MCCARGO v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 4/17/17. (jbk, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MAURICE A. MCCARGO,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,
Civil Action
No. 16-cv-08188 (JBS-AMD)
OPINION
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Maurice A. McCargo, Plaintiff Pro Se
3230 Braxton Walk
Camden, NJ 08104
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.
Plaintiff Maurice A. McCargo seeks to bring a civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”). Complaint, Docket
Entry 1.
2.
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review
complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis.
3.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
5.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 19831 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional
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Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
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rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) a person deprived him of a federal
right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted
under color of state or territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
6.
Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983,
“[t]he term ‘persons’ includes local and state officers acting
under color of state law.” Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).2 To
say that a person was “acting under color of state law” means
that the defendant in a § 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation
omitted). Generally, then, “a public employee acts under color
of state law while acting in his official capacity or while
exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id.
at 50.
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2 “Person” is not strictly limited to individuals who are state
and local government employees, however. For example,
municipalities and other local government units, such as
counties, also are considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.
See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
690-91 (1978).
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7.
Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that a
“person” deprived him of a federal right, the complaint does not
meet the standards necessary to set forth a prima facie case
under § 1983. Plaintiff presumably seeks monetary damages3 from
CCCF for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
The CCCF, however, is not a “person” within the meaning of
§ 1983; therefore, the claims against it must be dismissed with
prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992
(3d Cir. 1973)). Because the claims against the CCCF must be
dismissed with prejudice, the claims may not proceed and
Plaintiff may not name the CCCF as a defendant.
8.
Plaintiff may be able to amend the complaint to name a
person or persons who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
9.
Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint must
plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a
constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this
Court’s review under § 1915. Plaintiff alleges he experienced
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Plaintiff has not stated any requested relief in the complaint.
4
unconstitutional conditions of confinement August 24, 2006, to
September 7, 2006, May 27, 2010, to May 31, 2010, June 16, 2010,
to March 5, 2011, October 1, 2011, to October 3, 2011, September
5, 2012, to September 6, 2012, February 20, 2013, to April 1,
2013, May 30, 2013, to February 26, 2014, March 24, 2014, to May
13, 2014, June 13, 2015, to August 27, 2015, May 18, 2016 to
July 9, 2016, and August 3, 2016, to October 29, 2016. Complaint
§ III. The fact section of the complaint states in its entirety:
“I had to sleep on the floor upon my arrival being put in
crowded cells.” Id. Even accepting the statement as true for
screening purposes only, there is not enough factual support for
the Court to infer a constitutional violation has occurred.
10.
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily
in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
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F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the dates and length of
the confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, etc.
11.
Moreover, to the extent the complaint seeks relief for
conditions Plaintiff encountered during periods of confinement
ending prior to November 3, 2014, those claims are barred by the
statute of limitations and must be dismissed with prejudice,
meaning that Plaintiff cannot recover for those claims because
they have been brought too late.4 Civil rights claims under
§ 1983 are governed by New Jersey's limitations period for
personal injury and must be brought within two years of the
claim’s accrual. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985);
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010).
“Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff
knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is
based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480
(3d Cir. 2014).
4
Plaintiff filed this complaint on November 3, 2016.
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12.
Plaintiff alleges the events giving rise to his claims
occurred during eleven different incarcerations between 2006 and
2016. Complaint § III. However, all but three of these
incarcerations occurred more than two years prior to the filing
of Plaintiff’s complaint. The allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement at CCCF, namely the overcrowding,
would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of
his detention; therefore, the statute of limitations for
Plaintiff’s 2006, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 claims expired in
2008, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively, well before this
complaint was filed in 2016. In addition, the statute of
limitations for Plaintiff’s claims arising from his May 2013 to
February 2014 confinement and his March 2014 to May 2014
confinement expired, at the latest, in February 2016 and May
2016, respectively, before Plaintiff filed his complaint in
November 2016. Plaintiff therefore cannot recover for these
claims.5
5
Although the Court may toll, or extend, the statute of
limitations in the interests of justice, certain circumstances
must be present before it can do so. Tolling is not warranted in
this case because the state has not “actively misled” Plaintiff
as to the existence of his cause of action, there are no
extraordinary circumstances that prevented Plaintiff from filing
his claim, and there is nothing to indicate Plaintiff filed his
claim on time but in the wrong forum. See Omar v. Blackman, 590
F. App’x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014).
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13.
As Plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to
address the deficiencies noted by the Court, the Court shall
grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of
the date of this order. However, in the event Plaintiff does
elect to file an amended complaint, he should focus only on the
facts of his confinements from June 13, 2015, to August 27,
2015, May 18, 2016 to July 9, 2016, and August 3, 2016, to
October 29, 2016. Because Plaintiff’s earlier claims are barred
by the statute of limitations and must be dismissed with
prejudice, Plaintiff may not assert those claims in an amended
complaint.
14.
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint
is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself.6 Id.
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The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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15.
For the reasons stated above, the claims arising from
each of Plaintiff’s confinements from August 24, 2006, through
May 13, 2014, are barred by the statute of limitations and
therefore are dismissed with prejudice. The claims arising from
Plaintiff’s 2015 and 2016 confinements are dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim. The Court will reopen
the matter in the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint
within the time allotted by the Court.
16.
An appropriate order follows.
April 17, 2017
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
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