ITIOWE v. DANIEL et al

Filing 46

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 8/8/2018. (dmr)

[Dkt. No. 35]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

CHRISTIANA ITIOWE,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 16-7777(RMB/KMW)
v.
MAYOR TEEFY DANIEL, et al.

OPINION

Defendants.

BUMB, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon a motion to dismiss
Plaintiff Christiana Itiowe’s (the “Plaintiff”) Second Amended
Complaint filed by defendants the City of Williamstown, New
Jersey, Monroe Township Mayor Daniel Teefy (improperly pled as
Teefy Daniel), Municipal Court Judge Nicholas Lacovara;
Municipal Prosecutor Charles Fiore; John McKeown, Monroe
Township Police Chief; the Monroe Township Police Department and
its Internal Affairs Unit; and Officer Roy Pierson
(collectively, the “Defendants”). [Dkt. No. 35]. Defendants seek
to dismiss all counts of pro se plaintiff Christiana Itiowe’s
(the “Plaintiff”) Second Amended Complaint in which Plaintiff
alleges (1) violations of the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, for

which she seeks redress pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1983; (2)
violation of 42 U.S.C. §2000a-2; 1 (3) violations of N.J. Stat.
10:5-1 and 10:1-2; 2 (4) and violations of several New Jersey

1

42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 provides that “No person shall (a)
withhold, deny, or attempt to withhold or deny, or deprive or
attempt to deprive any person of any right or privilege secured
by section 2000a or 2000a-1 of this title . . . .” Section 2000a
provides, in part, that “[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation . . . without discrimination or segregation
on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000a(a). Section 2000a-1 provides that “[a]ll persons
shall be entitled to be free, at any establishment or place,
from discrimination or segregation of any kind on the ground of
race, color, religion, or national origin, if such
discrimination or segregation is or purports to be required by
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of a
State or any agency or political subdivision thereof.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a-1. Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that any
Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of any
protected characteristic under any of these statutory
provisions. Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed.
2 Plaintiff claims that Defendants—without specifying which
Defendant—violated NJSA 10:1-2 and 10:5-1. NJSA 10:1-2 provides
that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of [New Jersey]
shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public
accommodation, resort or amusement . . . .” None of the
allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint so much as suggests that
any Defendant denied Plaintiff such “equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities and privileges.” This claim will
therefore be dismissed. NJSA 10:5-1 is the first section of the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”). This law
prohibits discrimination based on “race, creed, color, national
origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual
orientation, familial status, disability, nationality, sex,
gender identity or expression or source of lawful income used
for rental or mortgage payments.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-4.
Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that any of the
Defendants discriminated against her based on any of these
protected categories, or at all. Plaintiff’s claims under NJLAD
are also dismissed.
2

criminal statutes. 3 For the reasons set forth below, the
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED in part, and
DENIED, in part.
I.

Factual Background

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must
liberally construe her Complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)
(“[H]owever inartfully pleaded,” the “allegations of a pro se
complaint [are held] to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”). As with Plaintiff’s Complaint
and Amended Complaint, even construing Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint liberally, it is difficult to comprehend. 4 The
facts below are those that the Court could make out from
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, and are accepted as true
for the purposes of this review.
Plaintiff alleges that on March 13, 2016, while in line at
the Walmart store located at 1840 Black Horse Pike,
Williamstown, New Jersey, a Walmart employee and another Walmart
customer behaved inappropriately, in a “racist like” manner

3

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated NJSA 2C:33-4,
NJSA 2C:16-1, NJSA 2C:5-2, and NJSA 2C:13-3. These claims were
raised by Plaintiff in her Amended Complaint and the Court
dismissed them with prejudice. [See Dkt. No. 28].
4 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is nearly identical to her
previous pleadings. [See Dkt. Nos. 1, 13].
3

towards her, leading to a verbal altercation. (Second Am. Compl.
at 11, ¶ 1). As a result of this altercation, a Walmart employee
called the police. (Id. at 11, ¶ 2). Monroe Township Police
Officer Roy Pierson was dispatched to the store and, ultimately,
Plaintiff was asked to leave. (Id. at 11, ¶ 2-3).
On her way out of the store, Plaintiff alleges, she
realized she had forgotten the bag containing the items she
purchased. (Id. at 11, ¶ 4-5). Plaintiff claims that upon
realizing this, she turned back toward the registers, at which
time Officer Pierson “made a hand gesture” and “acted like . . .
[he] was going to grab” her. (Id.) Because of “psychological
damage” and a fear of police, Plaintiff responded to this
gesture by asking Officer Pierson — in profane language — not to
touch her. (Id. at 12, ¶ 1). At that point, Plaintiff alleges
that Officer Pierson “went crazy,” and “started attacking” her
and “threatening” to arrest her. (Id.)

During this altercation,

Plaintiff alleges that Officer Pierson picked her up and bodyslammed her to the ground head first, which caused Plaintiff to
lose two of her teeth. (Id. at 12, ¶ 2-3). Officer Pierson then
arrested Plaintiff.
After her arrest, Plaintiff alleges that several of the
Defendants participated in a vague conspiracy against her by,
among other things, failing to read her her Miranda rights and
“chang[ing] the stories [sic]” and making false reports about
4

what happened outside the Walmart. (Id. at 12, ¶ 3). She
alleges, without any factual support, that the Monroe Township
Police Department filed malicious and frivolous criminal
complaints against her, (Id.); Municipal Prosecutor Fiore
maliciously prosecuted her, (Id.); and that Municipal Court
Judge Lacovara improperly denied motions she filed, refused to
dismiss the criminal case against her, and threatened her with
contempt of court (Id. at 12, ¶ 3; 13 ¶ 1-3). It is unclear what
Mayor Daniel Teefy and Chief John McKeown are alleged to have
done.
II.

Procedural Background

Plaintiff commenced this action on October 24, 2016,
alleging violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, along with several
New Jersey statutory violations and false imprisonment and false
arrest claims against the city of Williamstown, New Jersey; its
Mayor Daniel Teefy; Monroe Township Municipal Court Judge
Nicholas Lacovara; Municipal Prosecutor Charles Fiore; Marcella
Carter, Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Police; the
Monroe Township Police Department; and its Internal Affairs
Unit. [Dkt. No. 1]. On December 19, 2016, Defendants moved to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint [Dkt. No. 7]. On December 30,
2016, Plaintiff sought leave to amend her Complaint [Dkt. No.
10], which this Court granted [Dkt. No. 12], and Plaintiff filed
5

an Amended Complaint on February 15, 2017 [Dkt. No. 13].
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contained only one change, adding
Chief John McKeown as a defendant in place of Marcella Carter.
On March 1, 2017, Defendants again moved to dismiss each of
Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) [Dkt.
No. 15]. Plaintiff filed a letter in response to Defendants’
Motion on March 13, 2017 [Dkt. No. 19]. Defendant also filed
letters with the Court on March 20, 2017 [Dkt. No. 21, 22],
April 12, 2017 [Dkt. No. 23], and May 3, 2017 [Dkt. No. 24]
reiterating her incomprehensible arguments. On September 21,
2017, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, without
prejudice, and provided Plaintiff thirty days to file another
amended complaint. [Dkt. No. 28]. The Court ordered that
Plaintiff’s amended pleading should consist of no more than
three pages and should state in numbered paragraphs “the
claim(s) alleged with supporting facts specifically identifying
which individual or entity is accused of which acts.” [Id.] To
the extent Plaintiff needed additional pages to state her claim,
the Court required that she provide a one-page statement with an
explanation. [Id.]
On October 10, 2017, Plaintiff moved for an extension of
time to amend so that she could attempt to retain counsel. [Dkt.
No. 29]. The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion and extended her
deadline for amendment by thirty days. [Dkt. No. 30]. On
6

November 13, 2017, Plaintiff moved to stay the case until she
could retain counsel. [Dkt. No. 31]. The Court declined to stay
the case, but provided Plaintiff with another thirty-day
extension to file her Second Amended Complaint, either pro se or
with the assistance of counsel. [Dkt. No. 32]. On December 20,
2017, Plaintiff—still proceeding pro se—filed her Second Amended
Complaint. 5 [Dkt. No. 34].
The currently pending motion to dismiss was filed on
January 10, 2018. [Dkt. No. 35].
III. Legal Standards
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face’” in order to withstand a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Claims are facially plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged,” and “an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully harmed-me accusation” will not survive a motion to

5

Plaintiff’s amended pleading did not conform to the
requirements set forth in the Court’s September 21, 2017 Order.
[See Dkt. No. 28].
7

dismiss. Id. at 663, 678. “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide
the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
The district court “must accept as true all well-pled
factual allegations as well as all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from them, and construe those allegations in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff” when reviewing a
plaintiff's allegations. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 n. 1 (3d
Cir. 2012). Only the allegations in the complaint, and “matters
of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and
items appearing in the record of the case” are taken into
consideration. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38
F.3d 1380, 1384 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Chester County
Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812
(3d Cir. 1990)).
IV.

Analysis

Plaintiff lists a number of statutes and constitutional
provisions under which she seeks redress. For the most part,
though, the factual averments in the Second Amended Complaint
are unintelligible and it is not at all clear how the Defendants
allegedly violated those statutes and provisions. It appears
that Plaintiff is unhappy with her arrest and the legal process
8

she has received in municipal court, and has brought claims
against anyone she perceives as being involved in that process.
Plaintiff has sued her arresting officer, Roy Pierson. She has
also named as defendants the mayor, police department (and its
internal affairs unit), and police chief of the township in
which she was arrested. Moreover, she has named her prosecutor
and the judge who is presiding over her case. With the exception
of Officer Pierson, however, Plaintiff provides nothing more
than conclusory statements and general allegations of wrongdoing
against each of the Defendants.
To the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint can be construed as
alleging anything, the Court will analyze it under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. 6
A. Section 1983
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (“Section 1983”) for certain violations of constitutional
rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
6

Below, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s claims for false
arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, excessive
force, and violation of Miranda. Plaintiff also lists the First,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution in her
Second Amended Complaint, but it is not apparent to the Court
how any of these amendments are implicated here.
9

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
(emphasis added).
Thus, to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a
plaintiff must, at a minimum, allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and
that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person
acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff has not done this. She broadly alleges
Malicious prosecution/police misconduct/false
arrest/false imprisonment/police brutality/excessive
force, illegal search and seizure, false charges/
fraud, corruption, ethnic and racial profiling,
Miranda right was [sic] violated, discrimination,
retaliation, intimidation and harassment,

(Sec. Am. Compl. at 6, ¶4), and that her
1st amendment right-freedom of speech & right to
petition the government for a redress of grievances,
4th amendment right unreasonable seizure and search,
14th amendment right, 8th amendment rights & 5th
amendment right (right to a fair trial) [were
violated].
(Id. at 5, ¶2-3). Aside from her allegations about Officer
Pierson, however, Plaintiff provides no facts in support of her
claims. Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts

10

in support of her claims for malicious prosecution 7, false
arrest 8, false imprisonment 9, or a Miranda violation 10, and thus

7

“To prove malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding;
(2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor; (3) the
proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the
defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff
suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of
seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Kossler v.
Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Plaintiff’s allegations with regard to malicious prosecution are
entirely conclusory. She has not indicated for what she was
prosecuted, or the status of that prosecution, let alone any
facts that plausibly indicate either a lack of probable cause or
any malice in the decision to prosecute her.
8 “The Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials from
detaining a person in the absence of probable cause.” Manuel v.
City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 913 (2017). “To state a
claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff
must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the
arrest was made without probable cause.” James v. City of
Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). “Probable cause
to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the
arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to
warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been
or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Orsatti v.
New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995). All
Plaintiff has pleaded with regard to her arrest is that she was
in some sort of altercation in Wal-Mart and that Officer Pierson
arrested her in the Wal-Mart parking lot. Plaintiff has not
pleaded any facts indicative of a lack of probable cause for her
arrest. Without this basic information, the Court cannot
determine whether Plaintiff has raised a plausible claim for
false arrest. This claim, therefore, will be dismissed without
prejudice.
9 A false imprisonment claim based on an arrest made without
probable cause is grounded in the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unreasonable seizures. James v. City of Wilkes-Barre,
700 F.3d 675, 683 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Groman v. Township of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995)). The elements of a
false imprisonment claim under Section 1983 are: (1) that a
person was detained, and (2) that the detention was unlawful.
James, 700 F.3d at 682-83 (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
11

cannot state plausible claims for such violations. Accordingly,
with the exception of her claim against Officer Pierson for
excessive force, her constitutional claims, pursued via Section
1983, will be dismissed. 11

389 (2007)). A false imprisonment ends when the victim becomes
held pursuant to legal process, for example when she is
arraigned on charges. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007).
As with her false arrest claim, Plaintiff has not alleged facts
indicating what each defendant did to detain her unlawfully, and
what process she received (or did not receive) but rather
alleges, in a conclusory fashion, that the police and prosecutor
lied. As such, Plaintiff’s claim for false imprisonment will be
dismissed.
10 “Questioning a plaintiff in custody without providing Miranda
warnings is not a basis for a § 1983 claim as long as the
plaintiff's statements are not used against her at trial.”
Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 557-58 (3d Cir. 2003). Plaintiff
has not alleged who (if anyone) interrogated her, what
statements she made, or that any of her own statements were used
against her at trial. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss any
Fifth Amendment claims for failure to state a claim.
11 Moreover, even had Plaintiff alleged viable claims for
constitutional violations under Section 1983 against Lacovara,
such claims would be barred by judicial immunity. See Gallas v.
Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000)(“[J]udges
are immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary damages
arising from their judicial acts”). Likewise, any claims for
monetary damages against Fiore for prosecuting Plaintiff would
be barred by prosecutorial immunity. See Yarris v. Cnty. of
Del., 465 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
held that state prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability
under § 1983 for actions performed in a quasi-judicial role.”)
(citation omitted); Munchinksi v. Solomon, 615 Fed. Appx. 150,
154 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454,
1464 (3d Cir.1992))(“the arrest of a criminal defendant and the
filing of charges are at the fore of the prosecutorial function,
and ‘a prosecutor is absolutely immune when making [the decision
to initiate a prosecution] even where he acts without a good
faith belief that any wrongdoing has occurred.’”). Thus, any
claims against Lacovara and Fiore for monetary damages arising
out of their judicial and prosecutorial acts—seemingly what
Plaintiff is pursuing here—will be dismissed, with prejudice.
12

i.

Excessive Force

Where Officer Pierson is concerned, Plaintiff alleges that,
in arresting her, he violently tossed her to the ground,
breaking her front teeth. (Second Am. Compl. at 7). The Fourth
Amendment permits the use of “reasonable” force. Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). “[E]ach case alleging
excessive force must be evaluated under the totality of the
circumstances.” Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir.
1997). The factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of the amount of force used by an officer include
“the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.” Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 289 (3d Cir.
1999)(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that
she has plead a plausible claim of excessive force against
Officer Pierson. Therefore, to the extent Officer Pierson moved
for the dismissal of this claim, his motion will be denied. 12
ii.

Monell and Supervisory Liability

Among the Defendants named in this suit are the City of
Williamstown, Monroe Township Mayor Daniel Teefy, Monroe

12

The motion to dismiss seeks the dismissal of all claims, but
excessive force is not specifically addressed in the motion.
13

Township Police Chief John McKeown, the Monroe Township Police
Department, and the Monroe Township Police Department’s Internal
Affairs unit. At the outset, the Court notes that the Police
Department and its Internal Affairs unit are not proper
defendants in a Section 1983 action. See Mikhaeil v. Santos, 646
F. App'x 158, 163 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam)(citing Bonenberger
v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1997)(“ Although
local governmental units may constitute “persons” against whom
suit may be lodged under § 1983, a city police department is a
governmental sub-unit that is not distinct from the municipality
of which it is a part.”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1209 (2017);
Simmons v. Roxbury Police Dep't, No. CV 17-2526 (JMV), 2017 WL
5188060, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2017) (citing Surine v. Edgcomb,
479 Fed. Appx. 405, 408 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Will v.
Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)) (“A
specialized police unit is not a “person” that can be sued under
§ 1983.”). The Court will construe Plaintiff’s claims against
these entities as claims against Monroe Township.
Where McKeown and Teefy are concerned, Plaintiff does not
allege that either of these Defendants did anything. It appears
that Plaintiff seeks to hold Teefy and McKeown liable for the
acts of Officer Pierson and other unnamed officers. Respondeat
superior liability, however, is “inapplicable to” Section 1983
suits. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d
14

187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007)(“A defendant in a civil rights action
must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be
liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional
violation which he or she neither participated in nor
approved.”); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.
1988)(“Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of
personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.”).
Plaintiff has pleaded no knowledge or participation in any
alleged wrongdoing on the part of Teefy or McKeown, and her
claims against them will be dismissed.
With regard to Williamstown and Monroe Township, The
Supreme Court's Section 1983 jurisprudence “require[s] a
plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under §
1983 to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused
the plaintiff's injury.” Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). This requires a
plaintiff to show that “through its deliberate conduct, the
municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.”
Id. (emphasis in original). In this case, Plaintiff has not
alleged any policy or custom on the part of Williamstown or
Monroe Township, and her claims against them will be dismissed.

15

V.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, with the exception of her
excessive force claim against Officer Pierson, each of
Plaintiff’s claims will be dismissed. All claims against
Defendants Lacovara and Fiore will be dismissed, with prejudice.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims under 28 U.S.C § 2000b-2, the
NJLAD, and any criminal statutes will be dismissed, with
prejudice. Plaintiff’s claims of false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution will be dismissed
without prejudice to the extent they are raised against Officer
Pierson. 13 All other claims will be dismissed, with prejudice.
An Order consistent with the Opinion will be entered on the
docket on this date.

13

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that before a
Plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 action may “recover damages
for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or
for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid,” she must first “prove that
the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus[.]” 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); see also Bronowicz v.
Allegheny Cty., 804 F.3d 338, 346 (3d Cir. 2015) (“‘[A] prior
criminal case must have been disposed of in a way that indicates
the innocence of the accused in order to satisfy the favorable
termination element.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting
Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2009))). The
status of Plaintiff’s prosecution is not clear to the Court at
this juncture. The Court notes, however, that if she has been
convicted, Heck would likely operate as a bar to any false
arrest or imprisonment claims.
16

_s/_Renee Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

DATED: August 8, 2018

17