SCULLY v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 7/5/2017. (rtm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DENEEN M. SCULLY,
Plaintiff,
v.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-09312 (JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES
Deneen M. Scully, Plaintiff Pro Se
5302 Glenwood Drive
Pine Hill, NJ 08021
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Deneen M. Scully seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Jail (“CCJ”) for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss the Complaint with prejudice in part and dismiss it
without prejudice in part. The Complaint: (a) is dismissed with
prejudice as to claims made against defendant CCJ; (b) is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim as to
conditions of confinement regarding overcrowding allegations, 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); and(c) is dismissed without
prejudice as to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim
regarding jail conditions for provision of basic hygiene
products and clean clothes (“Jail Hygiene Conditions Claim”).
Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 60 days after the
date of this Opinion that identifies by name the party(ies) who
are allegedly liable under the Jail Hygiene Conditions Claim.
Any such amended complaint shall be subject to screening under
28 U.S.C. § 1915. Upon Plaintiff’s failure to file an amended
complaint naming the party(ies) whom she alleges are liable
under the Jail Hygiene Conditions Claim, such claim shall be
subject to dismissal without further notice for failure to state
a claim.
Standard of Review
4.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
2

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
Claims Against CCJ: Dismissed With Prejudice
5.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 19831 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) a person deprived him of a federal
right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted

1

Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3

under color of state or territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
6.

Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983,

“[t]he term ‘persons’ includes local and state officers acting
under color of state law.” Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).2 To
say that a person was “acting under color of state law” means
that the defendant in a § 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation
omitted). Generally, then, “a public employee acts under color
of state law while acting in his official capacity or while
exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id.
at 50.
7.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages

from CCJ for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. The CCJ, however, is not a “person” within the
meaning of § 1983; therefore, the claims against it must be

2

“Person” is not strictly limited to individuals who are state
and local government employees, however. For example,
municipalities and other local government units, such as
counties, also are considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.
See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
690-91 (1978).
4

dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F.
App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v.
Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern
State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989)
(correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983). Given
that the claims against the CCJ must be dismissed with
prejudice, the claims may not proceed and Plaintiff may not name
the CCJ as a defendant.
Conditions Of Confinement Claims:
Dismissed Without Prejudice
8.

Second, for the reasons set forth below, the Court

will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to
state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
9.

The present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts

to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review
under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff’s
Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not
enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional
violation has occurred.

5

10.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim3, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).

3

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
6

11.

A complaint must plead sufficient facts to support a

reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has
occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
12.

However, with respect to the alleged facts giving rise

to Plaintiff’s claims, the present Complaint states: “forced to
sleep on the cold cement floor with a mattress no thicker than a
bed sheet. I was also made to sleep on the floor with no mat at
all upon arrival there were anywhere from 1 (one) to 20 (twenty)
females in holding cell with one bench that seats four.” She
also alleges she had to “lay with head beneath a leaky toilet”
and had to eat her food on the floor. Complaint § III(C).
13.

Plaintiff does not specify the date(s) or time(s) that

these events occurred. Id. § III(B).
14.

Plaintiff seeks “monetary compensation for mental

anguish” as well as “mental and physical damages in an amount to
me no less than 750.” Id. § V.
15.

Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed
because the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual
support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation
has occurred.
16.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
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rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.
17.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to

particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
8

privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end,
the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint
within 60 days of the date of this Opinion.4
18.

Plaintiff is further advised that any amended

complaint must plead specific facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, including the dates. In the event Plaintiff files
an amended complaint, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to
support a reasonable inference that a constitutional violation
has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under §
1915.5
19.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function

4

The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
5 To the extent the Complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered prior to December 16, 2014, those claims
are barred by the statute of limitations. Claims brought under §
1983 are governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period
for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276
(1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the
action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d
472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement would have been immediately apparent
to Plaintiff; therefore, the statute of limitations on some of
Plaintiff’s claims expired two years after release from
incarceration. In the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended
complaint, it shall be limited to confinements in which
Plaintiff was released after December 16, 2014.
9

in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court in this Opinion and Order.

Conditions Of Confinement Claim – Allegations Regarding Jail
Conditions As To Provision Of Basic Hygiene Products And Clean
Clothes: Dismissed Without Prejudice
20.

The Court dismisses without prejudice the Plaintiff’s

conditions of confinement claim regarding jail conditions for
provision of basic hygiene products and clean clothes (“Jail
Hygiene Conditions Claim”).
21.

Plaintiff states that while incarcerated, “forced to

wear the same uniform for 7 days without getting a clean one”
and “when female problems occur I was made to stay in my same
soiled uniform because you only get one during that 7 day
period.” Id. § V.

10

22.

“A conditions of confinement claim is a constitutional

attack on the general conditions, practices, and restrictions of
pretrial or other detainee confinement. A constitutional
violation exists if the court finds that the conditions of
confinement are not reasonably related to a legitimate, nonpunitive governmental objective.” Al-Shahin v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 06-5261, 2007 WL 2985553, at *9 (D.N.J. Oct.
4, 2007) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39).
23.

“Analysis of whether a pre-trial detainee has been

deprived of liberty without due process is governed by the
standards set out by the Supreme Court.” Alexis v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 05-1484, 2005 WL 1502068, at *10 (D.N.J. June
24, 2005) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) and
Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2000)).
“[D]enial of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities,’ Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981), which
would include basic sanitary conditions, would be sufficient to
state an actionable constitutional deprivation. Further, unsafe,
unsanitary and inadequate conditions do not appear reasonably
related to a legitimate, non-punitive governmental objective.”
Al-Shahin, 2007 WL 2985553, at *10 (allowing plaintiff’s claims
of (a) denial of basic hygiene products and clothing (which were
mandated by the detention facility’s manual) and (b) severe
overcrowding (such as sleeping and eating in close proximity to
11

dirty toilets, vermin-infested cells, and poor ventilation) to
proceed as claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement).
Accord Gonzalez-Cifuentes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No.
04-4855, 2005 WL 1106562, at *12 (D.N.J. May 3, 2005).
24.

While the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable

prisons” (Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349), Plaintiff’s allegations of
not receiving “pads, toilet tissue, toothpaste and sometimes
soap[,] along with clean wash cloths” (Complaint § V) during two
months of incarceration. (id. §§ III(B)-(C)) encompass “basic
sanitary conditions.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
25.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Jail Hygiene Conditions Claim

is dismissed without prejudice. This Court grants Plaintiff
leave to file an amended complaint, and the Court notes for
Plaintiff that she bears the burden of supplying the facts of
her claim, including identification of the particular party(ies)
whom she alleges are liable under this claim. Mala, 704 F.3d at
245; Pliler, 542 U.S. at 231.
Conclusion
26.

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Complaint is

dismissed in part and shall conditionally proceed in part. The
Complaint: (a) is dismissed with prejudice as to claims made
against CCJ; (b) is dismissed without prejudice for failure to
state a claim as to conditions of confinement regarding
overcrowding; and (c) is dismissed without prejudice as to
12

Plaintiff’s Jail Hygiene Conditions Claim. Plaintiff may file an
amended complaint within 60 days after the date this Opinion and
Order are entered on the docket that identifies by name the
party(ies) whom Plaintiff alleges are liable under the Jail
Hygiene Conditions Claim. Any such amended complaint shall be
subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Upon Plaintiff’s
failure to file an amended complaint naming the party(ies) whom
she alleges are liable under the Jail Hygiene Conditions Claim,
such claim shall be subject to dismissal without further notice
for failure to state a claim.
27.

An appropriate order follows.

July 5, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

13