GOODMAN-BEY v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONS

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 8/22/17. (jbk, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RAMON GOODMAN-BEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONS,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-07051 (JBS-AMD)
OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Ramon Goodman-Bey, Plaintiff Pro Se
3014 Fenwick Road
Camden, NJ 08104
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Ramon Goodman-Bey seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Camden
County Corrections (“CCC”) for allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

The present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts

to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review
under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff’s
Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not
enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional
violation has occurred.
5.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim1, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

1

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
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alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
6.

With respect to factual allegations giving rise to his

claims, Plaintiff states: “Turned myself in to the Court- I was
not given Miranda right-nor given the medical attention or
[illegible]. I am a victim of victims of violent crime.”
Complaint § III(C).
7.

Plaintiff states this occurred between June 4, 2016

and September 12, 2016. Id. § III(B).
8.

With respect to injuries, Plaintiff alleges, “Because

I did not get the treatment needed [illegible] under Dr’s carefrom Camden County- and being made to sleep on a board witch
[sic] was not in any way good for my chronic back injuries- or
my diagnosis of PTS. No [illegible] treatment.” Id. § IV.

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9.

With respect to requested relief, Plaintiff seeks

“compensation for medical treatment and mental anguish.” Id. §
V.
10.

Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, any such
purported claims must be dismissed because the Complaint does
not set forth sufficient factual support for the Court to infer
that a constitutional violation has occurred.
11.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
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conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.
12.

Moreover, the Camden County Corrections is not a

separate legal entity from Camden County and is therefore not
independently subject to suit. See Bermudez v. Essex Cty.
D.O.C., No. 12-6035, 2013 WL 1405263, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 4,
2013) (citing cases). Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to
impose liability on Camden County.
13.

“There is no respondeat superior theory of municipal

liability, so a city may not be held vicariously liable under §
1983 for the actions of its agents. Rather, a municipality may
be held liable only if its policy or custom is the ‘moving
force’ behind a constitutional violation.” Sanford v. Stiles,
456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). See also Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992) (“The city
is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the constitutional
torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly
said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.”).
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14.

Plaintiff must plead facts showing that the relevant

Camden County policy-makers are “responsible for either the
affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a wellsettled custom.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d
Cir. 1990).2 In other words, Plaintiff must set forth facts
supporting an inference that Camden County itself was the
“moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 689.
15.

As Plaintiff may be able to amend his Complaint to

address the deficiencies noted by the Court, the Court shall
grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of
the date of this order.3
16.

In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he

should include specific facts, such as the dates and length of
confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,

2

“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.
Government custom can be demonstrated by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually
to constitute law.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 118 (3d
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
3 The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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and any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement. Conclusory statements are not enough.
17.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
18.

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The
Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an
amended complaint within the time allotted by the Court.
19.

An appropriate order follows.

August 22, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

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