BARNES v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
18
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 3/27/2018. (rtm, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LISA MARIE BARNES,
1:16-cv-09110-NLH
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
LISA MARIE BARNES
1324 SONGBIRD LANE
MAYS LANDING, NJ 08330
Appearing pro se
TIMOTHY PATRICK REILEY
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION REGION III
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
P.O. BOX 41777
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19101
On behalf of Defendant
HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section
205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), regarding Plaintiff’s application for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security
Act.
42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq.
The issue before the Court is
whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding
that there was “substantial evidence” that Plaintiff was not
disabled at any time since her alleged onset date of
disability, March 14, 2014.
For the reasons stated below,
this Court will affirm that decision.
I.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 14, 2014, Plaintiff, Lisa Marie Barnes, 1
protectively filed an application for SSI, initially alleging
that she became disabled on October 1, 2008. 2
Plaintiff claims
that she can no longer work as a preschool teacher because she
suffers from degenerative disc disease, scoliosis, and
hypertension.
Plaintiff’s claim was denied at the initial level and
then again on reconsideration.
A hearing was held before an
ALJ on October 19, 2015, and the ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision on February 23, 2016.
Plaintiff filed a Request for
Review by the Appeals Council, which denied her request on
1
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in her appeal. Plaintiff was
represented by counsel at the hearing before the ALJ.
2
Even though Plaintiff contends that her onset date of
disability is October 1, 2008, the relevant period for
Plaintiff’s SSI claim begins with her March 14, 2014
application date, through the date of the ALJ’s decision on
February 23, 2016. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.202 (claimant is not
eligible for SSI until, among other factors, the date on which
she files an application for SSI benefits); 20 C.F.R. §
416.501 (claimant may not be paid for SSI for any time period
that predates the first month she satisfies the eligibility
requirements, which cannot predate the date on which an
application was filed).
2
July 6, 2016, rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision
of the Commissioner.
Plaintiff brings this civil action for
review of the Commissioner’s decision.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Congress provided for judicial
review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny a complainant’s
application for social security benefits.
55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995).
Ventura v. Shalala,
A reviewing court must
uphold the Commissioner’s factual decisions where they are
supported by “substantial evidence.”
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir.
2001); Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000);
Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992).
Substantial evidence means more than “a mere scintilla.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. V. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id.
The inquiry
is not whether the reviewing court would have made the same
determination, but whether the Commissioner’s conclusion was
reasonable.
See Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir.
3
1988).
A reviewing court has a duty to review the evidence in
its totality.
1984).
See Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir.
“[A] court must ‘take into account whatever in the
record fairly detracts from its weight.’” Schonewolf v.
Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting
Willbanks v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 847 F.2d 301,
303 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. V. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)).
The Commissioner “must adequately explain in the record
his reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence.”
Ogden v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 273, 278 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (citing
Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1986)).
The Third
Circuit has held that an “ALJ must review all pertinent
medical evidence and explain his conciliations and
rejections.”
Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d
112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000).
Similarly, an ALJ must also consider
and weigh all of the non-medical evidence before him.
Id.
(citing Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir.
1983)); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 707 (3d Cir. 1981).
The Third Circuit has held that access to the
Commissioner’s reasoning is indeed essential to a meaningful
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court review:
Unless the [Commissioner] has analyzed all
evidence and has sufficiently explained
the weight he has given to obviously
probative exhibits, to say that his
decision is supported by substantial
evidence approaches an abdication of the
court’s duty to scrutinize the record as a
whole to determine whether the conclusions
reached are rational.
Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978).
Although
an ALJ, as the fact finder, must consider and evaluate the
medical evidence presented, Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42, “[t]here
is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in its opinion every
tidbit of evidence included in the record,” Hur v. Barnhart,
94 F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004).
In terms of judicial
review, a district court is not “empowered to weigh the
evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the factfinder.”
Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182.
However, apart from the
substantial evidence inquiry, a reviewing court is entitled to
satisfy itself that the Commissioner arrived at his decision
by application of the proper legal standards.
Sykes, 228 F.3d
at 262; Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir.
1983); Curtin v. Harris, 508 F. Supp. 791, 793 (D.N.J. 1981).
B.
Standard for Disability Benefits
The Social Security Act defines “disability” for purposes
5
of an entitlement to a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits as the inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
Under this
definition, a Plaintiff qualifies as disabled only if her
physical or mental impairments are of such severity that she
is not only unable to perform her past relevant work, but
cannot, given her age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other type of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists
in the immediate area in which she lives, or whether a
specific job vacancy exists for her, or whether she would be
hired if she applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B)
(emphasis added).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations 3 for
determining disability that require application of a five-step
3
The regulations were amended for various provisions effective
March 27, 2017. See 82 F.R. 5844. Because the ALJ issued his
decision prior to that effective date, the Court must employ
the standards in effect at the time of his decision.
6
sequential analysis.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
This five-
step process is summarized as follows:
1.
If the claimant currently is engaged in substantial
gainful employment, she will be found “not
disabled.”
2.
If the claimant does not suffer from a “severe
impairment,” she will be found “not disabled.”
3.
If the severe impairment meets or equals a listed
impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 and has lasted or is expected to last for
a continuous period of at least twelve months, the
claimant will be found “disabled.”
4.
If the claimant can still perform work she has done
in the past (“past relevant work”) despite the
severe impairment, she will be found “not disabled.”
5.
Finally, the Commissioner will consider the
claimant’s ability to perform work (“residual
functional capacity”), age, education, and past work
experience to determine whether or not she is
capable of performing other work which exists in the
national economy. If she is incapable, she will be
found “disabled.” If she is capable, she will be
found “not disabled.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f).
Entitlement to benefits is
therefore dependent upon a finding that the claimant is
incapable of performing work in the national economy.
This five-step process involves a shifting burden of
proof.
See Wallace v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 722
F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983).
In the first four steps of
the analysis, the burden is on the claimant to prove every
7
element of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
id.
See
In the final step, the Commissioner bears the burden of
proving that work is available for the Plaintiff: “Once a
claimant has proved that he is unable to perform his former
job, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there
is some other kind of substantial gainful employment he is
able to perform.”
Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir.
1987); see Olsen v. Schweiker, 703 F.2d 751, 753 (3d Cir.
1983).
C.
Analysis
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of
disability.
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s
impairments of degenerative disc disease, scoliosis, and
hypertension were severe.
At step three, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff’s severe impairments or her severe impairments
in combination with her other impairments did not equal the
severity of one of the listed impairments.
The ALJ then
determined that Plaintiff was not capable of performing her
previous job as a preschool teacher, but Plaintiff retained
the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light,
unskilled work in jobs such as an information clerk, router,
8
and office helper (steps four and five).
Plaintiff, a mother of a school-age child, claims in her
complaint and brief in support of her appeal that she suffers
from all-over back pain, excruciating pain from her
“tailbones” rubbing together due to loss of cartilage, and
extreme anxiety which produces panic attacks where she feels
like she is going to die.
Plaintiff claims that she has been
fighting for SSI for almost five years, she is unable to work,
and she is drowning financially.
Plaintiff asks for human
empathy and understanding, and for the Court to order the
Commissioner to provide her with SSI benefits.
Plaintiff, however, does not pinpoint where she contends
the ALJ erred in his decision, or which of the ALJ’s
determinations are not supported by substantial evidence.
The
Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision observes that he first
determined which of her impairments were severe, and whether
any of her impairments met the listings at step three.
Next,
the ALJ detailed Plaintiff’s complaints of pain and her
limitations from her testimony and self-completed reports.
He
then recounted the medical evidence of both treating and nontreating sources.
Based on a combination of Plaintiff’s
testimony and the medical evidence, the ALJ articulated why he
9
credited certain subjective complaints and medical findings
over others.
Following that assessment of the evidence, the
ALJ determined Plaintiff’s RFC, which rendered her able to
perform light, unskilled work.
From there, the ALJ engaged a vocational expert to
identify if there were jobs in the national economy for an
individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience,
and RFC.
Based on the testimony of the VE, the ALJ concluded
that Plaintiff was capable of making a successful adjustment
to other work which exists in significant numbers in the
national economy.
The Court cannot find that the ALJ faltered
in any of these steps.
As we have noted above, the Plaintiff does not make any
specific contentions as to where the ALJ erred and this Court
own independent review finds no error.
On the contrary, the
Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision finds that the ALJ
properly followed the standards set forth above, and that the
ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s brief recounts that on
August 22, 2017, she slipped on water and fell at a Target
store.
Plaintiff relates that this fall resulted in a
sprained left knee and ankle, and caused further trauma to her
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chronic back pain, along with two new tears in her right
shoulder.
Plaintiff states that after two months of physical
therapy she is not getting better, and that an orthopedic
specialist has determined that she needs to undergo surgery to
repair her shoulder.
Plaintiff contends that she is in even
more pain, is experiencing more anxiety, and is in a “dazed
state” from her medication.
The Court’s review of the denial of Plaintiff’s SSI
benefits is limited, however, to the relevant time period
assessed by the ALJ – March 14, 2014 through February 23,
2016.
Plaintiff’s fall that occurred on August 22, 2017 is
well outside of that time frame, and the Court cannot
independently assess whether Plaintiff’s subsequent
impairments would now render her disabled. 4
Thus, even though
the Court is not without empathy for Plaintiff and recognizes
4
As the Commissioner points out in her brief, Plaintiff is not
without options to seek disability benefits. The Social
Security Regulations permit Plaintiff to file a new,
subsequent application for a condition which has worsened
after the relevant period. See, e.g., SSR 11-1P (explaining
that a claimant is not allowed to have two claims for the same
type of benefits pending at the same time, but that rule does
not preclude a claimant from reporting new medical conditions
or a worsening in her existing medical conditions); id.
(explaining that a claimant may file a subsequent claim under
a different title or for a different benefit type at any time,
even when an appeal is pending).
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her so far unsuccessful efforts to obtain disability benefits,
the Court is constrained to properly apply the law, which
compels the affirmance of the ALJ’s decision.
III. Conclusion
This Court may not second guess the ALJ’s conclusions,
but may only determine whether substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s determinations.
Hartzell v. Astrue, 741 F. Supp. 2d
645, 647 (D.N.J. 2010) (citing Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d
1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)) (explaining that the pinnacle legal
principal that applies to the assessment of all of the other
standards:
A district court is not empowered to weigh the
evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the ALJ).
Plaintiff has not pointed to any errors in the ALJ’s
determination that Plaintiff was not totally disabled as of
March 14, 2014, and the Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision
finds that it is supported by substantial evidence.
The
decision of the ALJ is therefore affirmed.
An accompanying Order will be issued.
Date: March 27, 2018
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
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