FLORES v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 6/29/17. (jbk, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

EDUARDO FLORES, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-08353 (JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Eduardo Flores, Jr., Plaintiff Pro Se
617 N. 36th Street
Pennsauken, NJ 08110
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Eduardo Flores, Jr., seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”). Complaint, Docket Entry
1.
2.

Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis.
3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss the complaint with prejudice in part and without
prejudice in part for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
5.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 19831 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional

1

Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
2

rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) a person deprived him of a federal
right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted
under color of state or territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
6.

Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983,

“[t]he term ‘persons’ includes local and state officers acting
under color of state law.” Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).2 To
say that a person was “acting under color of state law” means
that the defendant in a § 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation
omitted). Generally, then, “a public employee acts under color
of state law while acting in his official capacity or while

the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2 “Person” is not strictly limited to individuals who are state
and local government employees, however. For example,
municipalities and other local government units, such as
counties, also are considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.
See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
690-91 (1978).
3

exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id.
at 50.
7.

Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that a

“person” deprived him of a federal right, the complaint does not
meet the standards necessary to set forth a prima facie case
under § 1983. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from CCCF for
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The CCCF,
however, is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983;
therefore, the claims against it must be dismissed with
prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992
(3d Cir. 1973)). Because the claims against the CCCF must be
dismissed with prejudice, the claims may not proceed and
Plaintiff may not name the CCCF as a defendant.
8.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the complaint to name a

person or persons who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
9.

However, to the extent the complaint seeks relief for

conditions Plaintiff encountered during confinements ending
prior to November 8, 2014, those claims are barred by the
statute of limitations and must be dismissed with prejudice,
4

meaning that Plaintiff cannot recover for those claims because
they have been brought too late.3
10.

Plaintiff does not identify the dates of the events

giving rise to his claims but alleges that they occurred
“[b]etween 2010 to 2014.” Complaint § III. Civil rights claims
under § 1983 are governed by New Jersey's limitations period for
personal injury and must be brought within two years of the
claim’s accrual. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985);
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010).
“Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff
knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is
based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480
(3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement Plaintiff encountered at CCCF would have been
immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of his detention;
therefore, the statute of limitations for some of Plaintiff’s
claims may have expired as early as 2012, well before this
complaint was filed in 2016. Plaintiff therefore cannot recover
for claims arising from confinements ending prior to November 8,
2014.4

3

Plaintiff filed this complaint on November 8, 2016.
Although the Court may toll, or extend, the statute of
limitations in the interests of justice, certain circumstances
must be present before it can do so. Tolling is not warranted in
this case because the state has not “actively misled” Plaintiff
as to the existence of his cause of action, there are no
4

5

11.

If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, he

therefore should focus only on facts that occurred during
confinements ending on or subsequent to November 8, 2014. In the
fact section of the complaint, Plaintiff states: “With such
crowded conditions, I had to sleep on the floor next to the
toilet, where many times when one went to use the toilet it
would splash on me. The showers had mold residue all over the
walls and floors. The area where our food as dispensed from, was
dirty, had mice and roaches, and mold residue as well. They gave
me medications that were not properly prescribed. They diagnosed
me with medical conditions where I had never been diagnosed
before. And the medications that they were giving me just put me
in a bad state of mind, where I feel that they just made me
hallucinate and caused me to have problems with other inmates
and staff.” Complaint § III. Plaintiff does not allege when
these events took place, however, and, given Plaintiff’s broad
and vague allegation regarding when the events giving rise to
his claims occurred, it is unclear from the face of the
complaint whether they occurred outside of the statute of
limitations. Construing the complaint liberally and granting
Plaintiff all reasonable inferences, these claims therefore will

extraordinary circumstances that prevented Plaintiff from filing
his claim, and there is nothing to indicate Plaintiff filed his
claim on time but in the wrong forum. See Omar v. Blackman, 590
F. App’x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014).
6

be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may provide greater
factual detail with respect to these allegations if he elects to
file an amended complaint naming a proper defendant or
defendants and if these events occurred within the statute of
limitations, i.e., during confinement(s) that ended on or after
November 8, 2014.5
12.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and

5

The Court does not presently address whether the facts alleged
in the complaint are enough to support an inference that a
constitutional violation has occurred. Because Plaintiff has not
named a proper defendant and because some unknown portion of
Plaintiff’s claims appear to be barred by the statute of
limitations, the complaint must be dismissed without prejudice
in any event. It is therefore not necessary for the Court to
make constitutional findings at this time. See Woodall v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2005) (declining
to address constitutional issues where it was unnecessary to do
so because disposition of case could be based on other grounds)
(citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347
(1936)).
7

explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself.6 Id.
13.

For the reasons stated above, the claims arising from

Plaintiff’s confinements ending prior to November 8, 2014, are
barred by the statute of limitations and therefore are dismissed
with prejudice. The remainder of the complaint is dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The Court will
reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an amended
complaint within the time allotted by the Court.
14.

An appropriate order follows.

June 29, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

6

The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
8