CAMPBELL v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL
Filing
6
OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 4/23/18. (jbk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ALLEGRA CAMPBELL,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 16-cv-8072(JBS-AMD)
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,
OPINION
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Allegra Campbell, Plaintiff Pro Se
7936 Montgomery Avenue
Elkins Park, PA 19027
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
1.
Plaintiff Allegra Campbell seeks to bring a civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Camden
County Jail (“CCJ”) for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. (Complaint, Docket Entry 1.)
2.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
II. BACKGROUND
3.
The following factual allegations are taken from the
Complaint and are accepted for purposes of this screening only.
The Court has made no findings as to the truth or merits of any
of Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint.
4.
Plaintiff alleges she endured unconstitutional
conditions of confinement in CCJ due to an overcrowded and
unsanitary facility where she was denied medical care.
(Complaint § III(C) (“ . . . I slept on the floor. They did not
give me any medical attention when I would ask . . . They also
had black mold along windows, walls & showers”).)
5.
Plaintiff alleges that these events occurred during
“February 27, 2015 to March 2, 2015.” (Id. § III(B).)
6.
Plaintiff alleges that she suffers ongoing left-hand
mobility and pain issues from a break that occurred and was
casted prior to her incarceration but did not heal properly
during or after her detainment at CCJ. (Id. § IV.)
7.
Plaintiff seeks $25,000 in relief. (Id. § V.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
8.
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review
complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
2
9.
To survive sua sponte screening,1 the Complaint must
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014).
While pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se
litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints
to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d
239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
A.
Claims Against CCJ: Dismissed With Prejudice
10.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 19832 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional
1
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)).
2 Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
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rights. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege: (a) the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (b) that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
11.
CCJ, who is the Complaint’s named defendant, is not a
“person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Michigan
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Crawford v.
McMillian, 660 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison
is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”);
Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–
39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a “person” under
§ 1983).
12.
Given that CCJ is not a “person” for § 1983 purposes,
the Complaint’s claims against CCJ must be dismissed with
prejudice.
B.
Conditions Of Confinement Claims
1. Overcrowding Claim: Dismissed Without Prejudice
13.
The Complaint states: “My first night I slept on the
floor.” (Complaint § III(C) (referred to as Plaintiff’s
“Overcrowding Claim”).)
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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14.
The Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to
support a reasonable inference that a constitutional violation
from overcrowding has occurred in order to survive this Court’s
review under § 1915.
15.
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily
in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Hubbard II”) (noting due process
analysis requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them”) (citing Union Cnty. Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d
984, 992 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 542)).
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16.
Here, the Complaint’s cursory contention of “[m]y
first night I slept on the floor” (Complaint § III(C)) does not
meet the pleading requirements to state a plausible cause of
action for unconstitutional overcrowding. The Overcrowding Claim
is therefore dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
2. Inadequate Medical Care Claim: Dismissed Without
Prejudice
17.
Plaintiff claims that she “was brought to jail with a
broken wrist, thumb, and hand and was told by the doctor at the
hospital that I was to keep the sling on in order for my injury
to heal properly . . . They wouldn’t give me [medical attention]
until after I was processed on Saturday. They made me take my
sling off once I was brought to jail. They saw I had a cast on
yet still put me in general population’s ‘7th Day’ . . . They did
not give me any medical attention when I would ask. One night,
finally, a guard said ‘you shouldn’t be in here (7th Day General
Population). You are visibly injured[,]’ and she transferred me
to the medical unit.” (Complaint § III(C) (referred to as
“Inadequate Medical Care Claim”).)
18.
The Complaint does not allege sufficient facts
supporting a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation from inadequate medical care has occurred.
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19.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to pretrial detainees’ claims of inadequate medical
care. Bocchino v. City of Atlantic City, 179 F. Supp.3d 387, 403
(D.N.J. 2016). In the context of a claim for violation of the
right to adequate medical care, a pretrial detainee must allege
the following two elements: (a) a serious medical need; and (b)
behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes
deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318
F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
20.
To satisfy Estelle’s first prong, an inmate must
demonstrate that her medical needs are serious. Atkinson v.
Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
21.
Estelle’s second element is subjective and “requires
an inmate to show that prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference to his serious medical need.” Holder v. Merline,
No. 05-1024, 2005 WL 1522130, at *4 (D.N.J. June 27, 2005)
(citing Natale, 318 F.3d at 582).
22.
Here, Plaintiff’s cursory contentions of no “medical
attention . . . until after I was processed” and of “transfer to
the medical unit . . . one night finally [when] a guard said
‘you shouldn’t be in here, you are visibly injured’” (Complaint
§ III(C)) are insufficient to establish a Fourteenth Amendment
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inadequate medical care claim. Plaintiff “was brought to jail
with a broken hand” that had been casted prior to arriving at
CCJ. (Id.) Thus, any “serious need” of broken bone care was
addressed pre-incarceration. She does not specify how being
“under the lights” (id.) worsened her broken hand, whether she
communicated such purported “light sensitiv[ity]” (id.) to CCJ
personnel, or how being in a room with lights was anything other
than a reasonable measure by CCJ to maintain order and safety in
the facility. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s acknowledgment of the CCJ
guard’s transfer of her “to the medical unit” upon noticing
Plaintiff’s cast negates any reasonable inference of “deliberate
indifference” to Plaintiff’s medical condition. Accordingly, the
Inadequate Medical Care Claim is dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
3.
23.
Uncleanly Conditions Claim: Dismissed Without
Prejudice
Plaintiff alleges: “They also had black mold along
windows, walls & showers (major health hazard!).” (Complaint §
III(C) (referred to as Plaintiff’s “Uncleanly Conditions
Claim”).)
24.
The Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to
satisfy either the objective or subjective components of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process analysis pertinent to the
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Uncleanly Conditions Claim, as explained in the paragraphs
below.
25.
A failure of prison officials to provide minimally
civil conditions of confinement to pre-trial detainees violates
their right not to be punished without due process of law.
Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1997).
Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
prison officials must satisfy “basic human needs -- e.g., food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.” Helling
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). When a pretrial detainee
complains about the conditions of her confinement, courts are to
consider, in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment, whether
the conditions “amount to punishment prior to an adjudication of
guilt in accordance with law.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150,
158 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Hubbard I”). Courts must inquire as to
whether the conditions “‘cause [detainees] to endure [such]
genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time,
that the adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the
purposes assigned to them.’” Id. at 159-60 (citations omitted).
26.
The objective component of this unconstitutional
punishment analysis examines whether “the deprivation [was]
sufficiently serious,” and the subjective component asks whether
“the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind[.]” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007)
9
(citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39, n.20), cert. denied, Phelps v.
Stevenson, 552 U.S. 1180 (2008).
27.
Here, Plaintiff’s Uncleanly Conditions Claim does not
satisfy either the objective or subjective components of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process analysis.
28.
As to the test’s objective prong, Plaintiff does not
offer any facts demonstrating that she was subjected to genuine
privation and hardship over an extended period of time. While
unsanitary living conditions may give rise to a conditions of
confinement claim, the Complaint here expresses nothing but
Plaintiff's displeasure with less than perfect jail conditions.
Plaintiff does not offer any facts showing that the supposed
condition potentially jeopardized her health. In fact, Plaintiff
does not allege any mold-related injuries. (Complaint § IV.)
29.
As to the constitutional test’s subjective prong,
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing, or from which this
Court could infer, that any CCJ personnel were aware of, and
disregarded, a substantial risk to her health and safety from
uncleanly conditions. Plaintiff’s displeasure with conditions
she lists is not actionable; there are no facts indicating any
jail personnel acted with a culpable state of mind. Plaintiff
has not offered facts plausibly suggesting that moldy conditions
were imposed by CCJ as “punishment.”
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30.
Accordingly, the Uncleanly Conditions Claim is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
31.
As to Plaintiff’s three conditions of confinement
claims (i.e., Overcrowding, Inadequate Medical Care, and
Uncleanly Conditions), she may be able to amend the Complaint to
particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that
were excessive in relation to their purposes, that exhibited
deliberate indifference by prison personnel to a serious medical
need, and/or that posed a substantial risk to her health and
safety. To that end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to
amend the Complaint within 30 days after the date that this
Opinion and Order are entered on the docket.3
32.
Plaintiff is further advised that any amended
complaint must plead specific facts regarding the overcrowded
conditions of confinement, inadequate medical care, and unclean
living conditions. In the event Plaintiff files an amended
complaint, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a
3
The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has
occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
33.
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint
is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above:
(1) the Complaint’s claims against CCJ are dismissed with
prejudice; and
(2)
the Complaint’s conditions of confinement claims as to
(a) overcrowding, (b) inadequate medical care, and (c) unclean
living space are dismissed without prejudice for failure to
state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
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An appropriate order follows.
April 23, 2018
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge
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