RICHARDSON v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 8/22/2017. (dmr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ALY J. RICHARDSON,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,
Civil Action
No. 16-cv-07158 (JBS-AMD)
OPINION
Defendant.
APPEARANCES
Aly J. Richardson, Plaintiff Pro Se
350 Blackwood/ Clementon Road
Apartment 1408
Pine Hill, NJ 08021
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
1.
Plaintiff Aly J. Richardson seeks to bring a civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket
Entry 1.
2.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review
complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (1)
dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against
CCCF; and (2) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for
failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
Claims Against CCCF: Dismissed With Prejudice
4.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 19831 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) a person deprived him of a federal
right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted
under color of state or territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
5.
Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983,
“[t]he term ‘persons’ includes local and state officers acting
under color of state law.” Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99
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Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).2 To
say that a person was “acting under color of state law” means
that the defendant in a § 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation
omitted). Generally, then, “a public employee acts under color
of state law while acting in his official capacity or while
exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id.
at 50.
6.
Because the Complaint has not sufficiently alleged
that a “person” deprived Plaintiff of a federal right, the
Complaint does not meet the standards necessary to set forth a
prima facie case under § 1983. In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages from CCCF for allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. The CCCF, however, is not a “person”
within the meaning of § 1983; therefore, the claims against it
must be dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660
F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v.
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“Person” is not strictly limited to individuals who are state
and local government employees, however. For example,
municipalities and other local government units, such as
counties, also are considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.
See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
690-91 (1978).
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Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern
State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989)
(correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983). Given
that the claims against the CCCF must be dismissed with
prejudice, the claims may not proceed and Plaintiff may not name
the CCCF as a defendant.
7.
Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to name a
person or persons who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
Complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
Conditions Of Confinement Claims:
Dismissed Without Prejudice
8.
Second, for the reasons set forth below, the Court
will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to
state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
9.
The present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts
to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review
under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff’s
Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not
enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional
violation has occurred.
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10.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim3, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
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11.
A complaint must plead sufficient facts to support a
reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has
occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
12.
However, with respect to the alleged facts giving rise
to Plaintiff’s claims, the present Complaint states in its
entirety: “I was forced to sleep on the floor of my cell and
subject to urine from the insanitary [sic] toilet water
splashing on me while others used toilet while I slept on the
floor. For more than 12 years. I even was assaulted by a Camden
County Corr. Officer but this has occurred over ten times,
between 2002 and 2016.” Complaint § III(C).
13.
Plaintiff states this occurred “Oct. 2015 to Feb.
2016.” Id. § III(B).
14.
Plaintiff states that these events caused him to catch
“various colds, infections and misdiagnosis by med. staff due to
overcrowding conditions.” Id. § III(C), § IV.
15.
With respect to requested relief, Plaintiff seeks
“compensatory, punitive and violations of human and civil
rights.” Id. § V.
16.
Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a
civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed
because the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual
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support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation
has occurred.
17.
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily
in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
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any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.
18.
Further, this Court construes Plaintiff’s contentions
regarding being “assaulted by a Camden County Correctional
Officer” as claims of excessive force under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The only specific conduct of which Plaintiff
complains is “assaulted by a Camden County Corr. Officer, but
they has occurred over ten times, between 2002 and 2016” (id. §
III(C)), but the circumstances surrounding the incident(s) are
left to speculation.
19.
“Claims of excessive force at the time an individual
is a pretrial detainee are evaluated based on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” See Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015).
20.
To establish a claim for use of excessive force in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
a plaintiff must show that the force used was applied
“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” and not “in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Baez v.
Lancaster County, 487 F. App’x 30, 32 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). A court must
examine, subjectively, “whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley
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v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). In making this inquiry
whether force was used in “good faith” or “maliciously and
sadistically,” courts have highlighted several factors to
consider, including: (1) “the need for the application of the
force;” (2) “the relationship between the need and the amount of
force that was used;” (3) “the extent of the injury inflicted;”
(4) “the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and
inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the
basis of facts known to them;” and (5) “any efforts made to
temper the severity of a forceful response.” Brooks v. Kyler,
204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000). “Not all use of force is
‘excessive’ and will rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.” Adegbuji, 2005 WL 3536073, at *6. See, e.g.,
Townsend v. Frame, 587 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (complaint
alleging that prison guard struck inmate in the face was
insufficient to state federal civil rights cause of action).
“[I]t is well-established that isolated torts do not become
constitutional violations solely because the complaining party
is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
21.
Here, Plaintiff’s contentions are not sufficient to
allege a claim for unconstitutional use of excessive force, and
therefore, will be dismissed.
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22.
Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint for the
conditions of confinement claim to particularly identify adverse
conditions that were caused by specific state actors, that
caused Plaintiff to endure genuine privations and hardship over
an extended period of time, and that were excessive in relation
to their purposes. Further, Plaintiff may be able to amend the
complaint by providing more factual account of his excessive
force claim. To that end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave
to amend the Complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.4
23.
Plaintiff is further advised that any amended
complaint must plead specific facts regarding the conditions of
confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint,
Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable
inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order
to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.5
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The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
5 To the extent the Complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered prior to October 13, 2014, those claims
are barred by the statute of limitations. Claims brought under §
1983 are governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period
for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276
(1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the
action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d
472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly unconstitutional
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24.
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint
is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
25.
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a)
dismissed with prejudice as to the CCCF; and (b) dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
26.
An appropriate order follows.
August 22, 2017
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge
conditions of confinement would have been immediately apparent
to Plaintiff; therefore, the statute of limitations on some of
Plaintiff’s claims expired two years after release from
incarceration. In the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended
complaint, it should be limited to confinements in which
Plaintiff was released after October 13, 2014.
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