POWELL v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL

Filing 3

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 10/6/17. (js)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DEVON C. POWELL,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-09314 (JBS-AMD)

Defendant.

OPINION

APPEARANCES
Devon C. Powell, Plaintiff Pro Se
91 Oak Street
Lindenwold, NJ 08091
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
1.

Plaintiff Devon C. Powell seeks to bring a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Jail (“CCJ”) for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (1)

dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against
CCJ; and (2) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure
to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii), except that
claims relating to conditions of confinement arising prior to
December 14, 2014, are dismissed with prejudice.
Claims Against CCJ: Dismissed With Prejudice
4.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 19831 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) a person deprived him of a federal
right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted
under color of state or territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
5.

Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983,

“[t]he term ‘persons’ includes local and state officers acting
under color of state law.” Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99

1

Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2

(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).2 To
say that a person was “acting under color of state law” means
that the defendant in a § 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation
omitted). Generally, then, “a public employee acts under color
of state law while acting in his official capacity or while
exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id.
at 50.
6.

Because the Complaint has not sufficiently alleged

that a “person” deprived Plaintiff of a federal right, the
Complaint does not meet the standards necessary to set forth a
prima facie case under § 1983. In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages from CCJ for allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. The CCJ, however, is not a “person”
within the meaning of § 1983; therefore, the claims against it
must be dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660
F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v.

2

“Person” is not strictly limited to individuals who are state
and local government employees, however. For example,
municipalities and other local government units, such as
counties, also are considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.
See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
690-91 (1978).
3

Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern
State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989)
(correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983). Given
that the claims against the CCJ must be dismissed with
prejudice, the claims may not proceed and Plaintiff may not name
the CCJ as a defendant.
7.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to name a

person or persons who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
Complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
Conditions Of Confinement Claims:
Dismissed Without Prejudice
8.

Second, for the reasons set forth below, the Court

will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to
state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
9.

The present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts

to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review
under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff’s
Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not
enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional
violation has occurred.

4

10.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim3, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).

3

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
5

11.

A complaint must plead sufficient facts to support a

reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has
occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
12.

However, with respect to the alleged facts giving rise

to Plaintiff’s claims, the present Complaint states: “was
incarcerated with injuries from getting shot, where bullets were
still lodge in my back and staples in my leg and stomach. The
Jail had me sleeping on the floor with 2 other people in the
cell. It was unsanitary with urine on floor. All toiletries were
not available when needed. As I slept on the floor my roommates
pooped and peed in the toilet next to where my head had to go.
Everyone in the Camden County Jail was involved. It was
overcrowded but the worked failed to care about the safety,
privacy and health risk of me and the rest of the inmates.”
Complaint § III(C).
13.

Plaintiff states this occurred from October 31, 2008

to December 2008 and February 22, 2016 to May 2016. Id. § III(B)
14.

Plaintiff states he “had injuries from street but

Camden County Jail added to these injuries my making me sleep on
the cot if available with a hernia in my stomach and bullets in
my back.” Id. § IV.
15.

With respect to requested relief, Plaintiff states he

would like to “be compensated for my pain and suffering while
incarcerated. I also would like something done that prevents the
6

unsafe and unhealthy housing accommodations the jail makes
inmates suffer. Compensation I would like at least $125-150 per
day, I had to ensure the pain.” Id. § V.4
16.

Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed
because the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual
support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation
has occurred.

4

Given Plaintiff’s reference to the “jail needs to be
straightened out” (Complaint § V), the Court advises
Plaintiff that she is one of thousands of members of a
certified class in a case on this Court's docket captioned
Dittimus-Bey, et al. v. Taylor, et al., Civil Action No.
1:05-cv-0063-JBS, United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey. The class plaintiffs are all
persons confined at the Camden County Correctional Facility
(“CCCF”), as either pretrial detainees or convicted
prisoners, at any time from January 6, 2005 until the
present time. The Dittimus-Bey class of plaintiffs seeks
injunctive and declaratory relief concerning allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the CCCF
involving overcrowding. The Dittimus-Bey class action does
not involve money damages for individuals. Various measures
undertaken pursuant to the Court-approved Second and Third
Consent Decrees have reduced the CCCF jail population to
fewer prisoners than the intended design capacity for the
jail, thereby greatly reducing or eliminating triple and
quadruple bunking in two-person cells; these details are
further explained in the Final Consent Decree, which would
continue those requirements under Court supervision for two
more years. This class action did not provide monetary
compensation to the class members. The settlement did not
bar any individual class member from seeking money damages
in an individual case.

7

17.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.

8

18.

Moreover, to the extent the complaint seeks relief for

conditions Plaintiff encountered during periods of confinement
ending prior to December 16, 2014, those claims are barred by
the statute of limitations and must be dismissed with prejudice,
meaning that Plaintiff cannot recover for those claims because
they have been brought too late.5 Civil rights claims under
§ 1983 are governed by New Jersey's limitations period for
personal injury and must be brought within two years of the
claim’s accrual. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985);
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010).
“Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff
knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is
based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480
(3d Cir. 2014).
19.

Plaintiff alleges the events giving rise to his claims

occurred in 2008 as well as 2016. Complaint § III. The allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCJ, namely the
overcrowding, would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff
at the time of his detention; therefore, the statute of
limitations for Plaintiff’s claims arising from his October 31,
2008 to December 2008 incarceration expired in December 2010,

5

Plaintiff filed this complaint on December 16, 2016.
9

before this complaint was filed in December 2016. Plaintiff
therefore cannot recover for these claims.6
Conditions Of Confinement Claim - Allegations Of Inadequate
Medical Care: Dismissed Without Prejudice

20.

Further, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered from a

gunshot wound and was exposed to unsanitary conditions due to
the overcrowding in the facility. It is unclear if this injury
occurred during Plaintiff’s 2008 or 2016 incarceration. As
discussed above, the 2008 incarceration is barred by the statute
of limitations and Plaintiff cannot recover for that claim.
21.

However, should Plaintiff have been alleging that this

occurred during his 2016 incarceration, Plaintiff still does not
allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a
constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this
Court’s review under § 1915.
22.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed.

R. Civ. P.”) requires pleadings to contain “a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .

6

a

Although the Court may toll, or extend, the statute of
limitations in the interests of justice, certain circumstances
must be present before it can do so. Tolling is not warranted in
this case because the state has not “actively misled” Plaintiff
as to the existence of his cause of action, there are no
extraordinary circumstances that prevented Plaintiff from filing
his claim, and there is nothing to indicate Plaintiff filed his
claim on time but in the wrong forum. See Omar v. Blackman, 590
F. App’x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014).
10

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief; and demand for the relief sought . . . .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3). While pro se complaints are
construed liberally and are held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers (Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972)), pro se litigants nevertheless must still allege facts,
taken as true, to suggest the required elements of the claims
asserted. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35
(3d Cir. 2008); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113
(1993)(“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in
ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse
mistakes by those who proceed without counsel”).
23.

Here, Plaintiff contends he sustained injuries from

getting shot that appeared to worsen in the facility. Complaint
§§ III, IV.
24.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

applies to pretrial detainees’ claims of inadequate medical
care. Bocchino v. City of Atlantic City, 179 F. Supp.3d 387, 403
(D.N.J. 2016). “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment in this context
incorporates the protections of the Eighth Amendment” (Holder v.
Merline, No. 05-1024, 2005 WL 1522130, at *3 (D.N.J. June 27,
2005) (citing Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042,
1067 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992)), and
11

most cases have stated that, at a minimum, the Eighth
Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” standard will suffice. In
other words, substantive due process rights are violated only
when the behavior of the government official is so egregious and
outrageous that it “shocks the conscience.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K.
v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 579 (3d
Cir. 2004) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
846-47 (1998)).
25.

Applying this principle in the context of a claim for

violation of the right to adequate medical care, a pretrial
detainee must allege the following two elements to set forth a
cognizable cause of action: (1) a serious medical need; and (2)
behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes
deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318
F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
26.

To satisfy the first prong of the Estelle inquiry, an

inmate must demonstrate that his medical needs are serious. The
Third Circuit has defined a serious medical need as: (1) “one
that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment”;
(2) “one that is so obvious that a lay person would recognize
the necessity for a doctor's attention”; or (3) one for which
“the denial of treatment would result in the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain” or “a life-long handicap or permanent
12

loss.” Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). When evaluating
this first element under Estelle, courts consider factors such
as “the severity of the medical problems, the potential for harm
if the medical care is denied or delayed and whether any such
harm actually resulted from the lack of medical attention.”
Maldonado v. Terhune, 28 F. Supp.2d 284, 289 (D.N.J. 1998).
27.

The second element of the Estelle test is subjective

and “requires an inmate to show that prison officials acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.” Holder,
2005 WL 1522130, at *4 (citing Natale, 318 F.3d at 582) (finding
deliberate indifference requires proof that the official knew of
and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety).
Conduct that constitutes negligence does not rise to the level
of deliberate indifference; rather, deliberate indifference is a
“reckless disregard of a known risk of harm.” Holder, 2005 WL
1522130, at *4 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836
(1994)). Courts have found deliberate indifference “in
situations where there was ‘objective evidence that [a]
plaintiff had serious need for medical care,’ and prison
officials ignored that evidence[,] Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d
798, 815 n. 14 (3d Cir. 2000) [and] in situations where
‘necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical
reasons.’ Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834
13

F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)[,] [cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006
(1988)].” Natale, 318 F.3d at 582.
28.

While the Court will accept as true for screening

purposes that the gunshot injury was of a nature and extent that
satisfied the “serious condition” prong of a Fourteenth
Amendment claim (Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976);
Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d
Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth no facts
establishing that CCJ demonstrated “deliberate indifference” to
these injuries during his incarceration (i.e., the second prong
for a Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim).
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. This second Estelle element “requires
an inmate to show that prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference to his serious medical need.” Holder, 2005 WL
1522130, at *4 (citing Natale, 318 F.3d at 582) (finding
deliberate indifference requires proof that the official knew of
and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety).
29.

Conduct that constitutes negligence does not rise to

the level of deliberate indifference; rather, deliberate
indifference is a “reckless disregard of a known risk of harm.”
Holder, 2005 WL 1522130, at *4 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 836 (1994)). Courts have found deliberate indifference
“in situations where there was ‘objective evidence that [a]
plaintiff had serious need for medical care,’ and prison
14

officials ignored that evidence[.] Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d
798, 815 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000).” Natale, 318 F.3d at 582.
30.

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of

action under the Fourteenth Amendment for inadequate medical
care of his gunshot injury while incarcerated at CCJ. These
claims will be dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend
the Complaint to meet the pleading deficiencies noted above, if
Plaintiff elects to pursue this claim with respect to deliberate
indifference with respect to his injury.
31.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to

particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end,
the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint
within 30 days of the date of this order.7
32.

Plaintiff is further advised that any amended

complaint must plead specific facts regarding the conditions of
confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint,
Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable
inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order
to survive this Court’s review under § 1915. As discussed above,

7

The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
15

if Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, it should be
limited to confinements in which Plaintiff was released after
December 16, 2014.
33.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
34.

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a)

dismissed with prejudice as to the CCJ; and (b) dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim, except that
claims arising prior to December 16, 2014, are dismissed with
prejudice.

16

35.

An appropriate order follows.

October 6, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

17