WILLIAMS v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY OF NEW JERSEY

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 4/18/2017. (tf, n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MICHAEL WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY OF NEW JERSEY,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-08293 (JBS-AMD)
OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Michael Williams, Plaintiff Pro Se
246 Sicklerville Rd.
Sicklerville, NJ 08081
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Michael Williams seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”). Complaint, Docket
Entry 1.
2.

Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis.
3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
5.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 19831 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional

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Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
2

rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) a person deprived him of a federal
right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted
under color of state or territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
6.

Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983,

“[t]he term ‘persons’ includes local and state officers acting
under color of state law.” Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).2 To
say that a person was “acting under color of state law” means
that the defendant in a § 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation
omitted). Generally, then, “a public employee acts under color
of state law while acting in his official capacity or while
exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id.
at 50.

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2 “Person” is not strictly limited to individuals who are state
and local government employees, however. For example,
municipalities and other local government units, such as
counties, also are considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.
See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
690-91 (1978).
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7.

Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that a

“person” deprived him of a federal right, the complaint does not
meet the standards necessary to set forth a prima facie case
under § 1983. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCCF for
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The CCCF,
however, is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983;
therefore, the claims against it must be dismissed with
prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992
(3d Cir. 1973)). Because the claims against the CCCF must be
dismissed with prejudice, the claims may not proceed and
Plaintiff may not name the CCCF as a defendant.
8.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the complaint to name a

person or persons who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
9.

Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint must

plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a
constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this
Court’s review under § 1915. Plaintiff alleges he experienced
unconstitutional conditions of confinement from in “2003; 2007;
[and] other dates were same conditions.” Complaint § III. The
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fact section of the complaint states: “While entering my cell
there were 3 other inmates which lead me to sleeping on floor.
Since size of cell Mr. Williams was sleeping near toilet which
unhumane [sic]; by the door and inmates were stepping over to
get in and out.” Id. Plaintiff further states: “medication
dispensed not as needed.” Id. § V. Even accepting these
statements as true for screening purposes only, there is not
enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional
violation has occurred.
10.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
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and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the dates and length of
the confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, etc.
11.

In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to

allege a claim based on a violation of his right to adequate
medical care, there are not enough facts to support an inference
that Plaintiff’s rights were violated in this regard. In order
to set forth a cognizable claim for a violation of his right to
adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious
medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials
that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. See
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden
Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff’s allegation stating “medication dispensed not as
needed” is insufficient to meet the pleading standard in the
absence of additional facts. If he wishes to pursue this claim,
Plaintiff should provide additional facts supporting both of the
requirements in his amended complaint.
12.

As Plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to

address the deficiencies noted by the Court,3 the Court shall

3

To the extent the complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered during confinements ending prior to
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grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of
the date of this order.
13.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and

November 7, 2014, those claims are barred by the statute of
limitations and must be dismissed with prejudice. Civil rights
claims under § 1983 are governed by New Jersey's limitations
period for personal injury and must be brought within two years
of the claim’s accrual. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276
(1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the
action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d
472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). Plaintiff is unclear regarding the
dates of his confinement, stating only that he was confined
“2003; 2007; other dates were same conditions.” The allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCCF, namely the
overcrowded conditions, would have been immediately apparent to
Plaintiff at the time of his detention; therefore, the statute
of limitations for Plaintiff’s 2003 and 2007 claims expired in
2005 and 2009, respectively, well before this complaint was
filed on November 7, 2016. In the event Plaintiff elects to file
an amended complaint, he should focus on facts that occurred
during confinements on or subsequent to November 7, 2014. Claims
arising from periods of confinement ending prior to November 7,
2014, are barred by the statute of limitations, meaning that
Plaintiff may not recover for those claims and may not assert
them in an amended complaint.
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explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself.4 Id.
14.

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s claims

arising from his confinements in 2003 and 2007 are barred by the
statute of limitations and therefore are dismissed with
prejudice. The remainder of the complaint, insofar as it seeks
relief for conditions Plaintiff encountered during confinements
ending on or subsequent to November 7, 2014, is dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The Court will
reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an amended
complaint within the time allotted by the Court.
15.

An appropriate order follows.

April 18, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

4

The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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