BOWERS v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL et al

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 4/26/2017. (tf, n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

WILLIAM A. BOWERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL and
CAMDEN COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-09232 (JBS-AMD)
OPINION

Defendants.

APPEARANCES
William A. Bowers, Plaintiff Pro Se
39 Grant Lane
Berlin, NJ 08009
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff William A. Bowers seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement against defendants
Camden County Jail (“CCJ”), Camden County (“CC”), Camden County
Correctional Facility (“CCCF”), and the jail physician
(“CCJ/CCCF Physician”) who attended to Plaintiff while
incarcerated regarding the medications with which Plaintiff
purportedly arrived at the jail. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any

claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (1)

dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against
CCJ and CCCF; and (2) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice
for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
Claims Against CCJ and CCCF: Dismissed With Prejudice
4.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 19831 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) a person deprived him of a federal
right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted
under color of state or territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).

1

Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2

5.

Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983,

“[t]he term ‘persons’ includes local and state officers acting
under color of state law.” Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).2 To
say that a person was “acting under color of state law” means
that the defendant in a § 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation
omitted). Generally, then, “a public employee acts under color
of state law while acting in his official capacity or while
exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id.
at 50.
6.

Because the Complaint has not sufficiently alleged

that a “person” deprived Plaintiff of a federal right, the
Complaint does not meet the standards necessary to set forth a
prima facie case under § 1983. In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages from CCJ and CCCF for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The CCJ and CCCF,
however, are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983;

2

“Person” is not strictly limited to individuals who are state
and local government employees, however. For example,
municipalities and other local government units, such as
counties, also are considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.
See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
690-91 (1978).
3

therefore, the claims against them must be dismissed with
prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992
(3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F.
Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a
“person” under § 1983). Given that the claims against the CCJ
and CCCF must be dismissed with prejudice, the claims may not
proceed and Plaintiff may not name the CCJ and CCCF as
defendants.
7.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to name a

person or persons who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
Complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
Conditions Of Confinement Claims - Overcrowding:
Dismissed Without Prejudice
8.

Second, for the reasons set forth below, the Court

will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to
state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
9.

The present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts

to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review
under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff’s

4

Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not
enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional
violation has occurred.
10.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim3, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts

3

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
5

in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
11.

A complaint must plead sufficient facts to support a

reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has
occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
12.

However, with respect to the alleged facts giving rise

to Plaintiff’s claims, the Complaint states: “Jail was
overcrowded, forced to sleep on floor.” Complaint § III(C).
13.

Plaintiff states that these events occurred during:

“2015.” Id. § III(B).
14.

Plaintiff states that he suffered “scars, bruises, a

black eye, and mental and physical anguish” from these events.
Id. § IV.
15.

Plaintiff seeks $4,800 in relief. Id. § V.

16.

Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed
because the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual
support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation
has occurred.
17.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
6

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.
18.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to

particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
7

that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end,
the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint
within 30 days of the date of this order.4
19.

Moreover, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to

impose liability on Camden County. “There is no respondeat
superior theory of municipal liability, so a city may not be
held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of its
agents. Rather, a municipality may be held liable only if its
policy or custom is the ‘moving force’ behind a constitutional
violation.” Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
691 (1978)). See also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115, 122 (1992) (“The city is not vicariously liable under
§ 1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only
liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the
wrongdoer.”). Plaintiff must plead facts showing that the
relevant Camden County policy-makers are “responsible for either
the affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a
well-settled custom.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850
(3d Cir. 1990).5 In other words, Plaintiff must set forth facts

4

The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
5 “Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.
Government custom can be demonstrated by showing that a given
8

supporting an inference that Camden County itself was the
“moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 689.
20.

Plaintiff is further advised that any amended

complaint must plead specific facts regarding the conditions of
confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint,
Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable
inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order
to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.6
21.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the

course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually
to constitute law.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 118 (3d
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
6
To the extent the Complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered prior to December 14, 2014, those claims
are barred by the statute of limitations. Claims brought under §
1983 are governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period
for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276
(1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the
action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d
472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement would have been immediately apparent
to Plaintiff; therefore, the statute of limitations on some of
Plaintiff’s claims expired two years after release from
incarceration. In the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended
complaint, it should be limited to confinements in which
Plaintiff was released after December 14, 2014.
9

amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
Conditions Of Confinement Claim - Inadequate Medical Care:
Dismissed Without Prejudice
22.

Construing the Complaint to assert § 1983 claims in

relation Plaintiff’s contention that his “psychiartic [sic] told
me never to just stop taking meds that I could die. Prison
doctor told me he had my meds but he wouldn’t give them to me. I
was sick for the time I was there” (Complaint § IV), such
statements are insufficient to allege constitutional violations
as to conditions of confinement. The Court will dismiss without
prejudice the Plaintiff’s claims of failure to provide adequate
medical care.
23.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s non-specific

assertion that he was denied “my meds” (Complaint § IV) is
insufficient to meet the pleading standard in the absence of any

10

facts. A mere assertion that jail facility medical staff did not
give out medication is insufficient to meet the pleading
standard in the absence of additional facts. See, e.g., Potter
v. Fraser, No. 10-4200, 2011 WL 2446642, at *5 (D.N.J. June 13,
2011) (“Drug use in jails or prison facilities is certainly of
the utmost concern to jail and prison authorities. The potential
for jail or prison disruption caused by the presence of drugs is
well-known. Thus, jail authorities have a legitimate security
concern in limiting exposure of inmates to drugs, even those
administered on a controlled basis”) (citing Inmates of
Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 761 (3d Cir.
1979)).
24.

With respect to Plaintiff’s contention that “prison dr

wouldn’t give them [my meds] to me” (Complaint § IV), Plaintiff
offers no facts to satisfy either of the two prongs of a
Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim: i.e., (a)
the “serious condition” prong; and (b) the “deliberate
indifference” prong. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976);
Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d
Cir. 2003). Since “the Due Process rights of a pre-trial
detainee are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment
protections available to a convicted prisoner,” Reynolds v.
Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 173 (3d Cir. 1997), the Eighth Amendment
sets the floor for the standard applicable to pre-trial
11

detainees’ claims. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544 (1979).
Thus, a failure of prison officials to provide minimally civil
conditions of confinement to pre-trial detainees, or deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need of such detainees,
violates their right not to be punished without due process of
law. Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 173-74; Monmouth Cnty. Corr.
Institution Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 345-46, n. 31 (3d
Cir. 1987); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
25.

As to the first requisite, Plaintiff’s Complaint here

sets forth no facts whatsoever establishing that he suffered
from any particular condition that satisfies the “serious
condition” prong of a Fourteenth Amendment claim (Estelle, 429
U.S. at 106; Natale, 318 F.3d at 582): i.e., the Complaint
offers no facts at all that Plaintiff had a condition that: “(1)
has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment”; (2)
“was so obvious that a lay person would recognize the necessity
for a doctor's attention”; or (3) was a condition for which “the
denial of treatment would result in the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain” or “a life-long handicap or permanent loss.”
Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
26.

The Complaint is silent with respect to facts relevant

to demonstrating “serious condition,” such as: the name or class
12

of medication with which Plaintiff purportedly entered into
incarceration; the nature and severity of Plaintiff’s supposed
medical condition that allegedly required uninterrupted dosage
of a particular type or brand of medication; whether, when and
to whom Plaintiff communicated such condition and medicinal need
to jail personnel; and Plaintiff’s medical history of frequency,
duration and dosage of such medication. (The foregoing examples
are merely illustrative but not exhaustive or exclusive.) See
Maldonado v. Terhune, 28 F. Supp.2d 284, 289 (D.N.J. 1998). In
short, Plaintiff does not allege that he has ever actually been
diagnosed with any condition requiring a particular medication
or that such purported condition was so obvious that a lay
person would recognize the necessity for particular medication.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not satisfied Estelle’s “serious
condition” element for a Fourteenth Amendment claim.
27.

As to the second requisite, Plaintiff’s Complaint sets

forth no facts establishing that his experience obtaining “meds”
(Complaint § IV) while incarcerated satisfies the “deliberate
indifference” prong of a Fourteenth Amendment claim. Estelle,
429 U.S. at 106. This second Estelle element “requires an inmate
to show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference
to his serious medical need.” Holder v. Merline, No. 05-1024,
2005 WL 1522130, at *4 (D.N.J. June 27, 2005) (citing Natale,
318 F.3d at 582) (finding deliberate indifference requires proof
13

that the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety). Conduct that constitutes negligence
does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference; rather,
deliberate indifference is a “reckless disregard of a known risk
of harm.” Holder, 2005 WL 1522130, at *4 (citing Farmer, 511
U.S. at 836). Courts have found deliberate indifference “in
situations where there was ‘objective evidence that [a]
plaintiff had serious need for medical care,’ and prison
officials ignored that evidence[.] Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d
798, 815 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000).” Natale, 318 F.3d at 582.
28.

In the context of detainees alleging claims related to

medical conditions, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the protections of the Eighth Amendment,
including the latter’s “deliberate indifference” standard, such
that “substantive due process rights are violated only when ‘the
behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the
conscience.’” Callaway v. New Jersey State Police Troop A, No.
12-5477, 2015 WL 1202533, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar, 17, 2015) (citing
Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47, n.8 (1998)).
See also Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty. Dep’t of Corr., No. 09-0133,
2010 WL 5141717, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2010) (“When executive
action is at issue, a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
right to substantive due process may be shown by conduct that
14

‘shocks the conscience’”) (citing A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne
County Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir.
2004)); Bocchino v. City of Atlantic City, 179 F. Supp.3d 387,
403 (D.N.J. 2016); Holder, 2005 WL 1522130, at *3 (D.N.J. June
27, 2005) (citing Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d
1042, 1067 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992)).
29.

Here, Plaintiff’s bare allegation that “prison dr

to[ld] me he had my meds but wouldn’t give them to me”
(Complaint § IV) is insufficient, without more, to establish
“deliberate indifference” for a Fourteenth Amendment claim under
Estelle.
30.

For example, Plaintiff sets forth no allegations as

to: whether he informed jail personnel of his pertinent medical
history or of a particular health condition that required the
uninterrupted use of the certain medication for reasons of
medical necessity; whether jail personnel then purposely denied
such item to Plaintiff; whether Plaintiff informed jail
personnel of the particular reason why he required the certain
medication at issue; or whether the medication that Plaintiff
purportedly brought with him into the jail was approved for use
by inmates within the facility in the first instance. See, e.g.,
Coletta v. Bd. of Freeholders, No. 06-585, 2007 WL 128893, at
*2, *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2007) (“[Plaintiff’s] only claim
concerning his medicine is that he was not given the Percocet
15

prescribed to him by [a physician outside the jail]. The County
Jail's policy or practice of not providing prisoners with
Percocet and instead supplying non-narcotic pain relievers does
not so violate ‘evolving standards of decency’ as to amount to
deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Percocet is
not available for inmates of the County Jail. Percocet is a
narcotic, whereas Darvocet is a non-narcotic pain reliever, and
the County Jail does not administer narcotics to inmates. It is
the policy of Community Health Services, which provides staffing
to meet the medical needs of the County Jail, to ‘stringently
restrict[ ] the use and administration of controlled substances
to the greatest extent possible within the confines of sound
practice of medicine.’ It is also the policy that any
‘prescription brought in by the inmate should be reviewed by the
CHS physician and replaced as soon as a CHS prescription is
filled or the physician denies filling that prescription’”);
Ellerman v. Woodward, No. 15-476, 2015 WL 715561, at *3-4
(D.N.J. Feb. 19, 2015) (“Plaintiff's specific allegations
against Dr. Reddy, for reducing or discontinuing an unspecified
pain medication without performing a physical examination, do
not, without more, rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir.
1990) (mere disagreement with medical treatment does not state a
constitutional violation) . . . The allegations are [also]
16

deficient because Plaintiff does not allege facts to establish
deliberate indifference by any particular defendant involved
with the decision not to renew his prescription for Norco”);
Elcheikhali v. C.C.A., No. 09-1618, 2009 WL 1545557, at *7
(D.N.J. June 9, 2009) (“Plaintiff disagreed with the medication
prescribed because it was not Paxil. Thus, it would appear that
Plaintiff was simply dissatisfied with the type of treatment he
was receiving, namely, a medication different from Paxil, but
nevertheless, a medication used to treat Plaintiff's anxiety and
panic disorders. As referenced above, ‘mere disagreements over
medical judgment do not state [constitutional] claims.’ White,
897 F.2d at 110. Therefore, even if the medical judgment
concerning the type of medication prescribed for Plaintiff is
later determined to be wrong, at most what might be proved is
medical malpractice and not [a constitutional] violation”);
Potter, 2011 WL 2446642, at *5 (“Assuming that drug withdrawal
and Hepatitis C are serious medical needs, as written, the
Complaint fails to state a § 1983 medical care claim because the
facts alleged in the Complaint do not show deliberate
indifference. Plaintiff alleges that [the jail physician] did
not prescribe medication for Plaintiff's withdrawal, but
Plaintiff does not specify why he believed he needed medication
and what medication he needed. Moreover, Plaintiff does not
assert facts showing the severity of any symptoms, or that he
17

complained to medical staff about certain symptoms, and his
symptoms were ignored. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff has
not plausibly asserted facts showing that any defendant was
deliberately indifferent to his drug withdrawal symptoms”).
31.

Analogous to Potter, the severity of Plaintiff’s

unspecified medical condition in this case that would
purportedly require only a particular type of uninterrupted
medication is also unclear from Plaintiff’s allegations. The
Complaint is silent with respect to whether CCJ personnel knew
that Plaintiff claimed to suffer from such a condition or
whether such condition was obvious. See, e.g., Mattern v. City
of Sea Isle, 131 F. Supp.3d 305, 316 (D.N.J. 2015) (citing
Nicini, 212 F.3d at 815 n.14) (“[T]he Third Circuit has found
deliberate indifference in situations where there was ‘objective
evidence that [a] plaintiff had serious need for medical care,’
and prison officials ignored that evidence”).
32.

As noted above, disagreement with the kind of medical

care administered does not state a viable claim for relief.
Innis v. Wilson, 334 F. App’x 454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 2009). See
also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (“mere
disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” is insufficient
to state a constitutional violation). A prisoner is not entitled
to the medical treatment of his choice. See Reed v. Cameron, 380
F. App’x 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2010) (dissatisfaction with prison
18

medical care is insufficient to show deliberate indifference)
(citing Monmouth Cnty., 834 F.2d at 346).
33.

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a conditions

of confinement cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment
for inadequate medical care while incarcerated. These claims
will be dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend the
Complaint within 30 days of the date of this opinion and order
to meet the pleading deficiencies noted above, if Plaintiff
elects to pursue this claim.
Conclusion
34.

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a)

dismissed with prejudice as to the CCJ and CCCF; and (b)
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
35.

An appropriate order follows.

April 26, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

19