ROBINSON v. SECTION 23 PROPOERTY OWNER'S ASSOCIATION, INC. et al
Filing
125
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 12/18/2018. (rss,n.m. )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ALBERT ROBINSON,
1:16-cv-09384-NLH-JS
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
SECTION 23 PROPERTY OWNER'S
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
ALBERT ROBINSON
P.O. BOX 1961
SUWANEE, GA 30024
Plaintiff appearing pro se
GREGG DOUGLAS WEINSTOCK
VIGORITO, BARKER, PATTERSON, NICHOLS & PORTER LLP
300 GARDEN CITY PLAZA
SUITE 308
GARDEN CITY, NY 11 530
On behalf of Defendants Section 23, Property Owner's
Association, Inc., James Shaefer, John McNamara, Auto
Owners Insurance Co., The Law Firm of Henderson, Franklin,
Starnes & Holt, P.A., Richard Barton Akin, II, Michael Paul
Versnik, and Patricia Schaefer
DAVID JAMES MELVIN
FRESH LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, PL
6930 W. LINEBAUGH AVE
TAMPA, FL 33625
On behalf of Keathel Chauncey, Fresh Legal Perspective,
Ellie Teng, Scott Hundley, Zachary Heathcote, Suzanne
Barnhart, Bruce Emerson, Bonafide Properties, LLC, David
Melvin, and Chelsea Smith-Scott
GARY ROBERT SHENDELL
LINDSAY SAMANTHA KATZ
SHENDELL & POLLOCK P.L.
2700 N. MILITARY TRAIL
SUITE 150
BOCA RATON, FL 33431
On behalf of Defendants Curtright Collins Truitt and The
Law Firm of Curtright C. Truitt PA
STAN WISNIEWSKI
25164 MARION AVENUE
PUNTA GORDA, FL 33950
Defendant appearing pro se
STEVEN JOSEPH BUTCHER
1720 E C478
WEBSTER, FL 33597
Defendant appearing pro se
JAMIE ELAINE MILLER
1720 E C478
WEBSTER, FL 33597
Defendant appearing pro se
DEVIN CRAIG SHULER
18081 BRACKEN CIRCLE
PORT CHARLOTTE, FL 33948
Defendant appearing pro se
DAVID KEITH OAKS
P.O. BOX 473
LYNN, NC 28750-0473
Defendant appearing pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff, Albert Robinson, appearing pro se, claims that
the various actions of the twenty-six individual and corporate
defendants relating to the possession and ultimate foreclosure
of his mother’s home in Punta Gorda, Florida, where he and his
family resided, constituted a massive conspiracy under the
Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), among
2
other claims.
Pending before the Court are the motions of
Defendants to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, primarily on the basis
of lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue.
the Defendants have moved for sanctions.
Several of
Also pending are eight
motions filed by Plaintiff for relief in his favor.
For the
reasons expressed below, Plaintiff’s claims against all
Defendants will be dismissed with prejudice and all other
motions will be denied.
BACKGROUND
Jane B. Robinson, as trustee for the Jane B. Robinson
revocable trust, owned a home at 25264 Padre Lane, Punta Gorda,
Charlotte County, Florida.
On August 1, 2014, the community
development manager, Section 23 Property Owners Association,
Inc. (“Section 23”), filed a foreclosure action in the state
court in Charlotte County. 1
Plaintiff, Albert Robinson, the son
of Jane B. Robinson, lived in the home.
Plaintiff disputed the
foreclosure on several bases, including a bankruptcy case
relating to Jane B. Robinson pending in the Bankruptcy Court for
the District of New Jersey. 2
1
Previously, Section 23 filed suit in Florida state court
against Plaintiff for violating certain deed restrictions.
Section 23 imposed fines on Plaintiff for parking a truck on the
grass and street and allowing garbage cans to be visible from
the street.
2
In re Jane Barbara Robinson, 14-34718-JNP (Bankr. D.N.J.).
3
On September 21, 2015, the state court entered a final
summary judgment of foreclosure in favor of Section 23 and set a
foreclosure sale to occur on October 12, 2015.
Defendant
Keathel Chauncey, as trustee for the 25264 Padre Ln Land Trust,
was the successful bidder at the foreclosure sale and was issued
a certificate of title.
On November 24, 2015, Chauncey moved
the state court to vacate the sale due to questions regarding
the automatic stay in Jane Robinson’s bankruptcy case.
The
court held a hearing on the motion on January 11, 2016,
determined that the sale did not violate the automatic stay, and
found that the sale should be upheld.
On December 24, 2015, Plaintiff appealed the case to the
Florida Second District Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff withdrew
the appeal after the court issued a notice to show cause
regarding Plaintiff’s failure to file his initial brief.
On
March 1, 2016, Chauncey received a Writ of Possession for the
property, which required Plaintiff to vacate the premises.
During this time and thereafter, Plaintiff filed many cases
against the same Defendants here and others in Florida state
court, 3 the Middle District of Florida, the Southern District of
3
On September 14, 2017, after Plaintiff filed over twelve cases
in Florida state court from January 2014 through March 2017, the
Florida state court found Plaintiff to be a “vexatious litigant”
pursuant to Florida Statute § 68.093, and the Florida state
court entered a litigation preclusion order against Plaintiff
that requires the court’s permission before Plaintiff may file
4
Florida, 4 and New Jersey state court. 5
The subject of all of
his cases, including this case, arises out of his residence at
his mother’s home in Florida.
Beginning with disputes over the
enforcement of deed restrictions, such as parking and property
maintenance, Plaintiff’s cases have evolved into claims against
essentially every person or entity that has been involved either
directly or indirectly in the ultimate foreclosure of the Punta
Gorda house and his resulting eviction from the property.
The
main thrust of Plaintiff’s claims is that all the Defendants
have conspired to illegally purchase his mother’s home and steal
all of his personal and intellectual property inside.
Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants have done so to quash his investigation
of their international money laundering and fraud scheme.
any new suit in that court. (See Docket No. 70 at 182-195.)
The Florida state court noted that the Texas state court had
deemed Plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant on December 18,
2014. (Id. at 194.)
4
Plaintiff filed several cases in the Middle District of Florida
and the Southern District of Florida, all of which were
dismissed for various reasons. See Robinson v. Section 23 POA,
et al., 12-cv-675-FtM-29CM (M.D. Fla., dismissed on September 2,
2014); Robinson v. Oaks, et al., 15-cv-242-FtM-38DNF (M.D. Fla.,
dismissed and affirmed by the 11th Circuit on August 6, 2015);
Robinson v. Teng, et al., 16-cv-80488-CIV-MARRA (S.D. Fla.,
dismissed and transferred to M.D. Fla. On March 30, 2016);
Robinson v. Section 23, et al., 2:16-cv-14127-JEM (S.D. Fla.,
dismissed without prejudice to refiling in M.D. Fla. on October
17, 2016).
5
Robinson v. Oaks, et al., CUML000476-16 (N.J. Super. Ct.,
dismissed on July 27, 2018).
5
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims,
primarily because this Court cannot exercise personal
jurisdiction over them, and because venue for Plaintiff’s claims
is improper here.
95, 97, 102, 110.)
(Docket No. 23, 51, 55, 58, 63, 70, 72, 89,
Several Defendants have also moved for
sanctions against Plaintiff.
(Docket No. 101.)
Plaintiff filed
an omnibus opposition to Defendants’ motions (Docket No. 116),
and he has filed two motions for summary judgment in his favor
(Docket No. 81, 91), as well as motions for default judgment and
other miscellaneous motions (Docket No. 75, 87, 90, 115, 124).
The Court has reviewed all the motions, in addition to all the
parties’ correspondence directed to the Court.
DISCUSSION
A.
Subject matter jurisdiction
Plaintiff asserts that this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over his federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1367.
B.
Analysis
Defendants argue that because they are citizens of Florida
and otherwise have no contacts with New Jersey this Court may
not exercise personal jurisdiction over them without violating
due process.
Defendants also argue that New Jersey is not the
proper venue for Plaintiff’s claims because the property at
6
issue is located, and Plaintiff’s allegations regarding
Defendants’ actions relative to the property and the fraud
scheme in general all arise, in Florida.
Plaintiff claims that personal jurisdiction and venue are
proper here because of a “Terms and Conditions” provision in a
contract he posted at the Punta Gorda home while he was living
there.
That document states, “By entering the property . . .
you agree to litigate any and all claims . . . directed towards
the Robinsons in the US District Court chosen by the Robinsons.”
(Docket No. 10-17 at 65.)
Plaintiff contends this is a mutual
agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants, and they have
therefore consented to appear in this Court – the U.S. District
Court of his choosing.
Plaintiff also argues that because
Section 23 sent numerous letters to him in New Jersey it has
sufficient minimum contacts with New Jersey.
Plaintiff further
argues that because he has established sufficient contacts for
one Defendant, jurisdiction over the other Defendants is
satisfied for his RICO claims.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides for
dismissal of an action when the Court does not have personal
jurisdiction over a defendant.
“Once challenged, the plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction.”
O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d
Cir. 2007) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150
7
(3d Cir. 2001)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the Court must “accept all of the
plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe disputed facts in
favor of the plaintiff.”
Carteret Sav. Bank v. Shushan, 954
F.2d 141, 142 n.1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 817 (1992)
(citations omitted).
A defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of a United
States district court if the defendant “is subject to the
jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state
where the district court is located[.]”
4(k)(1)(A).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
“A federal court sitting in New Jersey has
jurisdiction over parties to the extent provided under New
Jersey state law.”
Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d
93, 96 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
The New Jersey long-
arm statute “permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to
the fullest limits of due process.”
IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert
AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing DeJames v.
Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Under the Due Process clause, the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is appropriate when
the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
8
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
A defendant establishes minimum contacts by “‘purposefully
avail[ing] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State,’” thereby invoking “‘the benefits and
protections of [the forum State’s] laws.’”
Asahi Metal Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Sup. Ct. of California, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987)
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985)).
This “purposeful availment” requirement assures that
the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court
in the forum and is not haled into a forum as a result of
“random,” “fortuitous” or “attenuated” contacts with the forum
state.
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980); see also Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472,
475 (internal citations omitted).
In deciding whether a defendant’s contacts with a forum are
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over that party, the
Court must consider whether such contacts are related to or
arise out of the cause of action at issue in the case.
The
Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a
defendant where the cause of action is related to or arises out
of activities by the defendant that took place within the forum
state.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
If the cause of action has no
relationship to a defendant’s contacts with a forum state, the
9
Court may nonetheless exercise general personal jurisdiction if
the defendant has conducted “continuous and systematic” business
activities in the forum state.
Id. at 416.
Once the Court determines that the defendant has minimum
contacts with the forum state, it must also consider whether the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant
“comport[s] with ‘fair play and substantial justice’” to satisfy
the due process test.
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476
(quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).
In this regard, it must
be reasonable to require the defendant to litigate the suit in
the forum state, and a court may consider the following factors
to determine reasonableness: the burden on the defendant, the
forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining
an efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.
Id. at 477 (citing World Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292). 6
6
In the case of an intentional tort, the “effects test” may be
applied. The Calder “effects test” requires the plaintiff to
show the following:
(1) The defendant committed an intentional tort;
(2) The plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum
such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of
10
Here, Plaintiff has not established that any Defendant had
or has any contact with New Jersey whatsoever, let alone
“minimum contacts.”
Plaintiff has also failed to provide any
proof that his claims are related to or arise out of activities
by Defendants that took place in New Jersey, and he has failed
to provide any proof that Defendants have conducted “continuous
and systematic” business activities in New Jersey.
Defendants
are all Florida or out-of-state individuals or entities involved
in the alleged fraud scheme that arose in Florida and allegedly
victimized Plaintiff in Florida by depriving him of a tenancy in
his mother’s Florida home.
Neither the unilateral activities of Plaintiff in New
Jersey, nor the “unilateral expectation that his involvement in
any U.S. litigation would occur in New Jersey, are relevant to
the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of that
tort;
(3) The defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at
the forum such that the forum can be said to be the focal
point of the tortious activity.
IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265–66 (3d
Cir. 1998). “[I]n order to make out the third prong of this
test, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew that the
plaintiff would suffer the brunt of the harm caused by the
tortious conduct in the forum, and point to specific activity
indicating that the defendant expressly aimed its tortious
conduct at the forum.” Id. For the same reasons expressed
below with regard to specific and general jurisdiction, the
effects test does not confer personal jurisdiction over
Defendants.
11
this jurisdictional analysis.”
Al-Ghena Intern. Corp. v.
Radwan, 957 F. Supp. 2d 511, 530 (D.N.J. 2013) (citing Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“The unilateral activity of
those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant
cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State .
. . . [I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws.”).
Simply because
Plaintiff filed suit here, and claims that a fraud scheme that
started in Florida is affecting other alleged victims in the
entire United States, including New Jersey, is not sufficient to
satisfy due process or justify haling these non-forum Defendants
into this Court.
See, e.g., Al-Ghena Intern. Corp., 957 F.
Supp. 2d at 529 (in a case that alleged violations of federal
and New Jersey RICO laws and Florida's Civil Remedies for
Criminal Practices Act, as well as various related common law
causes of action, including fraud, conversion, conspiracy,
breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment, all arising
from a soured business deal to develop a boutique hotel in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida, finding no personal jurisdiction over the
defendants in New Jersey where the racketeering allegations in
the complaint, including the appendix of supporting
documentation, did not contain a single factual allegation
12
specifically tied to New Jersey, instead simply alleged
generally that the defendants’ racketeering activity occurred in
New Jersey and elsewhere).
Additionally, the domicile of the owner of the Punta Gorda
property is of no consequence to the personal jurisdiction
analysis as applied to these Defendants.
To the contrary, the
location of the property owner is only relevant to the issue of
personal jurisdiction over the property owner to the extent that
an out-of-state property owner can be subject to the
jurisdiction of a court and suit in the state where she owns the
property.
See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328 (1980)
(explaining that the ownership of property in a state is a
contact between the defendant and the forum that may establish
personal jurisdiction over the defendant).
Thus, Plaintiff’s
mother’s New Jersey residence cannot confer personal
jurisdiction over the out-of-state Defendants.
Nor does Plaintiff’s mother’s bankruptcy filing establish
minimum contacts between Defendants and New Jersey.
The Punta
Gorda house was listed as an asset in Jane Robinson’s schedule
of assets when she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on December 8,
2014.
A discharge of debtor was entered on March 27, 2015,
which prohibited any attempt to collect from the debtor a debt
that has been discharged.
(See 14-34718, Bankr. D.N.J., Docket
No. 10.)
13
That discharge did not automatically discharge any liens on
the Florida property.
(Id.; “[A] creditor may have the right to
enforce a valid lien, such as a mortgage or security interest,
against a debtor’s property after the bankruptcy, if that lien
was not avoided or eliminated in the bankruptcy case.”)
Ultimately, on October 13, 2015, the Trustee proposed to abandon
the property as being of inconsequential value because of the
nominal difference between the outstanding mortgage lien and the
property’s value.
(See 14-34718, Bankr. D.N.J., Docket No. 28.)
When no objection was received, the property was deemed
abandoned on November 4, 2015, and the bankruptcy case closed on
November 20, 2015.
(See 14-34718, Bankr. D.N.J., Docket No. 32,
33.)
As noted above, by motion of the trustee of the property,
the Florida state court determined that the sale did not violate
the automatic stay, and found that the sale should be upheld.
Plaintiff withdrew his appeal on that issue.
Even though the
state court proceedings that resulted in the foreclosure of Jane
Robinson’s property and Plaintiff’s eviction are the basis for
Plaintiff’s complaint, the interplay between a New Jersey
bankruptcy case that listed the property as an asset and
Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims does not present a sufficient
contact between Defendants and this Court, particularly when
Plaintiff does not claim that he held any legal interest in the
14
property other than being a tenant.
This Court cannot reassess
the propriety of the state court’s decision relating to the
foreclosure of Jane Robinson’s property.
See, e.g., Gage v.
Wells Fargo Bank, NA AS, 521 F. App’x 49, 50–51 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citing Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild
LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (other citation omitted).
(“Pursuant to the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, federal courts
generally lack subject matter jurisdiction to engage in
appellate review of state court determinations.
Four
requirements must be met for the doctrine to apply: (1) the
plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of
injury caused by the state court judgment; (3) the state court
judgment was rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4)
the plaintiff invites the district court to review and reject
the state court judgment. All four requirements are met with
respect to Gage's claims against Wells Fargo. Gage cannot evade
Rooker–Feldman by arguing on appeal that he was not injured by
the foreclosure judgment, but rather by Wells Fargo's
purportedly fraudulent actions. The complaint reveals the nature
of Gage's claims against Wells Fargo: that the bank had no right
to foreclose on the property and therefore committed “criminal
acts” by enforcing the foreclosure judgment.”).
Moreover, Plaintiff is not a resident of New Jersey but
15
rather resides in Georgia, 7 which is also a factor against
exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
See
Al-Ghena
Intern. Corp., 957 F. Supp. 2d at 529-30 (citing Marten v.
Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 2007) ([A] plaintiff’s
residence is relevant to the ‘jurisdictional inquiry’ insofar as
residence in the forum may, because of defendant's relationship
with the plaintiff, enhance defendant's contacts with the forum.
However, the state of a plaintiff's residence does not on its
own create jurisdiction over nonresident defendants”).
With regard to the letters Defendant Section 23 sent to
Plaintiff in New Jersey, Plaintiff has not specifically provided
those letters as evidence to refute Section 23’s challenge to
personal jurisdiction. 8
That failure is instantly fatal to
Plaintiff’s argument, because once the defense of lack of
personal jurisdiction is raised, “then the plaintiff must
7
When Plaintiff filed his complaint, he listed a P.O. Box in
North Port, Florida as his address. Plaintiff claims that he
has temporarily relocated to Georgia because of Defendants’
harassment.
8
The letters are not attached to an exhibit to Plaintiff’s
opposition to Section 23’s motion to dismiss. (See Docket No.
116.) Even if those letters are filed on the docket elsewhere,
that does not satisfy Plaintiff’s burden in opposing Defendants’
motions. See Sunoco, Inc. (R & M) v. MX Wholesale Fuel Corp.,
565 F. Supp. 2d 572, 577 (D.N.J. 2008) (quoting Albrechtsen v.
Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System, 309 F.3d
433, 436 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating “‘Judges are not like pigs,
hunting for truffles buried in’ the record.”)).
16
sustain its burden of proof in establishing jurisdictional facts
through sworn affidavits or other competent evidence. . . . [A]t
no point may a plaintiff rely on the bare pleadings alone in
order to withstand a defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss
for lack of in personam jurisdiction.
Once the motion is made,
plaintiff must respond with actual proofs, not mere
allegations.”
Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts,
Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 66 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
Moreover, that Section 23 mailed to Plaintiff in New Jersey
– or perhaps more likely mailed something to the property owner,
Plaintiff’s mother – several letters related to the Florida
property is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction
over Section 23.
Ostensibly, when the community development
management company is required to communicate with Plaintiff or
his mother about the property it managed, and neither Plaintiff
nor his mother were residing in the property, it would be
necessary to mail the communication to wherever Plaintiff or his
mother was located at the time, whether it be in New Jersey or
any other state.
Such communications do not constitute Section
23’s purposeful availment of the laws and the protection of the
courts in New Jersey, and do not satisfy the requisite contacts
to establish personal jurisdiction over Section 23. 9
9
See, e.g.,
To the extent that Section 23 mailed Plaintiff letters while he
was in New Jersey in response to Plaintiff’s numerous lawsuits
17
IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 267–68 (3d
Cir. 1998) (“[C]ases like Southmark and Far West make clear that
a few calls or letters into the forum may be of only marginal
import if the dispute is focused outside the forum.”); Isaacs v.
Arizona Bd. of Regents, 608 F. App’x 70, 75 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The
allegations in the amended complaint have nothing to do with
Pennsylvania, the alleged harms did not occur in Pennsylvania,
and these defendants do not purposely avail themselves of the
privileges of conducting activities within Pennsylvania to the
degree necessary to confer jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction
is not established by the mailing of a few letters to
[Plaintiff] after he returned to his home in Pennsylvania . . .
.”).
Finally, Plaintiff’s “contract” posted on the door of the
Punta Gorda property that stated any person who entered the
property agreed to his choice of forum for any legal dispute is
insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
Putting aside all the obvious deficiencies of that purported
“contract,” including the fact that most of the Defendants did
against Section 23, such communications also do not establish
Section 23’s minimum contacts with New Jersey. That the Court
must surmise the nature of the purported letters sent to
Plaintiff in New Jersey illuminates the very reason actual proof
– and not mere allegations – are required to establish personal
jurisdiction over a defendant.
18
not actually enter the residence while he was living there, a
“contract may provide a basis for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction that meets due process standards, but a contract
alone does not ‘automatically establish sufficient minimum
contacts in the other party’s home forum.’”
Grand Entm't Grp.,
Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 1993)
(quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478).
Without any actual
proof that Defendants have any meaningful contacts with New
Jersey, this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction of
them. 10
“Essentially, before hearing a case, a court must ask
whether the quality and nature of the defendant's activity is
such that it is reasonable and fair to require [that it] conduct
[its] defense in that state.”
Kulko v. Superior Court of
California, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
It is clear that Plaintiff
has not met his burden of establishing that any of the
10
Because Plaintiff has not established personal jurisdiction
over Section 23 or any other Defendant, the Court need not
address Plaintiff’s argument that under RICO the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over one defendant permits the Court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over all conspirators. See 18
U.S.C. § 1965(b) (“In any action under section 1964 of this
chapter in any district court of the United States in which it
is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties
residing in any other district be brought before the court, the
court may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for
that purpose may be served in any judicial district of the
United States by the marshal thereof.”).
19
Defendants have purposely availed themselves of the “privilege
of conducting activities within” New Jersey, either specifically
relating to Plaintiff’s claims against them or generally for
other purposes, such that this Court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over them would be fair and just.
The remedy for the lack of personal jurisdiction over
Defendants is either dismissing the action or transferring the
case to another district.
Corigliano v. Classic Motor, Inc.,
611 F. App’x 77, 81 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Goldlawr, Inc. v.
Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 465–66 (1962); Island Insteel Sys., Inc.
v. Waters, 296 F.3d 200, 218 n.9 (3d Cir. 2002)) (explaining
that under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, “Whenever a civil action is filed
in a court . . . and that court finds that there is a want of
jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of
justice, transfer such action . . . to any other such court in
which the action
. . . could have been brought at the time it
was filed . . . .”).
Whether to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint
or transfer Plaintiff’s case to the Middle District of Florida
raises the issues presented by Defendants’ motion for sanctions
pursuant to Federal Civil Procedure Rule 11. 11
11
The motion for sanctions was filed by Defendants Section 23,
Property Owner’s Association, Inc., James Shaefer, John
McNamara, Auto Owners Insurance Co., The Law Firm of Henderson,
Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A., Richard Barton Akin, II, Michael
Paul Versnik, and Patricia Schaefer. (Docket No. 101.) The
other Defendants have not filed a formal motion for sanctions,
20
Defendants relate:
Robinson's conduct in filing numerous frivolous pleading[s]
in numerous jurisdictions is exactly the type that Rule 11
was designed to deter. Robinson's incessant filing of
meritless pleadings is an explicit abuse of the judicial
system and amounts to nothing less than harassment.
Robinson is indiscriminant in his claims and has gone so
far as to bring meritless actions against individuals who
committed no other offense than having the mere misfortune
of living next to the property at issue. His claims are
unsupported by evidence and are absolutely unreasonable.
Furthermore, these exact claims have been exhaustively
litigated in Florida. The underlying property dispute
began ten (10) years ago in 2008 and was originally brought
in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. This case was dismissed in its
entirety. Additionally, Robinson brought an identical
action in New Jersey Superior Court, Cumberland County in
2016 which was also dismissed in its entirety. Since this
dismissal, Robinson has continued to bring frivolous and
meritless claims against Defendants in New Jersey, despite
it being a wholly improper forum. Robinson is fully aware
of all dismissals and has been warned by the courts in the
state of Florida that he is barred from bringing any future
litigation regarding this matter in Florida without
assistance of counsel. Robinson's decision to bring an
action that is essentially identical to the ones he is
barred from bringing in Florida is a clear attempt to
relitigate unsuccessful claims in a new and improper forum.
Furthermore, his attempt to bring an action in the present
forum is a textbook example of attempting to relitigate an
unsuccessful state court claim and is therefore violates
the restrictions of Rule 11.
Sanctions are absolutely appropriate in this matter
regardless that Robinson is a pro se plaintiff. He has
persisted regardless that his cause is clearly "hopeless"
and despite being repeatedly rejected by the courts of both
Florida and New Jersey. As a result of the warnings and
dismissals, it should have been clear to him as a
reasonable person that his cause was meritless and that
but they have requested that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed
with prejudice.
21
pursing it further would be frivolous.
(Docket No. 101-1 at 8-9.)
Defendants seek attorneys’ fees,
costs, and expenses, and seek to enjoin him from pursuing his
repetitive claims in this Court and in any other Court.
Rule 11 provides,
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or
other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or
later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party
certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on belief or a lack of information.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
There are two procedural requirements of
a motion filed for sanctions against a party for Rule 11(b)
violations – (1) “A motion for sanctions must be made separately
from any other motion and must describe the specific conduct
that allegedly violates Rule 11(b)”; and (2) “The motion must be
served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to
22
the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention,
or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days
after service or within another time the court sets.”
Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
Even though Defendants complied with the first procedural
requirement of Rule 11(c)(2), Defendants have not shown that
they followed the requirements to serve Plaintiff with their
motion and provide the 21-day notice period before filing the
motion.
The Court cannot consider Defendants’ motion as a
result.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kalenevitch, 502 F.
App’x 123, 125 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Schaefer Salt
Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 99 (3d Cir. 2008) (“If the twentyone day period is not provided, the [Rule 11] motion must be
denied.”).
Whether this Court may sanction Plaintiff is not, however,
stymied by Defendants’ procedural misstep.
“It is well within
the broad scope of the All Writs Act [28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)] for a
district court to issue an order restricting the filing of
meritless cases by a litigant whose manifold complaints raise
claims identical or similar to those that already have been
adjudicated.”
In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982).
“The interests of repose, finality of judgments, protection of
defendants from unwarranted harassment, and concern for
maintaining order in the court's dockets have been deemed
23
sufficient by a number of courts to warrant such a prohibition
against relitigation of claims.”
Id. (citation omitted).
“In
appropriate circumstances, courts have gone beyond prohibitions
against relitigation and enjoined persons from filing any
further claims of any sort without the permission of the court.”
Id. (citation omitted).
Because “any such order is an extreme remedy, and should be
used only in exigent circumstances,” id., a district court may
enjoin a pro se litigant from future filings so long as the
injunction complies with three requirements: (1) the litigant
must be continually abusing the judicial process; (2) the
litigant must be given notice of the potential injunction and an
opportunity to oppose the court’s order; and (3) the injunction
must be narrowly tailored to fit the specific circumstances of
the case.
Grossberger v. Ruane, 535 F. App’x 84, 86 (3d Cir.
2013) (citing Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir.
1993)).
Although Plaintiff’s instant case is the first one he filed
in the District of New Jersey, he has subsequently filed two
essentially identical actions in this Court. 12
This Court’s
independent review of all his other cases reveals that
12
ROBINSON v. SECTION 23, PROPERTY OWNER'S ASSOCIATION, INC. et
al., 1:18-cv-09658-NLH-JS; ROBINSON v. VIGORITO, BARKER,
PATTERSON, NICHOLS & PORTER, LLP et al., 1:18-cv-15352-NLH-JS.
24
Plaintiff’s claims are the same every time, with minor
variations as to defendants and allegations.
Further, where
personal jurisdiction can be established and venue is proper,
i.e., Florida state court and the Middle District of Florida,
Plaintiff has either been barred from filing cases there, or has
chosen to litigate elsewhere, like Texas state court (where he
is also barred), the Southern District of Florida, New Jersey
state court, and now this Court, 13 where personal jurisdiction is
lacking, venue is improper, or both. 14
At the time Plaintiff filed his first case here, the Court
13
Plaintiff also attempted to intervene in his mother’s
bankruptcy action and advance the same fraud scheme allegations
against many of the same defendants. The bankruptcy court
denied his motion, as well as his motion for reconsideration.
See In re Jane Barbara Robinson, 14-34718-JNP (Bankr. D.N.J.)
(Docket No. 38, 47, 55, 56).
14
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s case is dismissible
for lack of personal jurisdiction over all the Defendants, the
Court does not need to reach the venue question. Rocke v.
Pebble Beach Co., 541 F. App’x 208, 209 (3d Cir. 2013). The
Court notes, however, it is evident that the federal court venue
provision has not been met. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (“A civil
action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity
of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant
resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a
judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial
part of property that is the subject to the action is situated,
or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found,
if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be
brought.”).
25
was empowered to sua sponte screen Plaintiff’s complaint because
he filed it was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) seeking
to proceed without prepayment of fees (“in forma pauperis” or
“IFP”). 15 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Ball v.
Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that the
screening provisions of the IFP statute require a federal court
to dismiss an action sua sponte if, among other things, the
action is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to comply with
the proper pleading standards).
The Court could not, however,
sua sponte determine that personal jurisdiction was lacking or
that venue was improper.
See In re: Asbestos Products Liability
Litigation, 661 F. App’x 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011);
Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982) (“Personal jurisdiction restricts
judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter
of individual liberty, for due process protects the individual's
right to be subject only to lawful power.”
“Because the
requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an
individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.”);
Fiorani v. Chrysler Group, 510 F. App’x 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2013)
15
The Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP application and directed
that service of process be provided by the government. (Docket
No. 5.)
26
(quoting Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976)
(“District courts generally should not dismiss in forma pauperis
complaints for improper venue.
As we have previously explained,
28 U.S.C. § 1915 contains no express authorization for a
dismissal for lack of venue.
In the absence of any such
statutory authority, it is inappropriate for the trial court to
dispose of the case sua sponte on an objection to the complaint
which would be waived if not raised by the defendant(s) in a
timely manner.”).
Now, however, the Court may consider whether Plaintiff’s
instant case, as well as his essentially identical cases also
pending before this Court, are frivolous or malicious, and
whether the Court should enjoin Plaintiff from filing future
cases in this District without first seeking leave of Court.
See, e.g., Kundratic v. Polachek-Gartley, 644 F. App’x 123, 125
(3d Cir. 2016) (stating that in a nearly identical prior case
brought by the plaintiff, the Third Circuit affirmed the
District Court's award of summary judgment against the
plaintiff, and noting that the plaintiff’s instant complaint may
also be malicious because it duplicates two suits previously
dismissed by the District Court); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (“In
no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a
judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if
the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while
27
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or
appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the
grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is
under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”); Hickson v.
Mauro, 2011 WL 6001088, *1 (D.N.J. 2011) (citing Lister v. Dept.
of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005)) (“Section
1915(a) applies to all persons applying for IFP status, and not
just to prisoners.”)).
Plaintiff has filed dozens of the same cases against a
repetitive and ever-growing list of defendants, with all those
cases being dismissed, primarily because of the venue Plaintiff
has chosen to bring his claims once he was barred from Florida
state court, which had fully adjudicated Plaintiff’s claims on
the merits.
(See Docket No. 70 at 182-197.)
This Court finds
that in the interests of repose, finality of judgments,
protection of defendants from unwarranted harassment, and
concern for maintaining order in the court's dockets, an
injunction against Plaintiff from litigating his claims
concerning the money laundering fraud scheme against any
defendant he believes is liable for that scheme without first
obtaining permission from this Court may be warranted. 16
16
Defendants seek that the Court enjoin Plaintiff from bringing
his claims in any forum. This Court, however, can only exercise
28
Accordingly, the Court will decline to transfer Plaintiff’s
action to the Middle District of Florida, and will dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants with prejudice. 17
Plaintiff shall be afforded 20 days to show cause as to why he
should not be enjoined from filing any complaint in this
District without first seeking judicial approval so that the
Court may screen his complaint to determine whether it falls
within the scope of the preclusion order. 18
An appropriate Order will be entered.
Date:
December 18, 2018
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
its jurisdiction to issue a litigation preclusion order in this
District.
17
In light of the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims, his various
affirmative Motions [75, 81, 87, 90, 91, 115, 124] will be
denied as moot.
18
The Court will also issue an similar Order to Show Cause in
Plaintiff’s two other cases, 1:18-cv-09658-NLH-JS and 1:18-cv15352-NLH-JS.
29
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?