WYNN v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL

Filing 8

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/1/2017. (TH, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

IVAN WYNN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06930 (JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES
Ivan Wynn
Plaintiff Pro Se
1710 Kossuth Street
Camden, NJ 08104
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Ivan Wynn seeks to bring a civil rights complaint

against Camden County Jail (“CCJ”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that
is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua
sponte screening for dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)
because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
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For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the
Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Complaint states in its entirety: “Slept on the

floor and fed inadequately and not protected.” Complaint §
III(C).
With respect to allegations of injuries sustained from
these events, Plaintiff claims “back problems from sleeping on
the floor, food cold, and I got sliced with a razor[,] got
bandaged[,] and given medication. Anxiety.” Id. § IV.
Plaintiff states that the alleged events giving rise to his
claims occurred “July 4, 2012 – February 7, 2014.” Id. § III(B).
Regarding his claims for relief, Plaintiff states: “They
can give me treatment for my anxiety and give me 20,000.” Id. §
V.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive sua sponte screening under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially
plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
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the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster,
764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts claims against CCJ for allegedly

unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
Primarily, the Complaint must be dismissed as CCJ is not a
“state actor” within the meaning of § 1983. See, e.g., Grabow v.
Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J.
1989) (correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983).
Accordingly, the claims against CCJ must be dismissed with
prejudice.
Furthermore, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to
dismissal should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable under [§ 1915] or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies
leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred
by the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's
two-year limitations period for personal injury.1 See Wilson v.

1

“Although the running of the statute of limitations is
ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious
3

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983
action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). “Under federal law, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez, 773 F.3d
at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff states that the alleged events giving rise to his
claims occurred “July 4, 2012 – February 7, 2014.” Complaint §
III(B). The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement
at CCJ would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the
time of his detention. Accordingly, the statute of limitations
for Plaintiff’s claims expired in February 2016. As there are no
grounds for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations,2 the
Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's

from the face of the complaint and no development of the record
is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua
sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim.” Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111–12
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
2 Equitable tolling “is only appropriate ‘(1) where the defendant
has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's
cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary
way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3)
where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
mistakenly in the wrong forum.’” Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App’x
162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).
4

Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(affirming dismissal with prejudice due to expiration of statute
of limitations).
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed

with prejudice for failure to state a claim. An appropriate
order follows.

February 1, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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