RIVERA v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/8/2017. (tf, n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

MAELY RIVERA,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06932(JBS-AMD)

v.
CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES
Maely Rivera, Plaintiff Pro Se
632 Erie Street
Camden, NJ 08102
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Maely Rivera seeks to bring a civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden County
Jail (“CCJ”) for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.

28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under Section
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

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3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (1)

dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against
CCJ; and (2) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure
to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

First, the Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice

as to claims made against the CCJ because defendant is not a
“state actor” within the meaning of § 1983. See Crawford v.
McMillian, 660 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 2016) (“[T]he
prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir.
1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp.
537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a
“person” under § 1983).
5.

Second, for the reasons set forth below, the Court

will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to
state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
6.

The present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts

to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review
under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff’s
Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not
enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional
violation has occurred.

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7.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim 1, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).

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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
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8.

With respect to alleged facts giving rise to the

claims in the Complaint, Plaintiff states: “I slept on the floor
without a mattress. I was exposed to mold. I know [sic] have
chronic back pains. [F]ood was cold. I was on phyc [sic] meds &
they did not give me my medication. Camden County Jail did not
provide proper sleeping equipment.” Complaint § III(C).
9.

With respect to dates and times of the purported

events giving rise to these claims, Plaintiff states: “Nov 24,
2014 – Dec 2, 2014.” Id. § III(B)
10.

With respect to alleged injuries from these events,

Plaintiff states: “Chronic pain to my spine. I know [sic] have
anxiety, traumatic stress & manic mood disorder since I was
incarcerated.” Id. § IV.
11.

Plaintiff “want[s] [$]16,000 for my chronic pains and

traumatic stress.” Id. § V.
12.

These claims must be dismissed because the Complaint

does not set forth enough factual support for the Court to infer
that a constitutional violation has occurred.
13.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
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does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.
14.

Furthermore, there are also not enough facts for the

Court to infer Plaintiff was denied adequate medical care. In
order to set forth a cognizable claim for violation of a right
to adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious
medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials
that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. See
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden
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Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). A mere
assertion that Plaintiff was not given medication is
insufficient to meet the pleading standard in the absence of any
facts. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue this claim, Plaintiff
should provide facts in an amended complaint that support both
of the requirements of a claim of inadequate medical care.
15.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to

particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end,
the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint
within 30 days of the date of this order. 2
16.

Plaintiff is further advised that any amended

complaint must plead specific facts regarding the conditions of
confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint,
Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable
inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order
to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
17.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the

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The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
18.

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a)

dismissed with prejudice as to the CCJ; and (b) dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
19.

An appropriate order follows.

February 8, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

MAELY RIVERA,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06932 (JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,

ORDER

Defendant.

This matter having come before the Court on Plaintiff’s
Complaint (Docket Entry 1); the Court having considered the
submissions of the Plaintiff; for the reasons explained in the
Opinion of today’s date; and for good cause shown;
IT IS this

8th

day of

February

, 2017, hereby

ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as
to claims made against defendant Camden County Jail, which is
not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and it is further
ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
for failure to state a claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); and
it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within
30 days of the date of this Opinion and Order. Any amended
complaint is subject to screening prior to service; and it is
finally

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a
copy of this Opinion and Order via regular mail and mark this
case CLOSED.

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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