JIMENEZ v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 2/28/2017. (TH, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CARLOS JIMENEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-07190 (JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Carlos Jimenez, Plaintiff Pro Se
1600 Laurel Rd., Apt. H-122
Lindenwold, NJ 08021
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Carlos Jimenez seeks to bring a civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden County
Jail (“CCJ”). Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.

Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis.

3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
5.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCJ for

allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. As the CCJ
is not a “state actor” within the meaning of § 1983, the claims
against it must be dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g., Grabow
v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39
(D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a “person” under
§ 1983).

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6.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the complaint to name

state actors who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
7.

Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint must

plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a
constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this
Court’s review under § 1915. Plaintiff alleges that he was
confined at the CCJ from June 1998 through 2014 “off and on.”
Complaint § III. The fact section of the complaint states: “I
was forced on the floor of a two man cell with three other
inmates, while on the floor I hit my head, neck, back and legs
on the underside of the table, chair, toilet and bunk.” Id.
Plaintiff further states, “They refused to treat me do [sic] to
policy, I was told.” Id. § IV. Even accepting these statements
as true for screening purposes only, there is not enough factual
support for the Court to infer a constitutional violation has
occurred.
8.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
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488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the dates and length of
the confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, etc.
9.

In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to

allege a claim based on a violation of his right to adequate
medical care, there are not enough facts to support an inference
that Plaintiff’s rights were violated in this regard. In order
to set forth a cognizable claim for a violation of his right to
adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious
medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials
that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. See
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden
4

Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff’s allegation that “they refused to treat me [due] to
policy” is insufficient to meet the pleading standard in the
absence of additional facts. If he wishes to pursue this claim,
Plaintiff should provide additional facts supporting both of the
requirements in his amended complaint.
10.

As Plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to

address the deficiencies noted by the Court,1 the Court shall
grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of
the date of this order.
11.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the

1

To the extent the complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered during confinements ending prior to
October 13, 2014, those claims are barred by the statute of
limitations. Claims brought under § 1983 are governed by New
Jersey's two-year limitations period for personal injury. See
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State
Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under federal law, a
cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have
known of the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez v.
Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff has alleged that he encountered unconstitutional
conditions of confinement from June 1998 through 2014 “off and
on.” Complaint § III. The allegedly unconstitutional conditions
of confinement at CCJ would have been immediately apparent to
Plaintiff at the time of his detentions; therefore, the statute
of limitations for some of Plaintiff’s claims may have expired
as early as 2000. In the event Plaintiff elects to file an
amended complaint, he should focus on facts regarding periods of
confinement on or subsequent to October 13, 2014, if any.
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amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself.2 Id.
12.

For the reasons stated above, the complaint is

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The
Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an
amended complaint within the time allotted by the Court.
13.

An appropriate order follows.

February 28, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

2

The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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