NORMAN v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al
Filing
31
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 8/12/2019. (rss, n.m.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
KEVIN NORMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action
No. 16-cv-9102(NLH)
CAPTAIN CARLA TAYLOR and
WARDEN DAVID OWENS,
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Kevin Norman, Plaintiff Pro Se
37 Magnolia Court
Sicklerville, NJ 08081
Anne E. Walters, Esquire
Office of Camden County Counsel
520 Market Street, 14th Floor
Camden, NJ 08102
Attorney for Defendants
HILLMAN, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for
summary judgment (“the Motion”) of defendants, Warden David
Owens and Captain Carla Taylor (collectively, “Defendants”) of
the Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”). (D.E. 23.)
The Motion is being considered on the papers pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 78(b).
For the reasons set forth below, the motion for
summary judgment will be granted.
1
BACKGROUND
A.
PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at CCCF during the period
January 3, 2014 through approximately January 2016. (D.E.
D.E.
22-1 at 5; D.E.
22-9 at ¶4.)
1 at 4;
He is proceeding pro se with
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint (“the Complaint”) against
the Defendants regarding the conditions of confinement during
Plaintiff’s incarceration at CCCF. (D.E. 1.)
Plaintiff alleges that he “was made to sleep on a thin mat on
the floor,” and that CCCF had “poor air quality [with] dust and
dirt build-up in the cell which turned into bacteria.” (D.E. 1 at
5.)
He claims that he “was subjected to drinking dirty brown
water” at CCCF. (Id. at 4.)
He also contends that he brought the
water situation to Defendants’ attention, but that they “failed to
correct the problem or find an alternative remedy.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff states that the alleged conditions of confinement
caused
him
to
suffer
an
infected
scalp,
a
rash,
headaches,
dizziness, and dehydration. (Id. at 5-6.)
Plaintiff seeks $50,000 in damages for “pain[,] suffering[,]
mental anguish[,] and physical discomfort.” (Id. at 6.)
He also
asks that the Court: order water testing at CCCF; and compel CCCF
to hire a full-time population control manager. (Ibid.)
B.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On
March
17,
2017,
this
Court
2
granted
Plaintiff’s
IFP
Application and directed the Clerk of the Court to file the
Complaint.
(D.E.
2.)
After
screening
Plaintiff’s
Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, the Court ordered
that
the
Complaint’s
Fourteenth
Amendment
conditions
of
confinement claim against Defendants be allowed to proceed. (D.E.
4; D.E. 5.)
Defendants
filed
an
December 19, 2017. (D.E.
Answer
15.)
to
Plaintiff’s
Complaint
on
On January 30, 2018, Magistrate
Judge Ann Marie Donio issued a scheduling order requiring that all
pretrial factual discovery be concluded by June 29, 2018. (D.E.
18.)
Defendants served Plaintiff with their: (1) January 30, 2018
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Disclosures (D.E.
22-5 at 2-29); (2) February
14, 2018 document requests (D.E. 22-6 at 2 and 11-14); and (3)
February
14,
2018
interrogatories.
(D.E.
22-6
at
2-10.)
Defendants’ Motion states that Plaintiff has not served them with
any discovery responses or disclosures. (D.E. 22-1 at 6-7.)
On November 13, 2018, Defendants filed the motion for summary
judgment now pending before the Court. (D.E. 22.)
On December 6,
2018, Plaintiff made an oral request for extension of time to
oppose the Motion. (D.E. 24.)
The Court extended Plaintiff’s
deadline until December 17, 2018. (Ibid.)
On December 18, 2018,
Plaintiff submitted a written request for further extension of
time to file opposition to the Motion. (D.E. 25.)
The Court once
again extended Plaintiff’s deadline, this time until April 17,
3
2019. (D.E. 29.)
As of the date of this Opinion, Plaintiff has
not filed opposition to the Motion.
DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment on three grounds: (1)
Plaintiff’s failure to adduce evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could find unconstitutional conditions of
confinement at CCCF (D.E. 22-1 at 8-12); (2) the Complaint’s
mootness, in light of the Sixth and Amended Final Consent Decree
in the class action Dittimus-Bey, et al. v. Camden Cty. Corr.
Facility, et al., Docket No. 05-cv-0063 (D.N.J.) (“DittimusBey”) (D.E. 22-1 at 14-15); and (3) Defendants’ entitlement to
qualified immunity, based on Plaintiff’s failure to show that
Defendants were aware of purported risk of serious harm or that
they individually participated or acquiesced in the alleged
wrongs. (D.E. 22-1 at 13-14.)
This Court finds that: for the reasons discussed in Part
IV, the mootness doctrine does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims
for monetary relief; but for the reasons discussed in Part V,
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment by virtue of the
lack of a genuine dispute of material fact.
Given that summary
judgment is proper, there being no proof of a constitutional
violation, the Court need not address the qualified immunity
defense.
4
WHETHER THE FINAL CONSENT DECREE IN DITTIMUS-BEY RENDERS
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT MOOT
In
addition
to
Defendants’
meritorious
argument
that
Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence of Fourteenth Amendment
violations from CCCF conditions of confinement (see Section V(B)
below), Defendants also seeks summary judgment on the ground that
the Sixth and Final Amended Consent Decree in Dittimus-Bey has
rendered Plaintiff’s Complaint moot. (D.E. 23-1 at 13-14.)
The doctrine of “mootness” derives from the limitation upon
federal judicial power in Article III of the Constitution limiting
jurisdiction
to
actual
cases
and
controversies.
See
Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013).
Genesis
Federal
courts are limited to resolving “the legal rights of litigants in
actual controversies,” Id., quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll.
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia
S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).
Thus,
“[a]n action is rendered moot when an intervening circumstance
deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the
lawsuit at any point during the litigation.” MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (citations omitted).
The
test
for
Article
III
mootness
is
whether
it
has
become
“impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to
the prevailing party.” In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., 802 F.3d 547,
5
553 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (2013)).
Therefore, “[a]s long as the parties have a concrete interest,
however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not
moot.” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016).
It is true that Plaintiff does not contest the Dittimus–Bey
litigation and its effects on CCCF conditions, as characterized in
Defendants’ undisputed Brief In Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment. (D.E. 22-1 at 15.)
officials
measures
agreed
to
to
improve
consent
the
criminal
justice
recommend
solutions
to
(id.)
show
decrees
conditions
retaining
problems. (Id.)
For example, Camden County and CCCF
the
in
at
consultants
CCCF’s
Dittimus–Bey
the
to
CCCF,
to
such
take
as
investigate
overcrowding
and
by
and
staffing
Defendants’ undisputed characterizations of facts
significant
and
systemic
improvements
overcrowding and related conditions at CCCF.
as
to
both
Plaintiff is not
presently confined at CCCF, and the successful Dittimus–Bey class
action litigation has placed the challenged conditions at CCCF
under review, resulting in appreciable changes for those confined
at CCCF.
That these facts from Dittimus-Bey are uncontested here
by Plaintiff Norman is merely further demonstration that summary
judgment is appropriate.
The Court is not persuaded, however, that the final consent
decree in Dittimus-Bey in and of itself moots Plaintiff’s case.
Plaintiff, a class member in Dittimus-Bey, is bound by the final
6
judgment in which class members are deemed to release claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief against Camden County and its
officers and employees. This means that Mr. Norman, like all class
members, could no longer obtain injunctive relief beyond that
authorized in the Consent Decree for jail conditions during the
class period.
But that litigation did not involve individual
inmates’ or detainees’ claims or class claims for money damages,
which must be sought and proved on an individual claim basis.
In
other words, the Final Consent Decree in Dittimus-Bey did not
adjudicate or deal with any individual money damage claims.
That
Consent
that
Decree
does
not
extinguish
the
possibility
constitutional violations occurred to individuals during the class
period.
Indeed, claims for money damages were not sought in
Dittimus-Bey and inmates were free to pursue individual claims for
monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by filing an individual
complaint, as Mr. Norman has done.
Accordingly, to the extent
that Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for money damages is
mooted by the final Consent Decree in Dittimus-Bey, the mootness
argument lacks merit and is denied.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the materials of record
“show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
7
Civ. P. 56(a).
Where, as in this case, the nonmoving party bears the burden
of persuasion at trial, the moving party may be entitled to summary
judgment by observing that there is an absence of evidence to
support an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); see also Rahman v.
Taylor, 2013 WL 1192352, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2013).
Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c) “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.
at 322.
A plaintiff opposing a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment has the burden of coming forward with evidence, not mere
allegations, that would raise a genuine dispute of material fact
and suffice to enable a reasonable jury, giving all favorable
inferences to the plaintiff as the party opposing summary judgment,
to find in plaintiff’s favor at trial.
Rule 56(c)(1)(A) further
provides that, to create a genuine issue of material fact, the
nonmovant must do so by:
citing to particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits
or
declarations,
stipulations
(including
those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials.
8
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
However, failure to respond to a
motion for summary judgment “is not alone a sufficient basis for
the entry of a summary judgment.” Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin
Island Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990).
The
Court still must determine, even for an unopposed summary judgment
motion, whether the motion has been properly made and supported
and whether granting summary judgment is appropriate. Id.
In order to grant Defendants’ unopposed motion for summary
judgment, where, as here, “the moving party does not have the
burden of proof on the relevant issues, ... the district court
must
determine
that
the
deficiencies
in
opponent’s
evidence
designated in or in connection with the motion entitle the moving
party to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 175.
Additionally,
pursuant
statement
to
Local
Civ.
R.
56.1(a),
Defendants’
of
material facts, having not been admitted, denied or addressed by
Plaintiff in any other fashion, is deemed undisputed for the
purposes of this Motion.
In the present case, Mr. Norman has
failed to oppose this summary judgment motion and where he has
failed to supply responses to routine interrogatories and document
requests in the course of discovery.
There is thus no basis to
look beyond the Defendants’ proper submissions, including their
Rule 56.1 statement of undisputed material facts, to determine
whether summary judgment should be granted in Defendants’ favor.
9
After review of the record and the parties’ submissions on
the Motion, this Court finds that entry of summary judgment is
appropriate.
B.
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO COME FORWARD WITH ANY EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING HIS CLAIM OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT
1.
The
The Record In This Case As To Conditions At CCCF
evidentiary
record
attached to the Motion.
here
consists
of
what
Defendants
Plaintiff has provided the Court only
with pleadings that contain a mix of facts and legal conclusions
(D.E. 1.)
The Complaint attaches no affidavits, certifications,
or exhibits.
Mere pleadings are insufficient to defeat summary
judgment. Rahman, 2013 WL 1192352, at *3.
The ample time for
completing factual discovery has expired. (D.E. 18.)
Defendants’ Initial Disclosures suggest that Plaintiff was
detained in CCCF starting on January 4, 2014. (D.E. 22-5 at 5.)
Plaintiff’s
Complaint
(“January 3, 2014”).)
alleges
a
similar
date.
(D.E.
1
at
4
This fact makes Plaintiff a member of the
certified class in the matter of Dittimus-Bey. (D.E. 23-9 at ¶9.)
In Dittimus-Bey, the plaintiffs had alleged several conditions of
“unhealthy, unsafe, and unsanitary environment . . . [a]s a direct
result
of
severe
overcrowding
and
understaffing”
at
CCCF.
(Dittimus-Bey v. Taylor, No. 05-0063 (D.N.J. June 30, 2017) (D.E.
60 at 4 and 7).)
As noted in the Dittimus-Bey Sixth and Amended
Final Consent Decree, CCCF’s population “reached a crisis point in
10
early 2013” (D.E. 23-9 (Consent Decree) at ¶35), after which the
daily population at CCCF was closely monitored and managed over
time to appropriate levels for resolution of the Dittimus-Bey
claims. (Id. at ¶¶36–37.)
In this case, Defendants do not appear to contest Plaintiff’s
claim (D.E. 1 at 4-5) that he was housed at CCCF in an overcrowded
cell.
Neither party has provided the Court with specific evidence
of Mr. Norman’s particular cell assignments during his period of
detention.
Thus, the Court will assume, for purposes of this
Motion only, that Plaintiff was housed in overcrowded conditions
at some point during the period of his January 2014 through January
2016 detention.
Population data suggests that, at “crisis points”
during Plaintiff’s detention, the average two-person CCCF cell in
fact contained three persons, one of whom had to temporarily sleep
on the floor mattress, while two occupied bunk beds. Nevertheless,
the Dittimus-Bey Sixth and Final Amended Consent Decree reflects
the fact that the overcrowding issues were being addressed during
the time of Plaintiff’s incarceration at the CCCF. (D.E. 22-8 at
¶¶33-37 and 44-60.)
Defendants assert though that, based on the underlying facts
and on Plaintiff’s failure to provide evidence supporting his
contentions, he fails to state a claim or raise a dispute of
material fact as to any Fourteenth Amendment violation. (D.E. 221 (Def. Br.) at 8-12.)
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has
11
adduced no demonstration of unconstitutional conditions. (Id. at
10–12.)
2.
Governing Law As To Conditions Of Confinement Claim
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a
cell with more persons than its intended design does not, on its
own, rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill, 488
F. App’x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking does not
constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man, one cell
principle
lurking
in
the
Due
Process
Clause
Amendment’”) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 542)).
of
the
Fifth
More is needed to
demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a pretrial detainee,
“shock the conscience,” and thus violate due process rights. See
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that
due process analysis requires courts to consider whether the
totality of the conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that the
adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes
assigned to them”).
3.
Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Or Raise A Disputed
Material Fact As To Conditions Of Confinement
Plaintiff has adduced no evidence that the conditions he
experienced while incarcerated in a purportedly overcrowded cell
were so severe that they “shock the conscience.” See Hubbard, 538
F.3d at 233.
Similarly, being “made to sleep on a mat” (D.E. 1 at
12
5) where there was “dust and dirt build-up in the cell” (ibid.)
does not, standing alone, rise to the level of a due process
violation.
No Showing Of An Unconstitutional Deprivation Of A Basic Human
Need: Plaintiff’s cursory allegations regarding sleeping on a
“thin mat” in an “overcrowded [cell] [with] four people” (D.E. 1
at 5) essentially complain of an inconvenient and uncomfortable
situation. His contention about “poor air quality” and dirty cells
(ibid.) fails to state a claim of constitutional magnitude. “[T]he
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Carson, 488 F.
App’x at 560 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349).
“To the extent
that such conditions are harsh, they are part of the penalty that
criminal
offenders
pay
for
their
offenses
against
society.”
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
Without more, the Court cannot say that a reasonable fact
finder could conclude that the conditions Plaintiff references
deprived him of any basic human needs.
Even affording Plaintiff
the benefit of the doubt as to his unsubstantiated statements about
air and dirt (D.E. 1 at 5), he adduces no evidence that, for
example: he was sickened by the conditions he describes; “four
people [in] a cell” (D.E. 1 at 5) in fact led to any assault of
him by another inmate; or he was significantly sleep-deprived due
to
these
conditions.
See,
e.g.,
Williams
v.
Meisel,
2014
WL
4744561, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2014) (finding that mold in
showers did not amount to a constitutional violation because the
13
mold did not expose inmates to an unreasonable risk of serious
damage to future health).
Rashes and headaches from incarceration
(D.E. 1 at 5) fall short of conscience-shocking conduct.
By way of another example of the insufficiency in Plaintiff’s
claim, his CCCF incarceration file does not contain any records
indicating any grievances or damages he suffered, medical or
otherwise, from alleged overcrowding. (See D.E. 23-8 at ¶4; D.E.
23-6 at 6-50.)
Plaintiff offers no evidence to substantiate his
Complaint’s contention that he suffered “dizziness, dehydration,
[and] stomach pains.” (D.E. 1 at 6.)
this
Court
occurred
demonstrates
and
were
that
caused
the
by
the
Nothing in the record before
purported
injuries
allegedly
in
fact
unconstitutional
conditions of confinement.
Finally, as to absence of conscience-shocking conditions, the
Court notes Plaintiff’s contention that “there were a few dozen
occasions where I had no other choice but to consume brown-colored
water.” (D.E. 1 at 6.)
The Court recognizes that “there is no
doubt that potable water constitutes a basic human need and that
water that is suitable for drinking and bathing be supplied to
inmates.” Wolfe v. Christie, No. 10-2083, 2013 WL 3223625, at *5
(D.N.J. June 25, 2013) (internal citations omitted).
However, the
temporary “few dozen occasions” (D.E. 1 at 6) of “unclean water”
that
Plaintiff
may
have
found
unsettling,
upsetting
uncomfortable do not satisfy the requisite constitutional test.
or
A
Due Process claim for denial of the minimal civilized measure of
14
life's necessities has two prongs.
The
first
prong
is
the
Plaintiff meets neither.
“sufficiently
serious”
objective
prong, under which the challenged conditions must be objectively
serious and must result in the denial of the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities when viewed within the context of
contemporary standards of decency. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 832 (1994).
The second prong is the “sufficiently culpable
state of mind” subjective prong, under which a defendant must have
demonstrated a deliberate indifference to the well-being of a
plaintiff. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 104, 106 (1976); Natale v.
Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003);
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36
(1993).
Plaintiff has not provided evidence demonstrating the nature,
severity, cause, or degree of the “brown colored water” of which
he complains. (D.E. 1 at 6.)
Nor has he shown that he suffered
any objectively verifiable injury for the “few dozen occasions” of
which he complains.
His unsubstantiated contentions about his
personal impressions of water color at CCCF do not establish that
he
was
denied
“the
minimal
civilized
necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
that
CCCF
water
quality
was,
in
measure
of
life's
He has not demonstrated
fact,
unconstitutionally
unacceptable or that it caused his alleged “physical discomfort”
and “stomach pains.” (D.E. 1 at 6.)
Thus, Plaintiff has failed to
create any disputed issue of fact as to the objective standard of
15
the Fourteenth Amendment test.
Furthermore,
Plaintiff
has
provided
no
requisite
facts
suggesting that any Defendants were deliberately indifferent and
motivated by ill will with respect to CCCF water quality.
Thus,
Plaintiff also has failed to satisfy the subjective standard of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
test.
Plaintiff's
personal
dissatisfaction with CCCF water cannot provide a basis for a
constitutional claim.
His impressions of CCCF water color, and
his supposition that such was responsible for his alleged dizziness
and dehydration, do not suggest a deprivation of constitutional
magnitude.
They also do not rule out the possibility that water
problems such as he alleges were due to temporary plumbing issues.
See Pritchett v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, No. 16-cv-08241, 2018
WL 1522713, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2018) (“the mere fact that
the water hue in a jail cell was somewhat different (on isolated
occasions during a discrete period of time) from the color to which
Plaintiff
was
otherwise
accustomed,
is
not,
without
more,
sufficient to rise to the level of a constitutional violation”).
See also Passmore v. Ianello, 528 F. App’x 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2013)
(“[C]ourts will generally not interfere with prison administrative
matters”). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to create any disputed issue
of fact as to the subjective standard of the Fourteenth Amendment
test.
No
further
Demonstration
assert
that
Of
the
Deliberate
Dittimus-Bey
16
Indifference:
Defendants
class-action
litigation
remediated overcrowding and conditions of confinement at CCCF.
(D.E.
22-1 at 14-15.)
Indeed, as a result of the Dittimus-Bey
litigation 1, there has been a significant lessening of the crowding
in CCCF and improvements in other prison conditions. (D.E.
(Consent Decree) at ¶¶36-37.)
22-8
When the Dittimus-Bey litigation
commenced in 2005, CCCF’s average daily population was 1,848
inmates; by May of 2010, the average monthly population reached an
all-time low of 1,232 inmates. (D.E. 22-8 at ¶¶33-34.)
Roughly
four months prior to Plaintiff’s release from CCCF in April 2017,
CCCF’s population as of December 9, 2016 was at 1,160 -- in a
facility designed for 1,267 persons. (D.E.
22-8 (Consent Decree)
at ¶¶33-34, 36.) While it is conceivable that an individual inmate
could be subjected to unconstitutional conditions even at a jail
that is continuously monitored and operating within reasonable
capacity limits, Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence that he
has actually suffered such deprivation.
These undisputed facts refute any claim that Defendants or
other supervisors at CCCF were “deliberately indifferent” to the
alleged constitutional violations, which is the mental culpability
that must be proven to find liability under § 1983. See Jiminez v.
All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2007)
1
Order Approving Amended Final Consent Decree, Dittimus-Bey v.
Taylor, No. 05-0063 (D.N.J. June 30, 2017); see also Dittimus-Bey
v. Taylor, 2013 WL 6022128 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2013); Dittimus-Bey v.
Taylor, 244 F.R.D. 284 (2007).
The Court does not imply that
Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief in this case (ECF No. 1 at
6) are barred by the class action settlement of Dittimus-Bey, since
that case only involved claims for injunctive relief.
17
(describing the “deliberate indifference” standard).
There is no
evidence of conduct that would tend to show deliberate indifference
on the part of Defendants.
For all of these reasons, Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment
on
Plaintiff’s
overcrowded
Fourteenth Amendment claim.
conditions
of
confinement
In addition, since Plaintiff is no
longer confined at CCCF, injunctive relief is unavailable to him.
See Abdul–Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1993) (a
prisoner lacks standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief
if he is no longer subject to the alleged conditions).
C.
WHETHER CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS MUST BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE THEY ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In addition to the grounds discussed in Sections IV and
V(B) of this Opinion, Defendants also request that this Court
grant summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. (D.E.
22-1 at 13-14 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979),
Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007), and Rode
v. Dellaciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988).)
Qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability as long as their conduct “‘does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d
248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010).
The qualified immunity test is two-
pronged: whether the pleadings allege that constitutional
violation occurred, and whether “reasonable officials could
18
fairly have known that their alleged conduct was illegal.”
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 (2001); Larsen v. Senate of
the Commonwealth of Pa., 154 F.3d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1998).
Given that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a basis for a
constitutional violation, there is no need to address whether a
reasonable official would know his conduct was unlawful, due to
no proof of such illegality.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment will be granted.
An accompanying Order will be
entered.
August 12, 2019
Date
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN
U.S. District Judge
At Camden, New Jersey
19
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