SOSA v. COUNTY OF CAMDEN et al
Filing
21
AMENDED OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 6/4/2018. (tf, n.m.)
Case 1:16-cv-08662-JBS-AMD Document 21 Filed 06/04/18 Page 1 of 20 PageID: 215
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ADAM SOSA,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action
No. 16-cv-8662(JBS-AMD)
COUNTY OF CAMDEN, CAMDEN
COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN
FREEHOLDERS, WARDEN OF CAMDEN
COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
and CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS JANE
& JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 100 IN
OFFICIAL & INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITIES,
AMENDED OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Adam Sosa, Plaintiff Pro Se
#525099-C
Bayside State Prison
4293 Rt. 47
P.O. Box F-1
Leesburg, NJ 08327
CHRISTOPHER A. ORLANDO,
Camden County Counsel
By: ANNE E. WALTERS, Assistant County Counsel
OFFICE OF THE CAMDEN COUNTY COUNSEL
Courthouse 14th Floor
520 Market Street
Camden, New Jersey 08102-1375
Attorneys for Defendants
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on the unopposed motion
for summary judgment (“the Motion”) of defendants County of Camden
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(“County”), Camden County Freeholders (“Freeholders”), and Warden
of the Camden County Correctional Facility (“Warden”) (County,
Freeholders,
and
Warden
are
collectively
referred
to
as
“Defendants”) (ECF No. 18.)1 The Motion is being considered on the
papers pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth
below, the Motion shall be granted.
BACKGROUND
A.
Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff Adam Sosa (“Plaintiff”) was a pretrial detainee at
the Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) from July 2012
through November 2014. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff is currently
confined at Bayside State Prison. (ECF No. 9; ECF No. 18-8 ¶3.) He
is proceeding pro se with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint
(“Complaint”) regarding the conditions of confinement during his
stay at CCCF. (ECF No. 1.)
During the course of detention at CCCF, Plaintiff allegedly
requested on several occasions an inmate handbook and grievance
forms to register complaints about various conditions of his
confinement. His requests were denied. (ECF No. 1 at 2.)
On November 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed with this Court his
Complaint against Defendants, alleging overcrowding and various
unsanitary conditions at CCCF. (ECF No. 1.) As to the allegedly
1
The notation “ECF” as used in this Opinion refers to the numbered
docket entries for this case.
2
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overcrowded conditions of confinement, Plaintiff contends that he
was confined in “a cell [with] 3 other inmates [that] was designed
to hold only 2 inmates.” (ECF No. 1 at 2.) According to the
Complaint, Plaintiff was “forced to sleep on the floor right next
to a toilet ... with just [a] mattress, which is very thin.” (Id.
at 3.) As to the other conditions of which Plaintiff complains, he
describes: (1) being “housed in a cell where there was mold,
various insects & rodents, [with] no access to cleaning supplies”;
(2) having “no hot water in the cells at all for months”; (3) being
“housed
with
inmates
who
were
infected
with
M.R.S.A.”;
(4)
experiencing “air ducts/vents in the cells and on the housing units
[with]
visible
dust
and
mold
around
them”;
and
(5)
seeing
“paint[ing] over the walls & floors where the mold and dirt [are]
located, in order to hide these conditions.” (Id. at 2-4.)
As relief for the alleged violation of his constitutional and
statutory rights, Plaintiff seeks “[a]n award of compensatory &
punitive damages” and “injunctive relief [to] ... order Defendants
to
undertake
all
action
necessary
to
correct
the
unlawful
conditions of confinement.” (Id. at 5-6.)
B.
Procedural History
On December 20, 2016, this Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP
Application and directed the Clerk of the Court to file the
Complaint. (ECF No. 3.) After screening Plaintiff’s Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, this Court on
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August 30, 2017 dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s First
Amendment
freedom
of
speech
claims
and
proceeded
Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claims, Eighth
Amendment conditions of confinement claims, and New Jersey State
Constitution claims. (ECF Nos. 5 and 6.)2
Defendants
filed
an
Answer
to
Plaintiff’s
Complaint
on
October 30, 2017. (ECF No. 14.) On November 28, 2017, Magistrate
Judge Ann Marie Donio issued a scheduling order requiring that all
pretrial factual discovery be concluded by March 30, 2018. (ECF
No. 17.) Defendants served Plaintiff with their January 30, 2018
Rule 26(a) Disclosures (ECF No. 18-4) and March 20, 2018 document
requests and interrogatories. (ECF No. 18-5.) Plaintiff has not
served Defendants with any discovery responses or disclosures.
(ECF No. 18-2 at 6; ECF No. 18-8 at ¶6.) The time to do so has
expired. On May 11, 2018, Defendants filed the Motion now pending
before the Court. (ECF No. 18.) On May 11, 2018 the Court set the
Motion for June 4, 2018, to be decided on the papers. Plaintiff’s
2
This Court’s screening opinion, filed August 30, 2017,
contained a detailed discussion of Plaintiff’s claims and
attempted to explain in layman’s terms the type of factual
evidence Plaintiff must produce to eventually prove such claims.
(ECF No. 5 at 5-15.) Plaintiff was given unusually ample notice
of the evidentiary requirements that must be applied in this
summary judgment motion so that he would be able to gather
necessary evidence.
4
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opposition was due May 21, 2018. Plaintiff did not file any
opposition to the Motion, which remains unopposed.
DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment on four grounds: (1)
Plaintiff’s failure to adduce evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could find unconstitutional conditions of confinement;
(2) the Complaint’s mootness, in light of the Sixth and Amended
Final Consent Decree in the recent class action, Dittimus-Bey, et
al. v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, et al., Docket No. 05-cv-0063
(D.N.J.)
(“Dittimus-Bey”);
(3)
the
defendant
Warden’s
and
defendant Freeholders’ entitlement to qualified immunity; and (4)
Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim concerning First Amendment
violation.
This Court finds for reasons discussed in Part IV that
the mootness doctrine does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims for
monetary
relief,
but
that
for
reasons
discussed
in
Part
V,
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment by virtue of the lack
of a genuine dispute of material fact. Given that the Court finds
summary
judgment
is
proper,
there
being
no
proof
of
a
constitutional violation, the Court need not address the qualified
immunity defense.
WHETHER THE FINAL CONSENT DECREE IN DITTIMUS-BEY RENDERS
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT MOOT
In
addition
to
Defendants’
meritorious
argument
that
Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence of Fourteenth Amendment
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violations from CCCF conditions of confinement (see Section V(B)
below), Defendants also seek summary judgment on the ground that
the Sixth and Final Amended Consent Decree in Dittimus-Bey has
rendered Plaintiff’s Complaint moot. (ECF No. 18-2 at 13-14.)
The doctrine of “mootness” derives from the limitation upon
federal judicial power in Article III of the Constitution limiting
jurisdiction
to
actual
cases
and
controversies.
See
Genesis
Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013). Thus, federal
courts are limited to resolving “the legal rights of litigants in
actual controversies,” id., quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll.
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia
S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)). Thus,
“[a]n action is rendered moot when an intervening circumstance
deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the
lawsuit at any point during the litigation.” MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (citations omitted). The
test for Article III mootness is whether it has become “impossible
for
a
court
to
grant
any
effectual
relief
whatever
to
the
prevailing party.” In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., 802 F.3d 547, 553
(3d Cir. 2015) (citing Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (2013)).
Therefore, “[a]s long as the parties have a concrete interest,
however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not
moot.” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016).
6
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It is true that Plaintiff does not contest the Dittimus–Bey
litigation and its effects, as characterized in Exhibit D to
Defendants’ undisputed Statement of Material Facts. (ECF No. 187.) For example, Camden County and CCCF officials agreed to consent
decrees in Dittimus–Bey to take measures to improve the conditions
at the CCCF, such as by retaining criminal justice planning firms
to investigate and recommend solutions to the CCCF’s overcrowding
and staffing problems. (ECF No. 18-7 at ¶¶23-25 (Sixth and Amended
Final Consent Decree).) These undisputed facts show significant,
systemic
improvements
as
to
both
overcrowding
and
related
conditions at CCCF. Plaintiff is not presently confined at CCCF,
and
the
successful
Dittimus–Bey
class
action
litigation
has
resulted in substantial improvements for those confined at CCCF in
recent years. That these facts from Dittimus-Bey are uncontested
here by Plaintiff Sosa is merely further demonstration that summary
judgment is appropriate.
The Court is not persuaded, however, that the final consent
decree in Dittimus-Bey in and of itself moots Plaintiff’s case.
Plaintiff, a class member in Dittimus-Bey, is bound by the final
judgment in which class members are deemed to release claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief against Camden County and its
officers and employees. This means that Mr. Sosa, like all class
members, could no longer obtain injunctive relief beyond that
authorized in the Consent Decree for jail conditions during the
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class period. But that litigation did not involve individual
inmates’ or detainees’ claims or class claims for money damages,
which must be sought and proved on an individual claim basis. In
other words, the Final Consent Decree in Dittimus-Bey did not
adjudicate or deal with any individual money damage claims. That
Consent
Decree
does
not
extinguish
the
possibility
that
constitutional violations occurred to individuals during the class
period.
Indeed,
claims
for
money
damages
were
not
sought
in
Dittimus-Bey and inmates were free to pursue individual claims for
monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by filing an individual
complaint, as Mr. Sosa has done. Accordingly, to the extent that
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for money damages is mooted
by the final Consent Decree in Dittimus-Bey, the mootness argument
lacks merit and is denied.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the materials of record
“show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
Where, as in this case, the nonmoving party bears the burden
of persuasion at trial, the moving party may be entitled to summary
judgment by observing that there is an absence of evidence to
support an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex
8
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Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); see also Rahman v.
Taylor, 2013 WL 1192352, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2013). Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c) “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.
at 322. A plaintiff opposing a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment has the burden of coming forward with evidence, not mere
allegations, that would raise a genuine dispute of material fact
and suffice to enable a reasonable jury, giving all favorable
inferences to the plaintiff as the party opposing summary judgment,
to find in plaintiff’s favor at trial. Rule 56(c)(1)(A) further
provides that, to create a genuine issue of material fact, the
nonmovant must do so by:
citing to particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits
or
declarations,
stipulations
(including
those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). However, failure to respond to a
motion for summary judgment “is not alone a sufficient basis for
the entry of a summary judgment.” Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin
Island Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990). The
Court still must determine, even for an unopposed summary judgment
9
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motion, whether the motion has been properly made and supported
and whether granting summary judgment is appropriate. Id.
In order to grant Defendants’ unopposed motion for summary
judgment, where, as here, “the moving party does not have the
burden of proof on the relevant issues, ... the district court
must
determine
that
the
deficiencies
in
opponent’s
evidence
designated in or in connection with the motion entitle the moving
party to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 175. Additionally,
pursuant to Local Civ. R. 56.1(a), Defendants’ statements of
material facts, having not been admitted, denied or addressed by
Plaintiff in any other fashion, are deemed undisputed for the
purposes of this Motion. Thus, in the present case, where Mr. Sosa
has failed to oppose this summary judgment motion and where he has
failed to supply responses to routine interrogatories in the course
of discovery, there is no basis to look beyond the Defendants’
proper
submissions,
including
their
Rule
56.1
statement
of
undisputed material facts, to determine whether summary judgment
should be granted in Defendants’ favor.
B. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO COME FORWARD WITH ANY EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING HIS CLAIM OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT
In
this
case,
the
evidentiary
record
consists
of
what
Defendants attached to the Motion. Plaintiff has provided the Court
only
with
pleadings
conclusions.
The
that
contain
Complaint
a
mix
attaches
10
of
no
facts
and
affidavits
legal
or
Case 1:16-cv-08662-JBS-AMD Document 21 Filed 06/04/18 Page 11 of 20 PageID: 225
certifications.
Defendants’
(ECF
No.
discovery
1.)
Plaintiff
requests,
nor
has
did
not
respond
Plaintiff
made
to
any
discovery demands on Defendants. Mere pleadings are insufficient
to defeat summary judgment. Rahman, 2013 WL 1192352, at *3. The
ample time for completing factual discovery has expired.
Defendants
assert
in
their
uncontroverted
Statement
of
Material Facts that Plaintiff was a member of the certified class
(ECF No. 18-8 at ¶9) in the matter of Dittimus-Bey, et al. v.
Camden County et al., No. 05-cv-0063. (ECF No. 18-6.) In DittimusBey, the plaintiffs had alleged several conditions of “unhealthy,
unsafe, and unsanitary environment ... [a]s a direct result of
severe overcrowding and understaffing” at CCCF. (ECF No. 18-6
(Dittimus-Bey Amended Complaint) at 8; ECF No. 18-2 (Def. Br.) at
6 (“Plaintiffs in Dittimus-Bey alleged that policies and practices
created unconstitutional conditions, which included overcrowded
cells [and] inadequate sleeping arrangement[s] . . .”).) As noted
in the Dittimus-Bey Sixth and Amended Final Consent Decree, CCCF’s
population “reached a crisis point in early 2013” (ECF No. 18-7
(Consent Decree) at ¶35), after which the daily population was
closely monitored and managed over time to appropriate levels for
resolution of the Dittimus-Bey claims. (Id. at ¶¶36–37.) In this
case, Defendants do not appear to contest Plaintiff’s claim that
he was housed at CCCF with three other men in a cell designed for
only two men total (ECF No. 1 at 2) during a period of time when
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CCCF was at its population “crisis point.” (ECF No. 18-7 at ¶35.)
Neither party has provided the Court with specific evidence of Mr.
Sosa’s particular cell assignments during his period of detention.
Thus, the Court will assume, for purposes of this motion only,
that Plaintiff was “triple celled” at some point during the period
of his July 2012 through November 2014 incarceration, since the
population data would support a finding that, at the “crisis
points” during Plaintiff’s detention, the average two-person cell
in fact contained three persons, one of whom had to temporarily
sleep on the floor mattress, while two occupied bunk beds.
Defendants argue that, based on these facts and on Plaintiff’s
failure to provide evidence supporting his contentions, Plaintiff
fails to state a claim or raise a dispute of material fact as to
any Fourteenth Amendment violation. (ECF No. 18-2 (Def. Br.) at 813.) Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has adduced:
no proof of unconstitutional conditions (id. at 10–11); no proof
of injury or damages (id. at 11); no evidence that Defendants
intended to punish or were deliberately indifferent to (or were
even
aware
of
risk
of
serious
harm
from)
the
allegedly
constitutional violations (id. at 12-13); and no evidence of the
personal participation or acquiescence of any of the individual
defendants Warden or Freeholders in the alleged wrongs (id. at 1213), as required by Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979),
Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007), and Rode v.
12
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Dellaciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988).
Defendants’ factual assertions, which are deemed undisputed,
indicate that entry of summary judgment is appropriate. The mere
fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a cell with more
persons than its intended design does not, on its own, rise to the
level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) (holding double-celling in a one-man cell
by itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App’x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking does
not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man, one cell
principle
lurking
in
the
Due
Process
Clause
of
the
Fifth
Amendment.’ ”) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 542)). More is needed to
demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a pretrial detainee,
“shocks the conscience,” and thus violates due process rights. See
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that
due process analysis requires courts to consider whether the
totality of the conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that the
adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes
assigned to them”). Here, Plaintiff has adduced no evidence that
the conditions he experienced while “triple celled” in a two-man
unit were so severe that they “shock the conscience.” Similarly,
being a detainee in a unit housing two or three other men in a
cell designed for only two men total (ECF No. 1 at 2) does not,
standing alone, rise to the level of a due process violation.
13
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Defendants further assert that, as a result of other classaction
litigation
addressing
overcrowding
and
conditions
of
confinement at CCCF, there has been a “reduction in [CCCF’s]
population and improvement of other conditions in [CCCF].” (ECF
No.
18-2
at
14.)
Indeed,
as
a
result
of
the
Dittimus-Bey
litigation3, there has been a significant lessening of the crowding
in CCCF and improvements in other prison conditions. (ECF No. 187 (Consent Decree) at ¶¶36-37.) When the Dittimus-Bey litigation
commenced in 2005, CCCF’s average daily population was 1,848
inmates; by May of 2010, the average monthly population reached an
all-time low of 1,232 inmates. (ECF No. 18-7 at ¶¶33-34.) CCCF’s
population as of December 9, 2016 was at 1,160 -- in a facility
designed for 1,267 persons.(ECF No. 18-7 (Consent Decree) at ¶¶3334, 36.) While it is conceivable that an individual inmate could
be subjected to unconstitutional conditions even at a jail that is
continuously monitored and operating within reasonable capacity
limits, Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence that he has actually
suffered such deprivation. Furthermore, the Complaint does not
assert any facts from which a reasonable fact finder could discern
3
See Order Approving Amended Final Consent Decree, Dittimus-Bey
v. Taylor, No. 05-0063 (D.N.J. June 30, 2017), ECF No. 225; see
also Dittimus-Bey v. Taylor, 2013 WL 6022128 (D.N.J. Nov. 12,
2013); Dittimus-Bey v. Taylor, 244 F.R.D. 284 (2007). The Court
does not imply that Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief in this
case (ECF No. 1 at 6-7) are barred by the class action settlement
of Dittimus-Bey, since that case only involved claims for
injunctive relief.
14
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that
the
individual
defendants
Warden
or
Freeholders
were
deliberately indifferent to these conditions.
These undisputed facts refute any claim that Defendants or
supervisors at the facility were “deliberately indifferent” to the
alleged constitutional violations, which is the mental culpability
that must be proven to find liability under § 1983. See Jiminez v.
All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2007)
(describing the “deliberate indifference” standard). There is no
evidence of conduct that would tend to show deliberate indifference
on the part of Defendants. Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s overcrowded conditions of confinement
Fourteenth Amendment claim.
In
addition,
Plaintiff’s
vague
and
cursory
allegations
regarding mold, insects, and temperature issues (ECF No. 1 at 3)
essentially
complain
situation”;
however,
“of
“the
an
inconvenient
Constitution
and
does
uncomfortable
not
mandate
comfortable prisons.” Carson, 488 F. App’x at 560 (quoting Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 349). Notably, no claim identifies a single “basic
human need” which Plaintiff has been denied. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
347 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685-88 (1978)). Without
more, the Court cannot say that a reasonable fact finder could
conclude that these conditions deprived Plaintiff of any basic
human needs. See Carter v. Owens, 2017 WL 4107204, at *10 (D.N.J.
July 21, 2017) (finding that, without additional details about the
nature of prisoner’s inadequate “dayroom” space claim, prisoner
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“has not demonstrated that denial of access to it was sufficiently
serious
to
deprive
him
of
the
minimal
measure
of
life’s
necessities”); Williams v. Meisel, 2014 WL 4744561, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 24, 2014) (finding that mold in showers did not amount
to constitutional violation because the mold did not expose inmates
to an unreasonable risk of serious damage to future health). For
example, Plaintiff adduces no evidence that he was sickened by
these conditions or that the crowding led to any assault by another
inmate, or that he was significantly sleep-deprived due to these
conditions.
Accordingly,
Defendants
are
entitled
to
summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims involving
alleged mold, rodents, insects, and temperature issues.
C. WHETHER FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS MUST BE
DISMISSED BECAUSE PLINTIFF HAS FAILED TO COME FORWARD
WITH ANY EVIDENCE SUPPORTING HIS CLAIM
Plaintiff
contends
that
his
First
Amendment
rights
were
violated, but he does not specify any particular action(s) by
Defendants that caused such purported constitutional violation(s).
Rather, the Complaint states only: “Access to courts” and “Freedom
of Speech.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Although this Court has an obligation
to liberally construe pro se pleadings and to hold them to a less
stringent standard than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers4,
a nonmoving party on a summary judgment motion must nevertheless
“set forth ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial,’ else summary judgment, ‘if appropriate,’ will be
4
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
16
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entered.”
U.S. v. Premises Known as 717 S. Woodward Street,
Allentown, Pa., 2 F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party, here the Plaintiff, “may not,
in the face of a showing of a lack of a genuine issue, withstand
summary judgment by resting on mere allegations or denials in the
pleadings.” Id. In order to grant an unopposed motion for summary
judgment, where, as here, “the moving party does not have the
burden of proof on the relevant issues, ... the [Court] must
determine
that
designated
in
the
or
in
deficiencies
connection
in
with
[Plaintiff's]
the
motion
evidence
entitle
the
[Defendants] to judgment as a matter of law.” Anchorage Assocs.,
922 F.2d at 175.
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to
serve as the basis for his “Access to Courts” claim (ECF No. 1 at
5), and he has not presented any evidence independent of the
Complaint’s bare allegation of “attempted to retrieve grievance
form & an Inmate handbook” (id. at 2) in support of any aspect of
his “Freedom of Speech” claim. (Id. at 5.) Even construing these
claims liberally, this Court cannot find any factual allegations
whatsoever
within
the
Complaint
as
to
these
claims.
More
importantly, the summary judgment record contains no evidence from
which a jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor on the claim of
deprivation of access to the courts.
In fact, the only evidence of record arguably relating to
speech is the uncontested Certification of Albert Hickson, Jr., a
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CCCF corrections officer, submitted in support of the Motion. In
the Certification, Mr. Hickson states:
All inmates of the Camden County Correctional
Facility are issued an "Inmate Handbook" when
they are processed into the Facility. The
Inmate Handbook contains a specific section
for inmate grievances and the procedure to be
followed. That section indicates the procedure
for the inmates to file their grievance and if
not satisfied with the initial grievance
result how to appeal the decision.
I hereby certify that I have conducted a
search of the inmate files as they are kept in
the ordinary course of business by the Camden
County Correctional Facility and have not
located any grievances for Adam Sosa for the
time period of 2014 to 2015, when he was
previously incarcerated at the Camden County
Correctional Facility.
(ECF No. 18-9 at 2.) This evidence tends to show that Plaintiff
did not attempt to exercise any constitutionally protected rights
of expression for which he was retaliated against during his CCCF
incarceration. This Court can discern no allegations set forth by
Plaintiff
of
an
adverse
action
that
causally
resulted
from
constitutionally protected activity of filing grievances.5 For
5
The First Amendment offers protection for a wide variety of
expressive activities. See U.S. Const. amend. I. These rights are
lessened, but not extinguished in the prison context, where
legitimate penological interests must be considered in assessing
the constitutionality of official conduct. See Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). To state a freedom of speech claim which
is often interpreted as a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must, as
a threshold matter, establish “that the conduct which led to the
alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected.” Rauser v.
Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). Next, a plaintiff must
assert “he suffered some adverse action at the hands of the prison
officials,” such that “the alleged retaliatory conduct was
sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising
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Case 1:16-cv-08662-JBS-AMD Document 21 Filed 06/04/18 Page 19 of 20 PageID: 233
instance, his Complaint is devoid of any alleged retaliatory
conduct that would deter a reasonably firm prisoner from exercising
his First Amendment rights, such as being placed in segregation.
Therefore, because Plaintiff has not offered any evidence in
support of his First Amendment claims, and because the only
evidence in the record tends to undermine his claims, Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment.
D. WHETHER CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS MUST BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE THEY ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In addition to the grounds discussed in Sections V(B) and (C)
of this Opinion, Defendants also request that this Court grant
them summary judgment on the basis that they are entitled to
qualified immunity.
Qualified
immunity
protects
government
officials
from
liability as long as their conduct “‘does not violate clearly
established
statutory
or
constitutional
rights
of
which
a
reasonable person would have known.’” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248,
253 (3d Cir. 2010). The qualified immunity test is two-pronged:
whether
the
pleadings
allege
that
a
constitutional
violation
his First Amendment rights.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Finally, a plaintiff must establish “a causal link between the
exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken
against him,” by showing that “the constitutionally protected
conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to
discipline the inmate.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Filing
grievances “against prison officials constitutes constitutionally
protected activity.” See Mearin v. Vidonish, 450 F. App’x 100, 102
(3d Cir. 2011).
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Case 1:16-cv-08662-JBS-AMD Document 21 Filed 06/04/18 Page 20 of 20 PageID: 234
occurred, and whether “reasonable officials could fairly have
known that their alleged conduct was illegal.” Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 121 (2001); Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of
Pa., 154 F.3d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1998).
Because it is clear that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a
basis for a constitutional violation, there is no need to address
whether a reasonable official would know his conduct was unlawful,
due to no proof of such illegality.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendants’ motion for
summary
judgment
is
granted.
An
accompanying
Order
will
be
entered.6
June 4, 2018
Date
6
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge
Although the Complaint includes unnamed “Correctional Officers
Jane & John Does 1 through 100 in official and individual
capacities,” no such corrections officer has been identified or
served with process and the time for doing so under Rule 4(m),
Fed. R. Civ. P., has expired. Therefore, no claims remain in
this case, and the Clerk will also be directed to close it upon
the docket.
20
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