PARKER v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/7/2017. (TH, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ALBERT PARKER,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06929 (JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
and WARDEN DAVID S. OWENS,

OPINION

Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Albert Parker, Plaintiff Pro Se
1533 Route 38, Room 229
Lumberton, NJ 08060
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Albert Parker seeks to bring a civil rights

complaint against Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”)
and Warden David S. Owens (“Owens”) (collectively, “Defendants”)
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that
is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua

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sponte screening for dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)
because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the
Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Complaint states: “I was forced to live in

inhumane conditions while incarcerated. Forced to sleep on cell
floors by a toilet getting urine on my mattress and clothing and
sheets. I was unable [sic] to wash my soiled clothing only once
a week causing skin breakouts. Sleeping on a thin mattress on
concrete left me with consistent back pain. I was forced to
shower in fungus filled showers.” Complaint § III(C).
Plaintiff states that the alleged events giving rise to
these claims occurred: “June 2011.” Id. § III(B).
With respect to alleged injuries from these events,
Plaintiff states: “Back neck rashes. [T]his [is] why I collect
di[s]ability.” Id. § IV.
Plaintiff seeks $5,000 in relief. Id. § V.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive sua sponte screening under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially
plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
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2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster,
764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants for allegedly

unconstitutional conditions of confinement. This Court must
dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
(A)

First, the Complaint must be dismissed because: (1)

CCCF is not a “state actor” within the meaning of § 1983. See,
e.g., Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537,
538–39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a “person”
under § 1983); and (2) Plaintiff has “[not] alleged any personal
involvement by [Owens] in any constitutional violation – a fatal
flaw, since ‘liability in a § 1983 suit cannot be predicated
solely on the operation of respondeat superior.’” Baker v.
Flagg, 439 F. App’x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).
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“[Plaintiff’s] complaint contains no allegations regarding [the]
Warden. ‘Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983
suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.’ Thus, [plaintiff] failed to state a
claim against [the] Warden.” Bob v. Kuo, 387 F. App’x 134, 136
(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against CCCF and Owens must
be dismissed.
(B)

Second, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to

dismissal should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable under [§ 1915] or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies
leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred
by the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's
two-year limitations period for personal injury.1 See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983
action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato,

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“Although the running of the statute of limitations is
ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious
from the face of the complaint and no development of the record
is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua
sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim.” Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111–12
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
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549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). “Under federal law, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez, 773 F.3d
at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff states that the alleged events giving rise to his
claims occurred: “June 2011.” Complaint § III(B). The allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement would have been
immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of detention.
Accordingly, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims
expired in June 2013. As there are no grounds for equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations,2 the Complaint will be
dismissed with prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x
110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal with
prejudice due to expiration of statute of limitations).

2

Equitable tolling “is only appropriate ‘(1) where the defendant
has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's
cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary
way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3)
where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
mistakenly in the wrong forum.’” Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App’x
162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).
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V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed

with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
An appropriate order follows.

February 7, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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