BROCKINGTON v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/16/2017. (tf,n.m. )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SALAHUDDI Q. BROCKINGTON,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 16-7102 (JBS-AMD)

v.
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,

OPINION

Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
Salahuddi Q. Brockington, Plaintiff Pro Se
11 Ablette Village
Camden, NJ 08105
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Salahuddi Q. Brockington seeks to bring a civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”). Complaint, Docket Entry
1.
At this time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), to determine whether it should be
dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the

complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
II.

BACKGROUND
The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was confined in the

CCCF from January 1, 1999 to January 14, 2000; 2002 to 2003, and
2006 to 2007. Complaint § III. Plaintiff states: “While was
incarcerated was sexually and falsely accused for smuggling
drugs into my cell. I was strip searched and also was
transported from CCCF to Our Lady of Lourds to see if I was
wrongly accused for carrying illegal narcotics. They searched
myself in ways that shouldn’t have been done up to the laws of
the state of N.J. Checked rectum for drugs and hospital
performed a rape test and came to the information that would
prove that I was sexually harassed in the way that wasn’t
allowed by the state laws.” Id. The complaint further alleges
that Plaintiff “slept in cells that were equipped to live 2
people and there was 3 to 4 at all times.” Id.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that
is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua
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sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff presumably seeks monetary damages1 from CCCF for
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Primarily,
the complaint must be dismissed as the CCCF is not a “state
actor” within the meaning of § 1983. See Crawford v. McMillian,
660 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an
entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer

1

Plaintiff has not stated any requested relief in the complaint.
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v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)). Accordingly, the
claims against CCCF must be dismissed with prejudice.
Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to
dismissal under [§ 1915] should receive leave to amend unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies
leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff’s complaint is barred
by the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's
two-year limitations period for personal injury.2 See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983
action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014).
“Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the
action is based.” Montanez, 773 F.3d at 480 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Plaintiff states the events giving rise to these
claims occurred from January 1, 1999 to January 14, 2000; 2002

2

“Although the running of the statute of limitations is
ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious
from the face of the complaint and no development of the record
is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua
sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim.” Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111–12
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
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to 2003, and 2006 to 2007. The allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement at CCCF and the circumstances of the
allegedly unlawful search would have been immediately apparent
to Plaintiff at the time of detention and at the time the search
occurred; therefore, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s
claims expired, at the latest, in 2002, 2005, and 2009,
respectively. As there are no grounds for equitable tolling of
the statute of limitations,3 the complaint will be dismissed with
prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 112 (3d
Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal with prejudice due
to expiration of statute of limitations).
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the complaint is dismissed with

prejudice for failure to state a claim. An appropriate order
follows.

February 16, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

3

Equitable tolling “is only appropriate ‘(1) where the defendant
has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's
cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary
way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3)
where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights
mistakenly in the wrong forum.’” Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App’x
162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).
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