COLES v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 6/16/17. (jbk, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CARNEL R. COLES,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
No. 16-cv-07464 (JBS-AMD)
Carnel R. Coles, Plaintiff Pro Se
430 West Browning Road, Apt. H-3
Bellmawr, NJ 08031
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Carnel R. Coles seeks to bring a civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket
Entry 1. The Court now vacates its Opinion and Order filed and
entered June 6, 2017 in this matter (Docket Entries 5 and 6),
and instructs the Clerk to file and enter this Amended Opinion
and accompanying Amended Order on the docket. Based on
Plaintiff’s affidavit of indigency, the Court will grant
Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review
complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (1)
dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against
CCCF; and (2) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for
failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
Claims Against CCCF: Dismissed With Prejudice
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 19831 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) a person deprived him of a federal
right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted
under color of state or territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983,
“[t]he term ‘persons’ includes local and state officers acting
under color of state law.” Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).2 To
say that a person was “acting under color of state law” means
that the defendant in a § 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation
omitted). Generally, then, “a public employee acts under color
of state law while acting in his official capacity or while
exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id.
Because the Complaint has not sufficiently alleged
that a “person” deprived Plaintiff of a federal right, the
Complaint does not meet the standards necessary to set forth a
prima facie case under § 1983. In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages from CCCF for allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. The CCCF, however, is not a “person”
within the meaning of § 1983; therefore, the claims against it
“Person” is not strictly limited to individuals who are state
and local government employees, however. For example,
municipalities and other local government units, such as
counties, also are considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.
See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
must be dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660
F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v.
Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern
State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989)
(correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983). Given
that the claims against the CCCF must be dismissed with
prejudice, the claims may not proceed and Plaintiff may not name
the CCCF as a defendant.
Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to name a
person or persons who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
Complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
Conditions Of Confinement Claims -- Overcrowding:
Dismissed Without Prejudice
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
The present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts
to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review
under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff’s
Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not
enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional
violation has occurred.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim3, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
A complaint must plead sufficient facts to support a
reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has
occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
However, with respect to the alleged facts giving rise
to Plaintiff’s claims, the Complaint states: “[A]n overcrowded
facility . . . at the Camden County Correctional Facility . . .
led to an inhumane environment. To emphasize[,] there were four
inmates to one cell . . . When sleeping at night I slept on the
floor with no boat near the toilet because there was nowhere
else to sleep.” Complaint § III(C).
Plaintiff states that these events occurred “January
23, 2014 – June 6, 2016.” Id. § III(B).
Plaintiff does not identify or otherwise describe any
injuries sustained from these events. Id. § IV (blank).
Plaintiff does not identify or otherwise describe any
requested relied. Id. § V (blank).
Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a
civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed
because the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual
support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily
in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to
particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end,
the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint
within 30 days of the date of this order.4
Plaintiff is further advised that any amended
complaint must plead specific facts regarding the conditions of
confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint,
Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable
inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order
to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.5
The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
5 To the extent the Complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered prior to October 18, 2014, those claims
are barred by the statute of limitations. Claims brought under §
1983 are governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period
for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276
(1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the
action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d
472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement would have been immediately apparent
to Plaintiff; therefore, the statute of limitations on some of
Plaintiff’s claims expired two years after release from
incarceration. In the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended
complaint, it should be limited to confinements for which
Plaintiff was released after October 18, 2014.
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint
is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
Conditions Of Confinement Claims -- Jail Conditions:
Dismissed Without Prejudice
In addition to overcrowding, Plaintiff complains of
several other alleged jail conditions during his confinement at
CCCF: (a) “rodents”; (b) “sewer water flooding the floor as I
slep[t]”; and (c) “insect in my food” (the foregoing three
conditions of confinement collectively referred to hereinafter
as “Jail Conditions”). Complaint § III(C). For the reasons set
forth below, all such claims shall be dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. §
A failure of prison officials to provide minimally
civil conditions of confinement to pre-trial detainees violates
their right not to be punished without due process of law.
Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1997);
Monmouth Cnty., 834 F.2d at 345-46, n. 31; Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835
(1994).6 Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, prison officials must satisfy “basic human needs -e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable
safety.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). See also
Mora v. Camden Cnty., No. 09-4183, 2010 WL 2560680, at *8
(D.N.J. June 21, 2010) (applying Helling to pretrial detainee).
However, “a detainee seeking to show unconstitutional conditions
of confinement must clear a ‘high bar’ by demonstrating ‘extreme
deprivations.’” Cartegena v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, No.
12-4409, 2012 WL 5199217, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2012) (citing
Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004)).
When a pretrial detainee complains about the
conditions of his confinement, courts are to consider, in
accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment, whether the conditions
“[T]he Due Process rights of a pre-trial detainee are at least
as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a
convicted prisoner,” Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 173, and so the
Eighth Amendment sets the floor for the standard applicable to
pre-trial detainees’ claims. Bell, 441 U.S. at 544.
“amount to punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt in
accordance with law.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d
Cir. 2005) (“Hubbard I”). In making such a determination, courts
consider: (a) whether any legitimate purposes are served by the
conditions at issue, and (b) whether those conditions are
rationally related to those purposes. Hubbard II, 538 F.3d at
232 (quoting Union Cnty. Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984,
992 (3d Cir. 1983)). Courts must inquire as to whether the
conditions “‘cause [detainees] to endure [such] genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that
the adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the
purposes assigned to them.’” Hubbard I, 399 F.3d at 159-60
The objective component of unconstitutional punishment
analysis examines whether “the deprivation [was] sufficiently
serious” and the subjective component asks whether “the
officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind[.]”
Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing
Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39, n.20), cert. denied, Phelps v.
Stevenson, 552 U.S. 1180 (2008).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations about the Jail
Conditions do not surmount this constitutional analysis.
Food Claim: Dismissed Without Prejudice
Plaintiff alleges that there were “insect[s] in my
food” during his confinement at CCCF (hereinafter referred to as
“Food Claim”). Complaint § III(C).
The general allegations of Plaintiff’s Food Claim are
insufficient to satisfy either the objective or subjective
components to a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process cause of
The constitutionally adequate diet “must provide
adequate nutrition, but corrections officials may not be held
liable [as to detainee claims regarding food] unless the
[plaintiff] shows both an objective component (that the
deprivation was sufficiently serious) and a subjective component
(that the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind).” Duran v. Merline, 923 F. Supp.2d 702, 719-20 (D.N.J.
2013) (citing Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68 (quoting Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (“Unconstitutional punishment
typically includes both objective and subjective components”)).
Objectively, “[w]hether the deprivation of food falls
below this [constitutional] threshold depends on the amount and
duration of the deprivation.” Duran, 923 F. Supp.2d at 720
(citing Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999)).
“Under the Eighth Amendment, which provides a floor for the
rights of pretrial detainees, see Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr.
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003), inmates must be
served ‘nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and served
under conditions which do not present an immediate danger’ to
their health and well-being.” Duran, 923 F. Supp.2d at 720
(citing Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983)
(quoting Ramons v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 571 (10th Cir. 1980));
Mora, 2010 WL 2560680, at *8).
Plaintiff’s Food Claim has not satisfied this
objective requirement. “[I]solated instances of contaminated or
spoiled food, while certainly unpleasant, are not
unconstitutional.” Duran, 923 F. Supp.2d at 720 (citing Nickles
v. Taylor, Nos. 09-313, 09-557, 09-952, 2010 WL 1949447, at *5
(D.N.J. May 14, 2010) (“A single or occasional incident
involving spoiled food is insufficient to show that Plaintiff
has been denied life's necessities”). Here, the Complaint does
not contend that there were frequently “insect[s] in my food”
(Complaint § III(C)), that a significant portion of Plaintiff’s
diet consisted of food with insects, or that such fare caused
more than temporary discomfort or displeasure. Complaint §
III(C). Without any facts that are necessary to demonstrate
substantial nutritional deprivation, such as how frequently
“insect[s]” (Complaint § III(C)) were in Plaintiff’s food,
whether there were any food alternatives available to Plaintiff
during incarceration that did not have insects in them, or
whether Plaintiff sustained any harm as a result of the supposed
insects in his food, this Court cannot find that Plaintiff has
stated a cognizable constitutional claim. (The foregoing
examples are merely illustrative but not exhaustive or
exclusive.) That is, without additional facts such as these,
Plaintiff has not met the objective prong of the constitutional
analysis. Occasional incidents during incarceration involving
food are insufficient to show that Plaintiff has been denied
Additionally, Plaintiff has not alleged that CCCF
officials possessed the requisite culpability to satisfy the
subjective component of the Fourteenth Amendment analysis. As
noted above, Plaintiff must establish that CCCF officials acted
with “deliberate indifference” to his needs, meaning that they
were subjectively aware of the alleged food conditions with
insects and failed to reasonably respond to them. Duran, 923 F.
Supp.2d at 721 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829 and Mora, 2010 WL
2560680, at *9). The test for deliberate indifference is
“subjective recklessness” as that concept is understood in
criminal law. Duran, 923 F. Supp.2d at 721 (citing Farmer, 511
U.S. at 839-40). Plaintiff has not offered any facts from which
this Court can reasonably infer deliberate indifference by
anyone at CCCF with respect to food conditions.
Given that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate facts
suggesting (a) that the food served to him at CCCF presented an
objectively serious risk of nutritional deficiency (regardless
of Plaintiff’s dislike or displeasure) and (b) that prison
officials responsible for such knew of that risk and were
deliberately indifferent to it, the Complaint fails to state a
claim for which relief may be granted. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Food Claim shall be dismissed without prejudice, with leave to
file an amended complaint addressing its deficiencies, within 30
days after the date this Opinion and Order are entered on the
docket, if Plaintiff elects to pursue this claim of deliberate
indifference to a serious nutritional deprivation.
Rodent Claim: Dismissed Without Prejudice
Plaintiff alleges that “there were rodents” during his
time of incarceration at CCCF (hereinafter referred to as
“Rodent Claim”). Complaint § III(C).
This general, non-specific allegation is insufficient
to satisfy either the objective or subjective components of
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.
As to the objective prong of the test, Plaintiff does
not offer any facts that are necessary to show that he was
subjected to genuine privation and hardship over an extended
period of time. While unsanitary living conditions may give rise
to a conditions of confinement claim, the Complaint here
expresses nothing but Plaintiff's displeasure with less than
perfect jail conditions (“there were rodents” (Complaint §
III(C)). Plaintiff does not offer any facts that are necessary
to demonstrate that the supposed rodent condition potentially
jeopardized his health or in fact caused any injuries. The
Complaint fails to demonstrate that his housing conditions were
imposed as “punishment.”
Moreover, courts have, in fact, “routinely recognized
that ‘[k]eeping vermin under control in jails, prisons and other
large institutions is a monumental task, and that failure to do
so, without any suggestion that it reflects deliberate and
reckless conduct in the criminal law sense, is not a
constitutional violation.” See, e.g., Holloway v. Cappelli, No.
13-3378, 2014 WL 2861210, at *5 (D.N.J. June 24, 2014) (citing
Chavis v. Fairman, 51 F.3d 275, *4 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal
As to the subjective prong, Plaintiff has failed to
allege facts showing, or from which this Court could infer, that
any defendants were aware of, and disregarded, a substantial
risk to Plaintiff’s health and safety from the purported rodent
situation. The Complaint is void of facts showing, by way of
example, that any defendants either ignored the alleged rodents
at CCCF or denied Plaintiff medical treatment for any health
injuries arising from the supposed vermin. Complaint § III(C).
As such, Plaintiff’s displeasure with the purported rodent
situation is not actionable; there are no facts indicating any
defendants acted with a culpable state of mind.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Rodent Claim will be
dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend the complaint,
within 30 days after the date this Opinion and Order are entered
on the docket, to meet its deficiencies as noted herein, if
Plaintiff elects to pursue this claim of deliberate indifference
to a substantial risk to Plaintiff’s health and safety from the
purported rodent situation.
Plumbing Claim: Dismissed Without Prejudice
Plaintiff also complains that there was “sewer water
flooding the floor as I slep[t]” (hereinafter referred to as
“Plumbing Claim”). Complaint § III(C).
Denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities,” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, which would include basic
sanitary conditions, can be sufficient to state an actionable
constitutional deprivation. However, the Complaint fails to set
forth sufficient factual matter to show that the Plumbing Claim
is facially plausible.
For example, the Complaint is silent regarding: the
duration and frequency of the sewer water situation; whether
Plaintiff sustained any injury from it; the nature of the water
at issue (e.g., from sink pipes or toilet pipes); the
approximate depth and volume of water that “flood[ed]”
(Complaint § III(C)) Plaintiff’s cell on each occasion that such
incidents occurred; and the reason for the purported “flooding”
(Complaint § III(C)) of Plaintiff’s cell (e.g., plumbing
maintenance schedule, plumbing malfunction, etc.) (see Passmore
v. Ianello, 528 F. App’x 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[C]ourts will
generally not interfere with prison administrative matters and
will afford significant deference to judgments of prison
officials regarding prison regulation and administration. See,
e.g., Jones v. N. Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433
U.S. 119, 126 (1977) (‘Because the realities of running a penal
institution are complex and difficult, we have also recognized
the wide-ranging deference to be accorded the decisions of
Furthermore, construing the Complaint - without
deciding – to suggest that Plaintiff’s Plumbing Claim relates in
some manner to sanitary conditions, such “flooding” (Complaint §
III(C)) condition “[may] no doubt [have been] unpleasant, [but]
it does not pose an obvious health risk and consequently does
not deprive [Plaintiff] the minimal civilized measures of life’s
necessities.” Carson v. Main, No. 14-cv-7454, 2015 WL 18500193,
at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim where neighboring cells shared
plumbing pipes and required residents to flush their own toilet
to dispose of the neighboring cell’s waste). “There is, of
course, a de minimus level of imposition with which the
Constitution is not concerned.” Bell, 441 U.S. 539 n. 21.
Plaintiff has failed to present facts demonstrating that the
sewer water condition here passed this threshold. He does not
contend that the “flooding” (Complaint § III(C)) was intended as
punishment, or that he suffered adversely from it. The Complaint
has not alleged that Plaintiff developed physical injuries as a
result of the condition.
Viewing the facts and the totality of the
circumstances in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the
Complaint fails to set forth sufficient factual matter to show
that the Plumbing Claim is facially plausible. Fowler, 578 F.3d
at 210. Since Plaintiff’s claim asserting “sewer water flooding
the floor” (Complaint § III(C)) does not offer facts that are
necessary to show that he was subjected to a genuine privation
for an extended period, such allegations fail to state a claim
and will be dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend.
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a)
dismissed with prejudice as to the CCCF; and (b) dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
An appropriate order follows.
June 16, 2017
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?