GOODWATER v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/14/17. (jbk, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DAVID GOODWATER,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06994 (JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
David Goodwater, Plaintiff Pro Se
1127 Princess Avenue
Camden, NJ 08103
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff David Goodwater seeks to bring a civil rights

complaint against Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”)
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that
is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua
sponte screening for dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)
because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

1

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the
Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
II.

BACKGROUND
With respect to factual allegations giving rise to his

claims, Plaintiff’s Complaint states in its entirety: “Bad back
sleeping on cold floor and caught a fungle [sic], germs all over
my body.” Complaint § III(C).
Plaintiff alleges that these events occurred: “2009.” Id. §
III(B).
Plaintiff does not identify or otherwise describe injury
from the alleged events Id. § IV (“n/a”).
Plaintiff does not identify or otherwise describe requested
relief. Id. § V (“n/a”).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive sua sponte screening under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially
plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster,
764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers
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‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts claims against CCCF for allegedly

unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Even construing the
Complaint as seeking to bring a civil rights complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged prison overcrowding in relation
to Plaintiff “sleeping on cold floor” (Complaint § III(C)), any
such purported claims must be dismissed for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
First, claims against CCCF must be dismissed with prejudice
because defendant is not a “state actor” within the meaning of §
1983. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir.
2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992
(3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F.
Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a
“person” under § 1983.
Second, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to
dismissal should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable under [§ 1915] or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies
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leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred
by the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's
two-year limitations period for personal injury.1 See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983
action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). “Under federal law, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez, 773 F.3d
at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to his claims
occurred: “2009.” Complaint § III(B). The allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCCF would have
been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of detention.
Accordingly, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims
expired in 2011. As there are no grounds for equitable tolling
of the statute of limitations,2 the Complaint will be dismissed

1

“Although the running of the statute of limitations is
ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious
from the face of the complaint and no development of the record
is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua
sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim.” Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111–12
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
2 Equitable tolling “is only appropriate ‘(1) where the defendant
has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's
cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary
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with prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 112
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal with prejudice
due to expiration of statute of limitations).

V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed

with prejudice for failure to state a claim. An appropriate
order follows.

February 14, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3)
where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
mistakenly in the wrong forum.’” Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App’x
162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).
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