KING v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Filing
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OPINION FILED. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/3/17. (js)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
KERRON TYRELL KING,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,
Civil Action
No. 16-cv-07046 (JBS-AMD)
OPINION
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Kerron Tyrell King, Plaintiff Pro Se
157 Branch Village
Camden, NJ 08104
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.
Plaintiff Kerron Tyrell King seeks to bring a civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”). Complaint, Docket Entry
1.
2.
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review
complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis.
3.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
5.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCCF for
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. As the
CCCF is not a “state actor” within the meaning of § 1983, the
claims against it must be dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g.,
Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–
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39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a “person” under
§ 1983).
6.
Plaintiff may be able to amend the complaint to name
state actors who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
7.
Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint must
plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a
constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this
Court’s review under § 1915. Plaintiff alleges that he was
confined at the CCCF from 2012 through 2013 and from February
21, 2015 through June 2015. Complaint § III. The fact section of
the complaint states: “I Kerron T. King once incarcerated was
house[d] in poor living conditions. I was made to sleep on the
floors. My bed or cushion rather, has been often soiled with
urine from being almost directly under the toilet. The showers
were filled mold also[.] I currently have a toe infection due to
the showers not being sanitary enough or often flooded. Everyone
housed at the Camden County Correctional Facility at the time
that I was also there were treated to the same conditions.” Id.
Plaintiff further states, “I have had mercer from lack of proper
cleaning supplies and often, went untreated for considerable
amounts of time until the nursing staff get around to me.” Id.
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§ IV. Even accepting these statements as true for screening
purposes only, there is not enough factual support for the Court
to infer a constitutional violation has occurred.
8.
Plaintiff alleges he slept on the floor, presumably
because no open beds were available. The mere fact that an
individual is lodged temporarily in a cell with more persons
than its intended design does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by itself did not violate
Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F. App'x 554, 560
(3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking does not constitute
punishment, because there is no ‘one man, one cell principle
lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’”
(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979))). More is
needed to demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a
pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and thus violates due
process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d
Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis requires courts to
consider whether the totality of the conditions “cause[s]
inmates to endure such genuine privations and hardship over an
extended period of time, that the adverse conditions become
excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them.”). Some
relevant factors are the dates and length of the confinement(s),
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whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner,
etc.
9.
In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to
allege a claim based on a violation of his right to adequate
medical care, there are not enough facts to support an inference
that Plaintiff’s rights were violated in this regard. In order
to set forth a cognizable claim for a violation of his right to
adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious
medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials
that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. See
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden
Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff’s allegation that he “went untreated for considerable
amounts of time until the nursing staff get around to me” is
insufficient to meet the pleading standard in the absence of
additional facts. If he wishes to pursue this claim, Plaintiff
should provide additional facts supporting both of the
requirements in his amended complaint.
10.
As Plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to
address the deficiencies noted by the Court,1 the Court shall
1
To the extent the complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered during his confinement from 2012 through
2013, those claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
Claims brought under § 1983 are governed by New Jersey's twoyear limitations period for personal injury. See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
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grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of
the date of this order.
11.
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint
is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself.2 Id.
12.
For the reasons stated above, the complaint is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The
Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an
amended complaint within the time allotted by the Court.
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under federal law, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y
Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCCF
would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of
his detention; therefore, the statute of limitations for
Plaintiff’s 2012 to 2013 claims expired, at the latest, in 2015.
In the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, he
should focus on facts regarding his 2015 confinement.
2 The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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13.
An appropriate order follows.
March 3, 2017
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
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