FARMER v. KIRBY

Filing 21

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 3/14/2019. (dmr)(n.m.)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
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JOSEPH W. FARMER,
Petitioner,
v.
MARK A. KIRBY,
Respondent.

Civil Action No. 16-8657(RMB)

OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Joseph W.
Farmer’s (“Farmer”) Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Farmer is an inmate incarcerated
in the Federal Correctional Institution in Fairton, New Jersey
(“FCI Fairton”) who challenges the calculation of his jail credit
upon

parole

revocation

and

seeks

immediate

release.

(Id.)

Respondent filed an Answer, opposing habeas relief. (Answer, ECF
No. 4.) Farmer filed a reply. (Reply, ECF No. 5.)
On January 31, 2019, the Court entered an Opinion and Order
in this matter, deferring ruling on the petition until such time
as the parties submitted supplemental briefing on the issue Farmer
raised in his reply brief, that federal law rather than military
law governed calculation of his sentence after he was designated
to

a

federal

correctional

institution

to

serve

his

military

sentence. (Opinion, ECF No. 6 at 14.) Farmer appealed this Court’s
Order to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Third Circuit
dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. (Notice
of Appeal, ECF No. 8; Order of USCA, ECF No. 15.) Respondent filed
its supplemental brief on February 28, 2019. (“Respt’s Supp.
Brief,” ECF No. 19.) On March 11, 2019, Farmer filed a letter,
stating he would not file a reply to Respondent’s supplemental
brief. (Letter, ECF No. 20.)
I.

BACKGROUND
The Court restates below the background and the parties’

arguments in this matter from its Opinion of January 31, 2018.
(See Opinion, ECF No. 6.)
On March 31, 1977, Farmer was convicted by a general courtmartial of rape in violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 920, and sentenced to thirteen years
confinement. (Decl. of Adam Escobedo (“Escobedo Decl.”), ECF No.
4-1, ¶9.a; General Court-Martial Order Number 14, Ex. D.) Farmer
began serving his sentence at the United States Disciplinary
Barracks (USDB) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (Parole Certificate
and Agreement, Escobedo Decl., Ex. F.) Farmer was granted parole
and released from confinement on August 14, 1980. (Id.) At that
time, he had an unexpired term of confinement of 3,344 days.
(Escobedo Decl. ¶9.b.)

2

While he was on parole, on December 11, 1981, Farmer was
arrested

by

allegations

Philadelphia
of

attempted

County,
murder,

Pennsylvania
rape,

Police

aggravated

for

assault,

unlawful restraint, recklessly endangering another person, and
simple assault. (Dec. 22, 1981 Letter, Escobedo Decl., Ex. G.)
Therefore, Farmer’s parole was suspended on December 15, 1981.
(Id.) The Army placed a detainer on Farmer so he would be returned
to

military

control

to

serve

the

remainder

of

his

military

sentence. (Military Detainer, Escobedo Decl., Ex. I.)
On May 10, 1982, Farmer was convicted in the Philadelphia
County Court of Common Pleas of simple assault, aggravated assault,
unlawful restraint and rape. (Jan. 27, 1983 Letter, Escobedo Decl.,
Ex. J.) On January 24, 1983, he was sentenced to 13.5-35 years in
confinement. (Id.) The Army revoked Farmer’s parole on March 14,
1985. (Letter, Escobedo Decl., Ex. H.) The Army’s detainer remained
in place pending completion of Farmer’s civilian sentence in
Pennsylvania. (Escobedo Decl., ¶9.d.)
Farmer was released from civilian confinement on December 16,
2013 and taken into military control. (Escobedo Decl., ¶9.e.) He
was designated to serve the remainder of his sentence as a military
parole violator at a federal correctional institution in the
custody

of

the

Bureau

of

Prisons.

(Escobedo

Decl.,

¶9.e;

Declaration of Robert C. Jennings (“Jennings Decl.”) ECF No. 4-

3

4.,

¶4.)

In

accordance

with

BOP

Program

Statement

5110.16,1

Farmer’s sentence computation was provided by the Records Office,
U.S. Army Disciplinary Barracks, in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
(Jennings Decl., ¶5.)
Before his return to military control, Farmer’s remaining
military sentence was recalculated pursuant to Army Regulation
633-30. (Nov. 14, 2013 ACIS Sentence Computation Report, Escobedo
Decl., Ex. B.) Farmer’s sentence has been recalculated annually
since his return to military control. (Escobedo Decl., ¶8.) Based

1

BOP Program Statement 5110.16 (2), (3) and (4) provides:
2. ACCEPTANCE AND DESIGNATION
Referrals of military inmates for acceptance
into
Bureau
custody
are
made
to
the
Designation and Computation Center (DSCC) Team
responsible
for
the
Military
Court
of
Jurisdiction (COJ)
3. TREATMENT AND DISCIPLINE
Military inmates transferred to Bureau custody
are subject to the same treatment and
discipline as other Bureau inmates (Title 10
U.S.C. 858).
4. SENTENCE COMPUTATION
Military sentence computations are provided by
the Records Office, U.S. Army Disciplinary
Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The DSCC
must accept the sentence computation provided
by military authorities, and refer suspected
errors,
or
challenges
to
the
sentence
computation by the inmate, to the Military
Records Office for resolution.
4

on the most recent calculation, Farmer’s maximum release date is
on February 10, 2023, and his minimum release date is on August
21, 2019. (Nov. 30, 2016 ACIS Sentence Computation Report, Escobedo
Decl., Ex. C.)
II.

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Farmer

raises

two

grounds

for

relief

from

unlawful

confinement by the Department of the Army and the Bureau of
Prisons. (Pet., ECF No. 1, ¶13.) First, he contends Respondent’s
“nonacceptance that the parole revocation process reinstated the
remainder of the petitioner’s military sentence, which expired
prior to the completion of his state sentence, violates” the
Constitution. (Id., Ground One.)
Second, Farmer asserts he was not given jail credit, “for all
the time in confinement towards service of his ‘Old Law’ sentence”
in violation of the Constitution. (Id., Ground Two.) For relief,
he seeks immediate release from custody. (Pet., ECF No. 1, ¶15.)
Respondent

opposes

habeas

relief.

(Answer,

ECF

No.

4.)

Respondent contends Farmer’s Pennsylvania conviction and sentence
“interrupted” his military sentence, and his military sentence did
not begin to run again until he was returned to military control
for the purpose of completing his military sentence. (Id. at 56.) Respondent asserts that “[w]hat Petitioner mistakes for his
time spent in confinement prior to his parole is actually credit
for time spent in confinement prior to his court-martial.” (Answer,
5

ECF No. 4 at 7, n. 2, citing United States v. Allen, 17 M.J. 126
(C.M.A. 1984)).
Further, Respondent contends Farmer’s sentence was correctly
calculated, noting that “the maximum release date on a military
sentence to confinement is ‘[t]he day preceding the date determined
by adding the full term of the sentence to the beginning date of
the sentence.’” (Id. at 7, quoting AR 633-30, ¶2c.) The unexpired
term of the sentence to be served by the parole violator is “the
actual number of days difference between the date of release on
parole and the maximum expiration date of his sentence.” (Id.,
citing AR 633-20, ¶2h.)
Additionally, Respondent asserts “[p]arole violators will
not be credited with good conduct time or extra good time which
was earned prior to the date of their release on parole,” and
furthermore, “abatement time reduces the maximum release date,”
and “inoperative time extends the maximum release date on an actual
day basis.”

(Id. at 7, quoting AR 633-30, ¶¶ 2h(2), 14a, 5b.))

In reply, Farmer contends that a 1969 presidential executive
order

“that

promulgates

the

MCM

[Manual

for

Courts-Martial]

concerning Execution of Courts-Martial Sentences (confinement and
effective date of confinement) supersedes AR 633-30.” (Reply, ECF
No. 5 at 6.) According to Farmer, the MCM, 1969, para. 97c provides
that his court-martial sentence “runs continuous until the period

6

of confinement expires,” and none of the exceptions in the MCM
applies to his sentence. (Reply, ECF No. 5 at 6.)
Farmer also argues that his “court-martial sentence while
confined in the state had force/effect and was operative, because
service of his sentence was continuous on an annual basis for
clemency consideration . . .” (Id. at 8-9.) Furthermore, if the
Petitioner's sentence was interrupted by "inoperative time," there
shouldn't have been any contact between the Army and Petitioner
concerning

clemency

consideration

while

serving

his

state

sentence.” (Id. at 9.)
Next, Farmer contends that his parole was revoked when the
Board

made

a

parole

revocation

determination

concerning

the

detainer. (Id. at 10.) Thus, “if parole was revoked at that stage,
the remainder of the parolee’s original … sentence, reinstated by
the parole revocation would run concurrently with the subsequent
sentence from the time of execution of the warrant.” (Id., quoting
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1976)).
Even

if

the

Board

had

not

made

a

parole

revocation

determination at that stage “the original sentence [would] remain
in the status it occupied at the time of the asserted parole
violation.” (Id. at 11, quoting Moody, 429 U.S. at 84.)
Finally, Farmer contends he must be awarded credit for his
time in custody under the “Old Law.” (Id. at 13.) He bases this
claim on DoD Instruction 1325.4 (October 7, 1968), cited in United
7

States v. Allen, 17 M.J. 126, 127 (1984)). (Reply, ECF No. 5 at
12-13.) Farmer also quotes United States v. Tardif. 55 M.J. 670,
671 (2001), which states:
In interpreting the DoD directive [1325.4
(October 7, 1968))] with this portion of 18
U.S.C. § 3568, the Court of Military Appeals
in Allen decided that, although Congress
exempted
the
military
from
sentence
computation provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 3568,
the Secretary of Defense in the DoD directive
had voluntarily adopted those provisions.
Thus, our higher Court determined that
military prisoners must be allowed credit
toward the service of their sentence for any
“days spent in custody in connection with
offense or acts for which sentence was
imposed.”
(Id. at 13.)
Farmer further argues that “military prisoners who have been
transferred into federal custody are subject to all of the federal
laws

and

regulations

governing

any

other

prisoner,

including

federal parole provisions.” (Id., citing Artis v. United States,
166 F.Supp.2d 126 (D.N.J. 2001) (citing Hirsch v. Secretary of the
Army, 172 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished)). Farmer argues
that the Army and the BOP “did not adhere to the Department of
Justice’s computation procedures.” (Id.)
III. DISCUSSION
The Court restates Subsection III.A. below from its Opinion
dated January 31, 2018. (Opinion, ECF No. 6 at 8-12.)
A.

Imprisonment for Crime Committed while on Parole

8

“Unless a parole violator can be required to serve some time
in prison in addition to that imposed for an offence committed
while on parole, he not only escapes punishment for the unexpired
portion of his original sentence, but the disciplinary power of
the [Parole] Board will be practically nullified.” Zerbst v.
Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 363 (1938). Thus, the Supreme Court held:
When respondent committed a federal crime
while on parole, for which he was arrested,
convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned, not only
was his parole violated, but service of his
original
sentence
was
interrupted
and
suspended. Thereafter, his imprisonment was
attributable to his second sentence only, and
his rights and status as to his first sentence
were ‘analogous to those of an escaped
convict.' Not only had he-by his own conductforfeited the privileges granted him by
parole, but, since he was no longer in either
actual or constructive custody under his first
sentence, service under the second sentence
cannot be credited to the first without doing
violence to the plain intent and purpose of
the statutes providing for a parole system.
Id. at 361.
The respondents in Zerbst were not military parole violators,
however, the same reasoning applies in the context of a military
parole violator subsequently serving a civilian sentence. Thus, AR
633.30, ¶5b provides:2
Inoperative. Inoperative time consists of any
period during which a prisoner is not credited
2

Citations are to the army regulations in effect when Farmer was
court-martialed in 1977, AR 633-30 (effective Nov. 6, 1964),
attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Adam Escobedo. (ECF
No. 4-2 at 4-64.)
9

with serving his sentence. Inoperative time
will include the period … While absent from
confinement on a parole which proper authority
has suspended and later revoked …
Additionally, 633.30, ¶4b provides in pertinent part:
A sentence to confinement adjudged by a courtmartial will not be served concurrently with
any other sentence to confinement adjudged by
a court-martial or a civil court.
Farmer was paroled on August 15, 1980. (Escobedo Decl., ¶9.b.)
He was arrested by civilian authorities on December 15, 1981, and
his parole was suspended. (Jan. 27, 1983 Letter, Escobedo Decl.,
Ex. J.) He was sentenced in civilian court on January 24, 1983 and
released from state custody on December 16, 2013. Thus, pursuant
to AR 633.30, ¶¶4, 5, Farmer did not start serving his military
sentence again until he was returned, in December 2013, to the
control of military authorities to serve his military sentence.
(Escobedo Decl., ¶9e.)
Farmer contends the MCM, 1969, para. 97c indicates that his
court-martial

sentence

“runs

continuous

until

the

period

of

confinement expires,” and none of the exceptions in the MCM applies
to his sentence. (Id.) Farmer is wrong. Paragraph 97c of the 1969
MCM provides, in pertinent part:
c. Interruptions of execution of a sentence.
A sentence to confinement, hard labor without
confinement,
restriction
to
limits,
or
deprivation of privileges is continuous until
the term expires, with certain exceptions.
These exceptions include the following:
10

When delivery under Article 14 is made to any
civil authority of a person undergoing
sentence of a court martial, the delivery, if
followed by conviction in a civil tribunal,
interrupts the execution of the sentence of
the court-martial, and the offender after
having answered to the civil authorities for
his offense shall, upon the request of
competent military authority, be returned to
military custody for the completion of his
sentence (Art. 14(b)).
. . .
Periods during which a sentence to confinement
is suspended or deferred shall be excluded in
computing the service of the term of
confinement (Art. 57(b)).
Manual

for

courts

martial

1969

available

at

https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/CM-manuals.html
Next, Farmer contends that because he was considered for
clemency under military law while serving his state sentence, he
was serving his military sentence concurrently. For authority, he
cites AR 190-47 and Department of Defense Instruction 1325.4
(“DoD”) [effective 1968], noting that clemency consideration is
authorized within eight months after the sentence began to run and
annually

thereafter.

The

fact

that

clemency

consideration

is

authorized within a prescribed time after the military sentence
begins to run does not dictate when Farmer’s sentence was operative
for purposes of sentence calculation. Although Farmer contends
clemency consideration is inconsistent with “inoperative” time,
inoperative has a special definition in the Army Regulations.
11

Specifically, “inoperative time consists of any period during
which a prisoner is not credited with serving his sentence.
Inoperative time will include the period … while absent from
confinement on a parole which proper authority has suspended and
later

revoked

…

[and]

while

absent

after

delivery

to

civil

authorities, if subsequently convicted by a civil tribunal…” AR
633-30, ¶5b. Thus, according to Army Regulation, Farmer’s military
sentence

was

inoperative

while

he

was

on

parole,

which

was

subsequently suspended and revoked upon his arrest and conviction
by civil authorities.
Finally, Farmer contends that when the Army Board made a
parole

revocation

determination

and

issued

the

detainer,

his

military sentence began to run concurrently with his civilian
sentence. Farmer quotes Moody v. Daggett, “[i]f parole was revoked
at that stage, the remainder of the parolee's original sentence,
reinstated by the parole revocation, would run concurrently with
the subsequent sentence from the time of execution of the warrant."
429 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1976).
The Supreme Court in Moody held that a federal parolee
imprisoned

for

a

crime

committed

while

on

parole

was

not

constitutionally entitled to a prompt parole revocation hearing at
the time a parole violator warrant was issued and lodged with the
institution of his confinement. 429 U.S. at 89. The Court described
three options the U.S. Parole Board had “for disposing of its
12

parole violator warrant,” and the option cited by Farmer, which
would cause the sentences to run concurrently, was to “execute the
warrant immediately and take the parolee into custody.” This did
not happen in Farmer’s case, instead, the Army revoked his parole
and placed a detainer on Farmer without taking him into Army
custody until his civilian sentence was completed. For all of the
reasons discussed above, Farmer served his military and civilian
sentences consecutively, consistent with federal law and military
law.
B.

Sentencing Credit

In this Court’s Opinion of January 31, 2018, the Court set
forth the following issue for supplemental briefing. (Opinion, ECF
No. 6 at 12-14.)
Farmer contends that federal law governs computation of his
sentence because he is incarcerated in a federal prison. He relies
on cases holding that Congress, in enacting 10 U.S.C. § 858(a),
intended that “military prisoners who have been transferred into
federal

custody

are

subject

to

all

of

the

federal

laws

and

regulations governing any other prisoner, including federal parole
provisions.”

Artis

v.

United

States,

166

F.Supp.2d

126,

130

(quoting Hirsch v. Secretary of Army, 1999 WL 110549 (10th Cir.
1999)); United States v. Allen, 17 M.J. 126 (1984) (quoting DoD
Instruction 1325.4 (October 7, 1968)); United States v. Tardif, 55
M.J. 670, 671 (2001) (discussing history of DoD Directive 1325.4);
13

O'Callahan v. Attorney General, 230 F.Supp. 766, 767 (D. Mass.
1964), aff'd 338 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1964) (holding that pursuant
to 10 U.S.C. 858(a), military prisoner in federal penal institution
is subject to the federal parole system.)
10 U.S.C. § 858(a) (effective 1956 to January 5, 2006)
provides:
(a) Under such instructions as the Secretary
concerned may prescribe, a sentence of
confinement adjudged by a court-martial or
other military tribunal, whether or not the
sentence includes discharge or dismissal, and
whether or not the discharge or dismissal has
been executed, may be carried into execution
by confinement in any place of confinement
under the control of any of the armed forces
or in any penal or correctional institution
under the control of the United States, or
which the United States may be allowed to use.
Persons so confined in a penal or correctional
institution not under the control of one of
the armed forces are subject to the same
discipline and treatment as persons confined
or committed by the courts of the United
States or of the State, Territory, District of
Columbia, or place in which the institution is
situated.
Thus, Farmer contends the Army miscalculated his sentence by using
Army

regulations.

sentence

Farmer

calculation

did

would

not,

differ

however,
under

describe

federal

how

his

statutes

and

regulations.
1.
Respondent

Supplemental Briefing
filed

a

supplemental

brief

on

this

issue

on

February 28, 2019. (Respt’s Supp. Brief, ECF No. 19). Farmer

14

responded by letter, stating that he would not file a reply.
(Letter, ECF No. 20.)
Respondent asserts, in his supplemental brief, that the cases
cited by Farmer, United States v. Allen, United States v. Tardif,
and Artis v. United States do not support Farmer’s contention that
his sentence was improperly calculated. (Respt’s Supp. Brief, ECF
No. 19 at 3.) Quoting Allen, Respondent submits that the Military
“voluntarily incorporate[d] the pretrial sentence credit extended
to other Justice Department convicts,” and thus Allen stands for
the proposition that a military prisoner must receive prior custody
credit against an imposed sentence for any time spent in pretrial
detention as a result of the charged crime. (Id. at 4.)
Respondent contends that United States v. Tardif, 55 M.J. 670
(2001) is consistent with the above conclusion. (Id.) Tardif sought
prior custody credit for twelve days when he was held by state
authorities for the same activity that formed the basis for his
military conviction and sentence. (Id.) The Court applied the
amended federal prior custody credit statute and granted the
petitioner credit for time served in state custody because the
time was not credited against another sentence. (Id.)
Respondent

also

addressed

Artis

v.

United

States,

166

F.Supp.2d 126, 130 (D.N.J. 2001). (Id. at 4-5.) In Artis, the
petitioner was a military prisoner housed in a federal prison who
challenged the U.S. Parole Commission’s decision to deny him
15

parole, seeking annual parole review under the Army regulations.
(Resp’t Supp. Brief at 5, citing Artis at 129-31.) The court held
that the petitioner was not entitled to the application of the
military parole regulations because he was subject to the same
advantages and disadvantages of a civil prisoner after he was
transferred to a federal correctional institution. (Id.)
Respondent argues that Artis, a case that clarifies the parole
regime applicable to a military prisoner held in a civilian prison,
is inapplicable to the issue of military sentence calculation.
(Id.) Military sentences remain the responsibility of the United
States Army, applying Army Regulations. (Id., citing Holt v.
Terris, 269 F.Supp.3d 788, 796 (E.D. Mich. 2017); Curry v. Fischer,
09-2104, 2010 WL 1994843(D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2010); Curry v. Fondren,
08-134, 2009 WL 3164718 (D. Minn. Apr. 8, 2009)).
Respondent also speculated that Petitioner may have thought
the Army failed to credit him with prior custody credit, as
contemplated

by

the

Department

of

Justice

regulations

and

discussed in Allen and Tardif. (Respt’s Supp. Brief, ECF No. 19 at
6.) Respondent notes that Petitioner was credited for 171 days of
pretrial detention. (Id., citing Escobedo Decl., ECF No. 4-1,
¶9(a)).
2.

Analysis

Petitioner has informed the Court that he will not file a
reply to Respondent’s supplemental brief. (Letter, ECF No. 20.)
16

Petitioner has not clarified how his sentence would have differed
if it was calculated under DOJ rather than Army regulations.
The U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals recently explained:
Prior to our superior court’s decision in
Allen, “a military accused who had served a
period of pretrial confinement was not
entitled to administrative credit against his
adjudged confinement.”
United States v.
DeLeon, 53 M.J. 658, 659 (Army Ct. Crim. App.
2000).
In
Allen,
our
superior
court
interpreted Department of Defense Instruction
1325.4, Treatment of Military Prisoners and
Administration
of
Military
Correction
Facilities [DoDI 1325.4], (7 Oct. 1968), “as
voluntarily incorporating the pre-sentence
credit” procedures employed by the Department
of Justice (DOJ) for sentence computation.
Allen, 17 M.J. at 128. As a result, the Allen
court held that these Federal procedures
applied to courts-martials. Id. “This reading
of DoDI 1325.4 is the sole basis for what trial
practitioners for the past 30 years have
called ‘Allen credit.’ ” [United States v.]
Atkinson, 74 M.J. [645,] 647 [N.M.C.C.A. March
26, 2015.]
United States v. Harris, 78 M.J. 521, 524 (A. Ct. Crim. App.),
review granted, 78 M.J. 240 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (footnotes omitted).
Additionally, the federal procedures applied to court-martials
under Allen are codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3585, and “require a
defendant be given confinement credit, ‘as a result of any other
charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission
of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; that has not
been credited against another sentence.’” Harris, 78 M.J. at 524
n. 7 (emphasis in original).

17

Respondent
Supervisor,

submitted

Inmate

the

Personnel

Declaration
Division,

of

Adam

Military

Escobedo,

Correctional

Complex, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, with the answer to the petition.
(“Escobedo Decl.,” ECF No. 4-1, ¶1.) According to Escobedo, Farmer
was credited 171 days for pretrial confinement for October 11,
1976 to March 31, 1977 (time spent in confinement prior to courtmartial). (Escobedo Decl., Ex. D and Ex. E., ECF No. 4-3 at 2-7.)
Insofar as Petitioner may believe that federal law as opposed
to Army regulations would permit credit against his military
sentence for time served on his subsequent state sentence, he is
wrong. As explained in Harris, the federal procedures applied to
court-martials under Allen are codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3585, which
provides, in relevant part:
(b) Credit for prior custody.--A defendant
shall be given credit toward the service of a
term of imprisonment for any time he has spent
in official detention prior to the date the
sentence commences-- (2) as a result of any
other charge for which the defendant was
arrested after the commission of the offense
for which the sentence was imposed; that has
not been credited against another sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)(2) (emphasis added). See U.S. v. Wilson, 503
U.S. 329, 334 (1992) (petitioner was not entitled to credit against
federal

sentence

sentence).

for

Farmer’s

time

served

sentence,

credited

therefore,

against
has

been

calculated, and he is not entitled to habeas relief.

18

his

state

properly

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will deny the

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
An appropriate Order follows.

Date: March 14, 2019
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

19