ROBINSON v. NO DEFENDANT PROVIDED

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 10/19/2017. (tf, n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

MARCUS ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-09112 (JBS-AMD)

v.
NO DEFENDANT PROVIDED,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES
Marcus Robinson, Plaintiff Pro Se
133 State Street
Camden, NJ 08102
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Marcus Robinson seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket
Entry 1. Although Plaintiff does not name a defendant in the
caption or in § I(B) of his Complaint, this Court will construe
Plaintiff’s Complaint as asserting claims against Camden County
Jail (“CCJ”), based on Plaintiff’s allegations against “Camden
County Jail” in § III(A) of his Complaint.
2.

Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
1

subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the
Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
3.

Plaintiff’s Complaint states: “I was sleeping with

urine all around me, little bugs in the room, I slept on the
floor with a mat that didn’t have air or cussion [sic] four
people to a cell jump suit didn’t get switched for months. I
broke out with a rash it was unsanitized [sic] and there was no
justice served.” Complaint § III(C). Plaintiff alleges he
“caught a boil from the dirty floors.” Id. § IV.
4.

Plaintiff states he “was in there multiple times, the

most recent June 2016.” Id. § III(B).
5.

Plaintiff states he is seeking $3,500 in monetary

compensation. Id. § V.
6.

To survive sua sponte screening under 28 U.S.C.

1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, the complaint must
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014).
2

“[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
7.

Primarily, the Complaint must be dismissed as the CCJ

is not a “state actor” within the meaning of § 1983. See, e.g.,
Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–
39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a “person” under
§ 1983). See Complaint § III(A) (“Camden County Jail”).
Accordingly, the claims against CCJ must be dismissed with
prejudice.
8.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim1, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

1

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
3

alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
9.

Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed
because the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual
support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation
has occurred.
10.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
4

(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.
11.

Further, a mere assertion that Plaintiff was not given

a jumpsuit (Complaint § III(C)) is insufficient to set forth a
cause of action. Plaintiff essentially complains “of an
inconvenient and uncomfortable situation”; however, “‘the
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.’” Carson v.
Mulvihill, 488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 349); see also, Marnin v. Pinto, 463 F.2d 583, 584
(3d Cir. 1972) (“blanket statements alleging bad food and
miserable living conditions in the prison” were “naked

5

statements [that do not] ordinarily merit Federal court
intervention”).2
12.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to

particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end,
the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint
within 30 days of the date of this order.3
13.

Plaintiff is further advised that any amended

complaint must plead specific facts regarding the conditions of
confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint,
Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable

2

Under some circumstances, constitutional violations may arise
from unsanitary conditions or conditions that create vermin
infestations. See Drumgo v. Radcliff, Sgt., 661 F. App'x 758,
760 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Unsanitary prison conditions may result in
[a constitutional] violation.”) (citing Young v. Quinlan, 960
F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992)); Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176,
188 (3d Cir. 1993) (“inmates do have a right to be free of
conditions that generate infestations of vermin”). However,
Plaintiff has not alleged enough facts to demonstrate that the
conditions complained of, for a pretrial detainee, shock the
conscience and thus violate due process rights. See Hubbard v.
Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process
analysis requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Plaintiff also has not alleged that any person
acting under color of state law acted with deliberate
indifference in creating or failing to address the allegedly
unconstitutional conditions. See Kost, 1 F.3 at 188.
3 The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
6

inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order
to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
14.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
15.

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a)

dismissed with prejudice as to the CCJ; and (b) dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim. An appropriate
order follows.

October 19, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

7