PRITCHETT v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 5/31/2017. (tf, n.m.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOHN PRITCHETT,
Plaintiff,
v.
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Civil Action
No. 16-cv-09392 (JBS-AMD)
CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,
OPINION
Defendant.
APPEARANCES
John Pritchett, Plaintiff Pro Se
3018 N. Congress Road
Camden, NJ 08104
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.
Plaintiff John Pritchett seeks to bring a civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden County
Jail (“CCJ”) for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
2.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review
complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss the Complaint with prejudice in part and dismiss without
prejudice in part. The Complaint: (a) is dismissed with
prejudice as to claims made against defendant CCJ, (b) is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim
regarding false arrest / false imprisonment claims, and (c) is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim
regarding conditions of confinement claims for alleged
overcrowding. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
Standard of Review
4.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
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in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
Claims Against CCJ: Dismissed With Prejudice
5.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 19831 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) a person deprived him of a federal
right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted
under color of state or territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
6.
Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983,
“[t]he term ‘persons’ includes local and state officers acting
under color of state law.” Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).2 To
1
Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2 “Person” is not strictly limited to individuals who are state
and local government employees, however. For example,
municipalities and other local government units, such as
counties, also are considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.
See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
690-91 (1978).
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say that a person was “acting under color of state law” means
that the defendant in a § 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation
omitted). Generally, then, “a public employee acts under color
of state law while acting in his official capacity or while
exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id.
at 50.
7.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages
from CCJ for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. The CCJ, however, is not a “person” within the
meaning of § 1983; therefore, the claims against it must be
dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F.
App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v.
Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern
State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989)
(correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983). Given
that the claims against the CCJ must be dismissed with
prejudice, the claims may not proceed and Plaintiff may not name
the CCJ as a defendant.
False Arrest/ False Imprisonment Claims:
Dismissed Without Prejudice
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8.
The Complaint must be dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state of claim regarding false arrest/ false
imprisonment claims.
9.
With respect to the false arrest/ false imprisonment
claims, Plaintiff states, “I was taken in for questioning and
was never let out on something someone else did.” Complaint §
III. Further, plaintiff states he was ultimately never charged
after being detained. Id.
10.
These allegations can be construed as seeking to bring
a civil rights complaint for alleged false arrest/ false
imprisonment. There are two elements for assertion of a prima
facie claim for false arrest: (1) constraint of the person
against his will (2) that is without legal justification. Gibson
v. Superintendent of NJ Dep’t of Law and Public Safety-Division
of State Police, 411 F.3d 427, 451 (3d Cir. 2005).
11.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient
facts from which this Court can reasonably infer that his arrest
and detention was without legal justification, as required for
assertion of a claim for false arrest / false imprisonment.
Gibson, 411 F.3d at 451.
12.
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains scant, if any, facts
pertaining to his alleged false arrest, other than his
suggestion that the charge against him lacked merit. Complaint §
5
V (“I was taken in for questioning and was never let out on
something someone else did.”). As such, Plaintiff does not
sufficiently plead a claim for false arrest / false
imprisonment. Plaintiff must provide “more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” to survive sua
sponte screening. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555).
13.
Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to
particularly set forth facts from which the Court can infer that
his arrest was not legally justifiable. To that end, the Court
shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint if Plaintiff
is able to state specific grounds for his false arrest claim
against an officer or officers or against the municipality of
the arresting authority.
14.
Any amended complaint may not name the police
department as a defendant, but it may name the municipality of
the police department whom arrested him if Plaintiff claims that
the municipality had an unconstitutional policy or practice that
was a cause of his unlawful arrest. “[A] city police department
is a governmental sub-unit that is not distinct from the
municipality of which it is a part” (Jackson v. City of Erie
Police Dep't, 570 F. Appx. 112, 114 n.2 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694)). Accordingly, Plaintiff must plead
facts showing that the relevant arresting municipality policy6
makers are “responsible for either the affirmative proclamation
of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled custom.” Bielevicz
v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990). “Policy is made
when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish
municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official
proclamation, policy, or edict. Government custom can be
demonstrated by showing that a given course of conduct, although
not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so wellsettled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Kirkland
v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 118 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original).
In other words, Plaintiff must set forth facts supporting an
inference that the town itself was the “moving force” behind an
alleged constitutional violation by PHP. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 689 (1978).
15.
As Plaintiff may be able to amend his Complaint to
address the deficiencies noted by the Court as to his false
arrest claim, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint.
Conditions Of Confinement Claims- Overcrowding:
Dismissed Without Prejudice
16.
The Complaint must be dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state of claim regarding overcrowded conditions of
confinement.
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17.
With respect to alleged facts giving rise to her
condition of confinement claims, Plaintiff states: “I would like
the court to compensate me on sleeping on the floor, using dirty
toilets, dirty showers, depression [sic] course by abuse.”
Complaint § V.
18.
Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a
civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed
because the Complaint does not set forth enough factual support
for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation has
occurred.
19.
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily
in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
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requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.
20.
Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to
particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end,
the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint.3
21.
Plaintiff is further advised that any amended
complaint must plead specific facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, including the dates. In the event Plaintiff files
an amended complaint, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to
support a reasonable inference that a constitutional violation
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The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under §
1915.4
22.
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint
is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court in this Opinion and Order.
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To the extent the Complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered prior to December 20, 2014, those claims
are barred by the statute of limitations. Claims brought under §
1983 are governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period
for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276
(1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the
action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d
472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). The allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement would have been immediately apparent
to Plaintiff; therefore, the statute of limitations on some of
Plaintiff’s claims expired two years after release from
incarceration. In the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended
complaint, it shall be limited to confinements in which
Plaintiff was released after December 20, 2014.
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Conclusion
23.
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Complaint
is: (a) dismissed with prejudice as to the CCJ; and (b)
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim
24.
An appropriate order follows.
May 31, 2017
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
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