ALEXANDER v. CAMDEN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/14/2017. (tf, n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

MAX S. ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06993(JBS-AMD)

v.
CAMDEN COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS and CAMDEN
COUNTY BOARD OF FREEHOLDERS,

OPINION

Defendants.
APPEARANCES
Max S. Alexander, Plaintiff Pro Se
301 Market Street, #210
Camden, NJ 08102
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Max S. Alexander seeks to bring a civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden County
Department of Corrections (“CCDOC”) and the Camden County Board
of Freeholders (“BOF”) for allegedly unconstitutional conditions
of confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that
is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua
1

sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the
Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
II.

BACKGROUND
With respect to alleged facts giving rise to his claims,

Plaintiff states: “Camden County Department of Corrections
forced me to live in an overcrowded jail cell while I was a pretrial detainee from April 2007 to February 2009. During every
hour of every day of that time for close to two years, I had to
live and sleep on the floor. The cell had a 2-person capacity
and a toilet. CCDOC consistently housed 4 to 5 people in my
cell.” Complaint § III(C).
Plaintiff states that these alleged events occurred: “April
2007 through February 2009, all day, every day.” Id. § III(B).
Plaintiff contends that “[a]s a result of relentlessly
cruel and dehumanizing restriction and confinement, I contracted
MRSA and have heart disease, chronic back and joint pain, sleep
apnea, high blood pressure and mental depression.” Id. § IV.
Plaintiff seeks $25 million in relief.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive sua sponte screening under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege
2

“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially
plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster,
764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts claims against the CCDOC and BOF for

allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed with prejudice.
First, the CCDOC and BOF are not separate legal entities
from Camden County and are therefore not independently subject
to suit. See Bermudez v. Essex Cty. D.O.C., No. 12-6035, 2013 WL
1405263, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2013) (citing cases). Plaintiff
has not pled sufficient facts to impose liability on Camden
County. “There is no respondeat superior theory of municipal
liability, so a city may not be held vicariously liable under §
1983 for the actions of its agents. Rather, a municipality may
be held liable only if its policy or custom is the ‘moving
3

force’ behind a constitutional violation.” Sanford v. Stiles,
456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). See also Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992) (“The city
is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the constitutional
torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly
said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.”). A plaintiff must
plead facts showing that the relevant Camden County policymakers are “responsible for either the affirmative proclamation
of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled custom.” Bielevicz
v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990).1
Second, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to
dismissal should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable under [§ 1915] or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies
leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred
by the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's

1

“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.
Government custom can be demonstrated by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually
to constitute law.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 118 (3d
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
4

two-year limitations period for personal injury.2 See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983
action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). “Under federal law, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez, 773 F.3d
at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to claims in
the Complaint occurred: “April 2007 through February 2009, all
day, every day.” Complaint § III(B). The allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement would have been
immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of detention.
Accordingly, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims
expired in February 2011. As there are no grounds for equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations,3 the Complaint will be

2

“Although the running of the statute of limitations is
ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious
from the face of the complaint and no development of the record
is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua
sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim.” Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111–12
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
3 Equitable tolling “is only appropriate ‘(1) where the defendant
has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's
cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary
way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3)
where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
5

dismissed with prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x
110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal with
prejudice due to expiration of statute of limitations).
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed
with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
An appropriate order follows.

February 14, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

mistakenly in the wrong forum.’” Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App’x
162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).
6