VASQUEZ v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/21/17. (jbk, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHRISTOPHER J. VASQUEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-07054 (JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Christopher J. Vasquez, Plaintiff Pro Se
521 Rand Street, Apt. A
Camden, NJ 08105
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Christopher J. Vasquez seeks to bring a

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Camden County Jail (“CCJ”). Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.

Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis.

3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
5.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCJ for

allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. As the CCJ
is not a “state actor” within the meaning of § 1983, the claims
against it must be dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v.
McMillian, 660 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison
is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”)
(citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)).

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6.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the complaint to name

state actors who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
7.

Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint must

plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a
constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this
Court’s review under § 1915. Plaintiff alleges he experienced
unconstitutional conditions of confinement on June 1, 2010, June
10, 2011, August 14, 2011, June 4, 2012, and June 15, 2016.
Complaint § III. The fact section of the complaint states:
“During these dates in the CCCF I was forced to sleep on the
floor using a thin mat. Sleeping next to doors, and under tables
and bunks. I’ve slept next to toilets and been splashed with
water while being flushed with mold on the floor and inside
toilets. Mold on trays. I had to sleep with up to four people in
a room that’s meant for two.” Id. Even accepting these
statements as true for screening purposes only, there is not
enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional
violation has occurred.
8.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the dates and length of
the confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, etc.
9.

As Plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to

address the deficiencies noted by the Court,1 the Court shall

1

To the extent the complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered during his confinements in 2010, 2011, and
2012, those claims are barred by the statute of limitations and
must be dismissed with prejudice. Claims brought under § 1983
are governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period for
personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985);
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010).
“Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff
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grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of
the date of this order.
10.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself.2 Id.
11.

For the reasons stated above, the complaint is

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The

knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is
based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480
(3d Cir. 2014). Plaintiff alleges that the facts giving rise to
these particular claims occurred on June 1, 2010, June 10, 2011,
August 14, 2011, and June 4, 2012. Complaint § III. The
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCJ
would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of
his detention; therefore, the statute of limitations for these
claims expired in 2012, 2013, and 2014, respectively. In the
event Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, he should
focus on facts that occurred during his 2016 confinement.
2 The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an
amended complaint within the time allotted by the Court.
12.

An appropriate order follows.

February 21, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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