CAMICK v. HOLLADAY et al

Filing 6

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 5/9/18. (jbk, )

[Dkt. No. 1, 5]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

LESLIE L. CAMICK,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 16-9013 (RMB/AMD)
v.
HARRY R. HOLLADAY, ESQ.;
EVELYN A. WATTLEY; and
KAITRAXX LLC,

OPINION

Defendants.

BUMB, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon the filing of an
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), [Dkt. No. 5],
by Plaintiff Leslie L. Camick (the “Plaintiff”). Plaintiff’s
application to proceed IFP will be granted based on the
information provided therein, and the Clerk of the Court will be
ordered to file the Complaint. Because Plaintiff is proceeding
IFP, the Court must now screen his Complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I.

Background

On December 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against
Defendants Harry Holladay (“Holladay”), Evelyn Wattley
(“Wattley”), and Kaitraxx, Inc. (“Kaitraxx” and collectively,

the “Defendants”), alleging that they violated 28 U.S.C. §
1985(3) (“Section 1985”) by conspiring to cause Plaintiff to be
wrongfully arrested on multiple occasions between 2011 and 2013.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wattley made a
false police report and a series of false statements to police
indicating that Plaintiff had stolen her car, which ultimately
resulted in Plaintiff’s arrest. With regard to Defendant
Holladay, Plaintiff seems to allege that he conspired to violate
Plaintiff’s rights by providing Wattley with legal advice
regarding “her actions.” (See Compl. at ¶ 81-89). Defendant
Kaitraxx appears to be an LLC of which Wattley is the sole
member and CEO. [Dkt. No. 1-4]. There are no allegations in the
Complaint regarding any wrongdoing by Kaitraxx.
II.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must
preliminarily screen IFP filings, and must dismiss any filing
that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In
reviewing a plaintiff's allegations, a district court “must
accept as true all well-pled factual allegations as well as all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and construe
those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012). Moreover, pro
se pleadings must be construed liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Where,
however, “the complaint facially shows noncompliance with” a
statute of limitations, it may be dismissed for failure to state
a claim. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d
1380, 1385 (3d Cir. 1994).
III. Discussion
A Section 1985(3) claim accrues when the plaintiff “knew or
should have known of the alleged conspiracy.” Dique v. New
Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2010)(citing
Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir.1989)).
“The statute of limitations, accordingly, runs from the date of
each overt act causing damage to the plaintiff.” Bougher, 882
F.2d at 80. Courts in the Third Circuit apply state personal
injury statutes of limitation to Section 1985(3) claims. See id.
at 79. In New Jersey, the limitations period for personal injury
is two years. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2. Plaintiff’s Complaint
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arises from actions allegedly taken by Defendants between 2011
and 2013, and at the very latest January 2014 when Plaintiff was
convicted. Plaintiff did not, however, file his Complaint until
December 2016. Because he filed his Complaint more than twoyears from the date any alleged injury arose, Plaintiff’s claims
are barred by the statute of limitations. 1
In fact, Plaintiff acknowledges in the second paragraph of
his Complaint that his claims are untimely. (See Compl. at 2).
He argues, however, that the limitations period should be
equitably tolled. “Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy
which should be extended only sparingly.” Hedges v. United
States, 404 F.3d 744, 751 (3d Cir. 2005)(citations omitted).
There are three principal situations in which equitable tolling
may be appropriate: “(1) where the defendant has actively misled
the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2)
where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented
from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has
timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong
forum.” Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1387. Moreover, “[t]o obtain the
benefit of equitable tolling, a party also must show that ‘she

1

It would be difficult for Plaintiff to argue that he did not
know of the alleged conspiracy in 2013 considering he filed a
civil action in the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas (No. 13-2361-JAR-JPO) naming Wattley and
Kaitraxx, among other defendants, and complaining of largely the
same conduct.
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exercised due diligence in pursuing and preserving her claim.’”
Omar v. Blackman, 590 Fed. Appx. 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Santos ex rel Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 197
(3d Cir. 2009)).
Plaintiff has not made any of the above showings. He argues
instead that he was barred from filing this suit, or any suit
against these Defendants, by order of the District of Kansas. In
the order on which Plaintiff relies, however, the court denied a
request by the government to enjoin Plaintiff from filing
further pleadings in federal court. See United States v. Camick,
No. 13-10042-01-JTM, 2014 WL 644997, at *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 19,
2014); see also Camick v. Smith, No. CV 16-8844 (RBK/JS), 2017
WL 2779752, at *2 (D.N.J. June 26, 2017), aff'd, 698 F. App'x 41
(3d Cir. 2017). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s action is barred by the
statute of limitations, and the Court will dismiss it with
prejudice.
IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs application to
proceed without prepayment of fees and costs is GRANTED, and
Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. An Order
consistent with this Opinion shall issue on this date.
_s/_Renee Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
DATED: May 9, 2018
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