THOMAS v. CAMDEN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al

Filing 4

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/24/2017. (tf, n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BRYANT THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
v.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-07151 (JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; CAMDEN COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; DAVID
OWENS; CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF
CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS,

OPINION

Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Bryant Thomas, Plaintiff Pro Se
1413 Park Boulevard
Camden, NJ 08104
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Bryant Thomas seeks to bring a civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden County
Department of Corrections (“CCDOC”), the Camden County
Correctional Facility (“CCCF”), Warden David Owens (“Warden”),
and the Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders
(“Freeholders”). Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.

Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis.
3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
5.

Plaintiff alleges he experienced unconditional

conditions of confinement while detained at the CCCF in
September 1992, March 1993, August 2001, July 2006, July 2008,
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October 2010, May 2015, April 2016, and October 2016.

Complaint

§ III. The fact section of the complaint states: “On the above
stated dates I was placed in crowded cells that had harse
conditions where I sleep on the floor near toilet and had very
unsanitary conditions for anyone in the cell that was made to
hold two inmates.” Id. Even accepting the statement as true for
screening purposes only, there is not enough factual support for
the Court to infer a constitutional violation has occurred.
6.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
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conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the dates and length of
the confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, etc.
7.

Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts

to support an inference that the named Defendants are personally
liable for the alleged constitutional violations.
8.

First, the CCDOC is not independently subject to suit

because it is not a separate legal entity from Camden County.
See Bermudez v. Essex Cty. D.O.C., No. 12-6035, 2013 WL 1405263,
at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2013) (citing cases). Plaintiff has not
pled sufficient facts to impose liability on Camden County.
9.

“There is no respondeat superior theory of municipal

liability, so a city may not be held vicariously liable under
§ 1983 for the actions of its agents. Rather, a municipality may
be held liable only if its policy or custom is the ‘moving
force’ behind a constitutional violation.” Sanford v. Stiles,
456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). See also Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992) (“The city
is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the constitutional
torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly
said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.”).

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10.

Plaintiff must plead facts showing that the relevant

Camden County policy-makers are “responsible for either the
affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a wellsettled custom.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d
Cir. 1990).1 In other words, Plaintiff must set forth facts
supporting an inference that Camden County itself was the
“moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 689.
11.

Likewise, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts

regarding the personal liability of the Freeholders. As the
governing body of Camden County, the Freeholders also cannot be
held liable under § 1983 solely on a theory of respondeat
superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. Plaintiff therefore must
meet the same pleading standard regarding the Freeholder’s
liability as must be met for Camden County, i.e., he must set
forth facts supporting an inference that the Freeholders
themselves were the “moving force” behind the alleged
constitutional violations. Monell, 436 U.S. at 689. Plaintiff

1

“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.
Government custom can be demonstrated by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually
to constitute law.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 118 (3d
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
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has not set forth such facts with respect to either Camden
County or the Freeholders.
12.

Similarly, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to

support an inference that the Warden was personally involved in
either the creation of, or failure to address, the conditions of
his confinement. State actors are liable only for their own
unconstitutional conduct and may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of
respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
(2009); Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012).
13.

In addition, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from

CCCF for the allegedly unconstitutional conditions of his
confinement. As the CCCF is not a “state actor” within the
meaning of § 1983, the claims against it must be dismissed with
prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992
(3d Cir. 1973)).
14.

As Plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to

address the deficiencies noted by the Court,2 the Court shall

2

To the extent the complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered during his confinements in September 1992,
March 1993, August 2001, July 2006, July 2008, and October 2010,
those claims are barred by the statute of limitations and must
be dismissed with prejudice. Claims brought under § 1983 are
governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period for
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grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of
the date of this order.
15.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself.3 Id.
16.

For the reasons stated above, the complaint is

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The

personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985);
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010).
“Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff
knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is
based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480
(3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement at CCCF would have been immediately apparent to
Plaintiff at the time of his detention; therefore, the statute
of limitations for these claims expired in 1994, 1995, 2003,
2008, 2010, and 2012, respectively. In the event Plaintiff
elects to file an amended complaint, he should focus on the
facts of his 2015 and 2016 confinements.
3 The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an
amended complaint within the time allotted by the Court.
17.

An appropriate order follows.

February 24, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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