
of limitations).
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed

with prejudice for failure to state a claim. An appropriate
order follows.

February 7, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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Equitable tolling “is only appropriate ‘(1) where the defendant
has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's
cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary
way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3)
where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
mistakenly in the wrong forum.’” Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App’x
162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).
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