REED v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
14
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 10/30/2018. (rtm, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
NANCY L. REED,
1:16-cv-9099-NLH
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
RICHARD LOWELL FRANKEL
BROSS & FRANKEL, PA
102 BROWNING LANE, BLDG C-1
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08003
On behalf of Plaintiff
KATIE M. GAUGHAN
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
300 SPRING GARDEN STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19123
On behalf of Defendant
HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section
205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), to review the final decision of the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration, denying Plaintiff’s
application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under
Title II of the Social Security Act.
42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq.
The issue before the Court is whether the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding that there was “substantial
evidence” that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time since
her alleged onset date of disability, which Plaintiff
initially claimed was June 28, 2004, but subsequently amended
to April 2, 2008.
For the reasons stated below, this Court
will affirm that decision.
I.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 17, 2011, Plaintiff, Nancy L. Reed,
protectively filed an application for DIB, initially alleging
that she became disabled on June 28, 2004, but she later
amended her alleged onset date to April 2, 2008.
Plaintiff
claims that she is no longer able to work in her past
employment as a legal secretary because she suffers from
various impairments, including degenerative disc disease of
the lumbosacral and cervical spine, sleep apnea, peripheral
neuropathy, and urinary incontinence.
Plaintiff’s initial claim was denied on December 12,
2011.
After her request for reconsideration was denied on
April 11, 2012, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ,
which was held on July 2, 2013.
At the hearing, Plaintiff
amended her alleged onset date of disability to April 2, 2008.
On August 14, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision.
Pursuant to Plaintiff’s Request for Review of Hearing Decision
2
to the Appeals Council on March 26, 2015, the Appeals Council
remanded the case to the ALJ for further review of the
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”).
hearing was held on July 9, 2015.
A second
On August 31, 2015, the ALJ
issued a second unfavorable decision.
Plaintiff’s Request for
Review of Hearing Decision was denied by the Appeals Council
on October 5, 2016, making the ALJ’s August 31, 2015 decision
final.
Plaintiff brings this civil action for review of the
Commissioner’s decision.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Congress provided for judicial
review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny a complainant’s
application for social security benefits.
55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995).
Ventura v. Shalala,
A reviewing court must
uphold the Commissioner’s factual decisions where they are
supported by “substantial evidence.”
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir.
2001); Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000);
Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992).
Substantial evidence means more than “a mere scintilla.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(quoting
3
Consolidated Edison Co. V. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id.
The inquiry
is not whether the reviewing court would have made the same
determination, but whether the Commissioner’s conclusion was
reasonable.
See Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir.
1988).
A reviewing court has a duty to review the evidence in
its totality.
1984).
See Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir.
“[A] court must ‘take into account whatever in the
record fairly detracts from its weight.’” Schonewolf v.
Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting
Willbanks v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 847 F.2d 301,
303 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. V. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)).
The Commissioner “must adequately explain in the record
his reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence.”
Ogden v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 273, 278 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (citing
Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1986)).
The Third
Circuit has held that an “ALJ must review all pertinent
medical evidence and explain his conciliations and
rejections.”
Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d
4
112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000).
Similarly, an ALJ must also consider
and weigh all of the non-medical evidence before him.
Id.
(citing Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir.
1983)); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 707 (3d Cir. 1981).
The Third Circuit has held that access to the
Commissioner’s reasoning is indeed essential to a meaningful
court review:
Unless the [Commissioner] has analyzed all
evidence and has sufficiently explained
the weight he has given to obviously
probative exhibits, to say that his
decision is supported by substantial
evidence approaches an abdication of the
court’s duty to scrutinize the record as a
whole to determine whether the conclusions
reached are rational.
Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978).
Although
an ALJ, as the fact finder, must consider and evaluate the
medical evidence presented, Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42, “[t]here
is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in its opinion every
tidbit of evidence included in the record,” Hur v. Barnhart,
94 F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004).
In terms of judicial
review, a district court is not “empowered to weigh the
evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the factfinder.”
Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182.
However, apart from the
substantial evidence inquiry, a reviewing court is entitled to
5
satisfy itself that the Commissioner arrived at his decision
by application of the proper legal standards.
Sykes, 228 F.3d
at 262; Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir.
1983); Curtin v. Harris, 508 F. Supp. 791, 793 (D.N.J. 1981).
B.
Standard for Disability Insurance Benefits
The Social Security Act defines “disability” for purposes
of an entitlement to a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits as the inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
Under this
definition, a Plaintiff qualifies as disabled only if his
physical or mental impairments are of such severity that he is
not only unable to perform his past relevant work, but cannot,
given his age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other type of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in
the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he
applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B) (emphasis
6
added).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations 1 for
determining disability that require application of a five-step
sequential analysis.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
This five-
step process is summarized as follows:
1.
If the claimant currently is engaged in substantial
gainful employment, he will be found “not disabled.”
2.
If the claimant does not suffer from a “severe
impairment,” he will be found “not disabled.”
3.
If the severe impairment meets or equals a listed
impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 and has lasted or is expected to last for
a continuous period of at least twelve months, the
claimant will be found “disabled.”
4.
If the claimant can still perform work he has done
in the past (“past relevant work”) despite the
severe impairment, he will be found “not disabled.”
5.
Finally, the Commissioner will consider the
claimant’s ability to perform work (“residual
functional capacity”), age, education, and past work
experience to determine whether or not he is capable
of performing other work which exists in the
national economy. If he is incapable, he will be
found “disabled.” If he is capable, he will be
found “not disabled.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f).
Entitlement to benefits is
therefore dependent upon a finding that the claimant is
1
The regulations were amended for various provisions effective
March 27, 2017. See 82 F.R. 5844. Because the ALJ issued his
decision prior to that effective date, the Court must employ
the standards in effect at the time of his decision.
7
incapable of performing work in the national economy.
This five-step process involves a shifting burden of
proof.
See Wallace v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 722
F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983).
In the first four steps of
the analysis, the burden is on the claimant to prove every
element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
id.
See
In the final step, the Commissioner bears the burden of
proving that work is available for the Plaintiff: “Once a
claimant has proved that he is unable to perform his former
job, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there
is some other kind of substantial gainful employment he is
able to perform.”
Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir.
1987); see Olsen v. Schweiker, 703 F.2d 751, 753 (3d Cir.
1983).
C.
Analysis
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of
disability.
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s
impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbosacral
spine, status-post a laminectomy, and degenerative disc
disease of the cervical spine, status-post a cervical fusion,
were severe.
At step three, the ALJ determined that
8
Plaintiff’s severe impairments or her severe impairments in
combination with her other impairments did not equal the
severity of one of the listed impairments.
The ALJ then
determined that Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) precluded her from performing her past work as a legal
secretary, but her RFC rendered her capable of performing
sedentary work in jobs such information clerk, appointment
clerk, and surveillance system monitor (steps four and five).
Plaintiff presents four arguments on appeal:
1.
Whether the ALJ erred at step five in finding that
Plaintiff acquired “transferrable skills” to perform certain
jobs by relying on the Vocational Expert’s testimony that work
aptitudes or “abilities” were actually “skills”;
2.
Whether the ALJ erred in failing to address the VE’s
testimony that a frequent limitation in reaching and handling
would have a significant impact on the transferability of the
skills identified;
3.
Whether the ALJ failed to provide a credibility
determination pursuant to SSR 96-7p; and
4.
Whether the ALJ erred in failing to address
significant evidence in the record.
The Court will address Plaintiff’s arguments in two parts.
9
First, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s arguments regarding
the VE’s testimony and the ALJ’s transferrable skills analysis
at step five of the sequential evaluation process.
Second, the
Court will consider Plaintiff’s arguments about the ALJ’s
credibility determination and consideration of the record
evidence as a whole.
a.
Whether the ALJ erred at step five
As set forth above, at the fourth step in the ALJ’s
analysis of a DIB claim, the burden is on the claimant to
establish that she is unable to perform any of her past
relevant work.
The primary part of this analysis requires the
ALJ to determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”).
The RFC reflects “what [the claimant] can still do
despite [his or her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). 2
In making a RFC determination, the ALJ is required to do
the following:
In determining whether you are disabled, we consider all
your symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which
your symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent
with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.
By objective medical evidence, we mean medical signs and
laboratory findings . . . . By other evidence, we mean .
. . statements or reports from you, your treating or
2
The RFC finding is a determination expressly reserved to the
Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2),
404.1546(c), 416.946(c).
10
nontreating source, and others about your medical history,
diagnosis, prescribed treatment, daily activities, efforts
to work, and any other evidence showing how your
impairment(s) and any related symptoms affect your ability
to work. . . .
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
Under this framework, the ALJ in this case determined that
through the date last insured 3 – June 30, 2009 - Plaintiff had
the RFC to perform sedentary work, in addition to performing
frequent fingering, grasping, holding, reaching and handling
with her hands. 4
Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined that
even though the Appeals Council suggested that Plaintiff was
able to perform her past relevant work as a legal secretary,
and his RFC assessment could also support that finding, the ALJ
nonetheless provided Plaintiff with “the benefit of the doubt”
and proceeded to step five under the assumption she was unable
3
The date last insured is the last day of the quarter a
claimant meets insured status for disability. A claimant must
be deemed disabled by that date in order to receive DIB
benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.131.
4
Sedentary work “involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a
time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket
files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is
defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of
walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job
duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are
required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567.
11
to perform her past relevant work.
(R. at 29.)
Having found that Plaintiff met her burden at step four,
the ALJ continued to step five, where the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to show that other work exists in the national
economy that the claimant is capable of performing.
To make
that showing, the ALJ considered testimony from a Vocational
Expert, and the transferability of Plaintiff’s skills as a
legal secretary to other jobs was discussed.
Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568, in order to evaluate a
claimant’s skills and to help determine the existence of work a
claimant is able to perform, occupations are classified as
unskilled, 5 semi-skilled, 6 and skilled.
With regard to
transferrable skills, the regulations explain:
(d) Skills that can be used in other work
(transferability)—
(1) What we mean by transferable skills. We consider
you to have skills that can be used in other jobs,
when the skilled or semi-skilled work activities you
did in past work can be used to meet the requirements
of skilled or semi-skilled work activities of other
jobs or kinds of work. This depends largely on the
5
Unskilled work is work which needs little or no judgment to do
simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period
of time. . . . A person does not gain work skills by doing
unskilled jobs. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568.
6
Semi-skilled work is work which needs some skills but does not
require doing the more complex work duties. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1568.
12
similarity of occupationally significant work
activities among different jobs.
(2) How we determine skills that can be transferred
to other jobs. Transferability is most probable and
meaningful among jobs in which—
(i) The same or a lesser degree of skill is
required;
(ii) The same or similar tools and machines are
used; and
(iii) The same or similar raw materials,
products, processes, or services are involved.
(3) Degrees of transferability. There are degrees of
transferability of skills ranging from very close
similarities to remote and incidental similarities
among jobs. A complete similarity of all three
factors is not necessary for transferability.
However, when skills are so specialized or have been
acquired in such an isolated vocational setting (like
many jobs in mining, agriculture, or fishing) that
they are not readily usable in other industries,
jobs, and work settings, we consider that they are
not transferable.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1568.
Under this framework, the VE testified that Plaintiff’s
past relevant work as a legal secretary entailed the skills of
documentation, filing, operation of computer and other office
equipment, scheduling and typing skills, and these skill were
transferrable to sedentary jobs, such as an information clerk
and appointment clerk.
In tandem with this testimony, the VE
further testified that based on a hypothetical individual with
Plaintiff’s skills and RFC as found by the ALJ, as well as her
13
age and education, that individual would be able to work as:
(1) an information clerk, which is semi-skilled and sedentary,
and 500,000 jobs exists in the national economy; (2) an
appointment clerk, which is semi-skilled and sedentary, and
100,000 jobs exists in the national economy; and (3) a
surveillance system monitor, which is unskilled, sedentary, and
90,000 jobs exists in the national economy.
The ALJ determined that even though Plaintiff’s
limitations did not allow her to perform the full range of
sedentary work, the range of jobs Plaintiff could perform was
not significantly diminished by her non-exertional limitations.
These jobs included the three jobs set forth by the VE, which
the ALJ found to satisfy the Commissioner’s burden of proving
that other jobs existed in significant numbers in the national
economy that Plaintiff was capable of performing.
Plaintiff finds fault with this determination in two ways.
Plaintiff argues that the VE, and as a result the ALJ,
inappropriately considered Plaintiff’s “aptitudes” or “traits”
present in all jobs – even unskilled jobs - rather than her
“skills” which are specialized in the transferability analysis.
She also argues that the ALJ did not consider the testimony
elicited from Plaintiff’s counsel’s questioning of the VE about
14
Plaintiff’s skills relative to a claimant who was limited in
frequent reaching and handling.
The Court does not find that the ALJ erred in either way.
The VE testified, and the ALJ accepted, that Plaintiff gained
the skills of documentation, filing, operation of computer and
other office equipment, scheduling and typing skills from her
prior work as a legal secretary.
The Court is not persuaded
that these are aptitudes or traits rather than skills.
Examples of traits and aptitudes are “alertness,”
“coordination and dexterity,” “special perception,” and “motor
coordination.”
Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d
Cir. 1984) (discussing SSR 82-41).
In contrast, skills refer
to experience and demonstrated proficiency with work activities
in particular tasks or jobs.
For example, “a semiskilled
general office clerk (administrative clerk), doing light work,
ordinarily is equally proficient in, and spends considerable
time doing, typing, filing, tabulating and posting data in
record books, preparing invoices and statements, operating
adding and calculating machines, etc.”
SSR 82-41.
“These
clerical skills may be readily transferable to such semiskilled
sedentary occupations as typist, clerk-typist and insurance
auditing control clerk.”
Id.
15
Here, the ALJ found, based on the VE testimony, that
Plaintiff’s prior job as a legal secretary provided her with
the skills of documentation, filing, operation of computer and
other office equipment, scheduling and typing.
These
proficiencies are clearly skills garnered from her prior
employment and not simply general aptitudes.
Plaintiff
requires a certain level of motor skills, for example, to type
on a computer and file documents, but as the SSA explained, “It
is the acquired capacity to perform the work activities with
facility (rather than the traits themselves) that gives rise to
potentially transferable skills.”
SSR 82-41.
Thus, the ALJ
did not impermissibly perform the transferability analysis as
to Plaintiff’s traits instead of skills as she contends.
Even if, however, the ALJ erred in this analysis, the ALJ
also found that Plaintiff was capable of performing the
unskilled, sedentary job of surveillance system monitor.
The
transferability analysis is not relevant to a claimant’s
ability to perform an unskilled job.
See Podedworny, 745 F.2d
at 221 (explaining that the regulations do not permit benefits
to be denied based on the transfer of skills to unskilled jobs,
and “it is counterintuitive to suggest that skills can be
transferred to unskilled work”).
16
Thus, the ALJ did not err in
the transferability analysis because it was inapplicable to
that unskilled job.
Moreover, the finding that Plaintiff
retained the RFC to perform one job that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy met the ALJ’s burden at step
five to show that Plaintiff is not disabled.
See Nalej v.
Berryhill, 2017 WL 6493144, at *11 (D.N.J. 2017) (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.966(b))(explaining that SSA regulations provide
that work exists in the national economy when there is a
significant number of jobs in one or more occupations that an
individual can perform, and holding that even if the ALJ erred
in finding the plaintiff capable of performing two of three
jobs, he did not err as to the third job, and that finding as
to only one job was sufficient to support his determination
that the plaintiff was not disabled).
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly
consider the hypothetical posed by Plaintiff’s counsel to the
VE about a claimant who has limited ability in using her upper
extremities, because as the VE testified, such a limitation
would erode the skills necessary for the semi-skilled
positions.
The Court does not agree.
The ALJ explicitly found
that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform sedentary work, in
addition to performing frequent fingering, grasping, holding,
17
reaching and handling with her hands.
This finding meant that
Plaintiff had little to no limitation on the use of her upper
extremities as required at the sedentary level, which finding
matches the skills and abilities required by the sedentary,
semi-skilled jobs suggested by the VE.
There was no need,
therefore, for the ALJ to consider a hypothetical claimant who
was limited in these areas, since Plaintiff was not.
Moreover,
even if the ALJ were required to assess this hypothetical
claimant, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of
performing an unskilled position, and as previously explained,
the transferability analysis is not implicated for that
position.
Consequently, Plaintiff’s argument for reversal of the
ALJ’s decision regarding his transfer-of-skills analysis is
unavailing.
b.
Whether the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s
credibility and considered all the evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ barely acknowledged her
testimony, and essentially ignored most of the record
evidence.
The Court recognizes that the ALJ’s decision does
not recount in intricate detail either Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints or her medical records which span almost 20 years.
The ALJ is not required to do so, however, and what evidence
18
he specifically referenced is more than sufficient to satisfy
this Court that substantial evidence supports his decision.
As to Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ summarized her
complaints that: she cannot sit, stand or walk for long
periods or lift or carry significant weights in a work
setting; she had numbness and tingling in her fingers; she has
fallen when she has tried to walk long distances; pain causes
her difficulty in concentration and remembering things; she
does not do much but watch television during the day, perform
light housework, and do light cooking; and in October 2010 she
was able to do some part-time work as a housecleaner.
(R. at
27.)
As to Plaintiff’s medical records, the ALJ summarized her
impairments beginning in 1994 when she was injured in a motor
vehicle accident.
The ALJ related her surgeries and medical
care through the subsequent years, and noted that as of June
3, 2008, Plaintiff reported to her physician that her neck was
“okay” but stiff occasionally, and she had intermittent
weakness in her arms, but it was much better since her fusion.
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff began treatment for knee
pain in October 2010, but the onset of that condition occurred
after the date for insured status.
19
(R. at 27-28.)
The ALJ related that on April 3, 2012, Plaintiff’s
medical file was examined by a state agency medical
consultant.
That physician determined in an eight-hour work
day, Plaintiff could sit for six hours, stand/walk for four
hours, and lift/carry ten pounds occasionally, but she could
only occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or
crawl.
The ALJ noted that these findings were consistent with
sedentary work.
(R. at 28.)
By July 2013, Plaintiff’s medical records showed that she
had equal strength of hand grasps in the upper extremities,
normal motor strength in all extremities, and intact
sensation.
(R. at 29.)
The ALJ related that even though her
medical records showed that she ebbed and flowed in
exacerbations and remissions from 2012, the ALJ was tasked to
determine Plaintiff’s RFC as of June 30, 2009.
(R. at 28.)
The ALJ concluded that the medical evidence overall failed to
corroborate Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and it did not
establish that Plaintiff’s RFC precluded all levels and types
of gainful work activity as of that date.
(R. at 29.)
The ALJ could have discussed every single medical record
in the file, restated Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearings,
and recounted all her subjective complaints since 1994, but
20
that would not have changed the result.
The ALJ is required
to consider all the evidence and give some reason for
discounting the evidence he rejects, Adorno v. Shalala, 40
F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994), but the ALJ “need not undertake an
exhaustive discussion of all the evidence” to meet this
burden, Hernandez v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 89 F. App’x
771, 773–74 (3d Cir. 2004).
Thus, even if the ALJ listed
every one of Plaintiff’s medical records and stated verbatim
her testimony and subjective complaints, the central reasons
for the ALJ’s decision would be the same as he related in his
decision.
While Plaintiff points to medical records from the early
2000s directly after her surgeries to support her disability
claim, the ALJ reviewed all of the records and Plaintiff’s
testimony as a whole, and specifically referenced pre-June
2009 and subsequent records to support his determination that
Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform sedentary work as of
June 30, 2009.
The ALJ has an obligation to provide an
“adequate basis so that the reviewing court can determine
whether the administrative decision is based on substantial
evidence.”
1981).
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir.
Although Plaintiff challenges the ALJ because his
21
decision was not exhaustive, the ALJ’s decision in this case
met his obligation by what he specifically referenced in the
decision and how he articulated his findings to support his
conclusion.
See, e.g., Gaddis v. Commissioner of Social Sec.,
417 F. App’x 106, 108 (3d Cir. 2011) (“While he did not author
a particularly lengthy opinion, we are satisfied that the
[ALJ] fulfilled the obligations imposed by SSR 82–41 in a
manner supported by substantial evidence.”).
Consequently, the Court does not find that the ALJ erred
in his consideration of Plaintiff’s testimony and the medical
record as a whole.
III. CONCLUSION
This Court may not second guess the ALJ’s conclusions,
and may only determine whether substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s determinations.
Hartzell v. Astrue, 741 F. Supp. 2d
645, 647 (D.N.J. 2010) (citing Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d
1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)) (explaining that the pinnacle legal
principal is that a district court is not empowered to weigh
the evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the
ALJ).
The Court finds in this case the ALJ’s determination
that Plaintiff was not totally disabled as of June 30, 2009 is
supported by substantial evidence.
22
The decision of the ALJ is
therefore affirmed.
An accompanying Order will be issued.
Date: October 30, 2018
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
23
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