GROOVER v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 4/23/18. (jbk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
STEVEN JOSEPH GROOVER,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 16-cv-9428(JBS-AMD)
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY, OFFICER STEPHEN
PRATT, OFFICER BRYAN CONWAY,
OFFICER JOHN KRIMMEL and SGT.
DAVID DOLSON,
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Steven Joseph Groover, Plaintiff Pro Se
232 Market Street, Apt. A
Gloucester City, NJ 08030
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
1.
Plaintiff Steven Joseph Groover seeks to bring a civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Camden
County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”), Officer Stephen Pratt
(“Pratt”), Officer Bryan Conway (“Conway”), Officer John Krimmel
(“Krimmel”), and Sgt. David Dolson (“Dolson”) (Pratt, Conway,
Krimmel, and Dolson are referred to collectively in this Opinion
as the “Individual Defendants”) for allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. (Complaint, Docket Entry 1.)
2.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
II. BACKGROUND
3.
The following factual allegations are taken from the
Complaint and are accepted for purposes of this screening only.
The Court has made no findings as to the truth or merits of any
of Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint.
4.
Plaintiff alleges he endured unconstitutional
conditions of confinement in CCCF due to an overcrowded and
unsanitary facility where he was denied medical care. (Complaint
§ III(C) (“I was forced to sleep on the floor in a jail cell
with 3 other inmates. During that time I had to be treated in
the medical dept. for a staff [sic] infection or MRSA due to
having to live in unsanitary conditions and overcrowded jail
cells being a health hazard”).)
5.
Plaintiff alleges that these events occurred during
“1-3-14 until 5-17-14[,] 9-23-15 until 11-7-15[,] 2-8-16 until
2-18-16[,] 8-8-16 until 10-12-16[,] [and] 7-20-13 until 10-2013.” (Id. § III(B).)
6.
Plaintiff alleges that he developed MRSA from the CCCF
housing conditions of which he complains. (Id. § IV.)
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7.
Plaintiff “would like the court to step in and make
changes so that other inmates do not have to live under the same
conditions that I did” and “would like the court to award me the
maximum monetary compensation that is allowed by law.” (Id. §
V.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
8.
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review
complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
9.
To survive sua sponte screening,1 the Complaint must
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
1
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)).
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allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014).
While pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se
litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints
to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d
239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
A.
Claims Against CCCF: Dismissed With Prejudice
10.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 19832 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege: (a) the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (b) that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
11.
CCCF, who is the Complaint’s named defendant, is not a
“person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Michigan
2
Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Crawford v.
McMillian, 660 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison
is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”);
Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–
39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a “person” under
§ 1983).
12.
Given that CCCF is not a “person” for § 1983 purposes,
the Complaint’s claims against CCCF must be dismissed with
prejudice.
B.
Conditions Of Confinement Claims
1. Overcrowding Claim: Dismissed Without Prejudice
13.
The Complaint states: “I was forced to sleep on the
floor in a jail cell with 3 other inmates . . . [It was] a cell
designed for 2 inmates, but that cell housed myself and 3 others
for the majority of my stay.” (Complaint §§ III(C), IV (referred
to as Plaintiff’s “Overcrowding Claim”).)
14.
The Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to
support a reasonable inference that a constitutional violation
from overcrowding has occurred in order to survive this Court’s
review under § 1915.
15.
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily
in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (double-celling by itself
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did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F.
App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking does not
constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man, one cell
principle lurking in the Due Process Clause.’” (quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979))). More is needed to
demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a pretrial
detainee, shock the conscience and violate due process rights.
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (due process
analysis requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them”) (citing Union Cnty. Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d
984, 992 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 542)).
16.
Here, the Complaint’s cursory contentions regarding “a
cell designed for 2 inmates that housed myself and 3 others”
(Complaint § IV) do not meet the pleading requirements to state
a plausible cause of action for unconstitutional overcrowding.
The Overcrowding Claim is therefore dismissed without prejudice
for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
2. Inadequate Medical Care Claim: Dismissed Without
Prejudice
17.
Plaintiff claims that he developed “a staff [sic]
infection or MRSA due to having to live in unsanitary conditions
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and overcrowded jail cells.” (Complaint § III(C).) He states
that he “was called down to medical” in response to his
“[written request] slips to the medical dept,” but that “the
wound was barely cleaned” and he “was sent back to my housing
area” despite his requests “to be quarantined.” (Id.(referred to
as Plaintiff’s “Inadequate Medical Care Claim”).)
18.
The Complaint does not allege sufficient facts
supporting a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation from inadequate medical care has occurred.
19.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to pretrial detainees’ claims of inadequate medical
care. Bocchino v. City of Atlantic City, 179 F. Supp.3d 387, 403
(D.N.J. 2016). In the context of a claim for violation of the
right to adequate medical care, a pretrial detainee must allege
the following two elements: (a) a serious medical need; and (b)
behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes
deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318
F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
20.
To satisfy Estelle’s first prong, an inmate must
demonstrate that his medical needs are serious. Atkinson v.
Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
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21.
Estelle’s second element is subjective and “requires
an inmate to show that prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference to his serious medical need.” Holder v. Merline,
No. 05-1024, 2005 WL 1522130, at *4 (D.N.J. June 27, 2005)
(citing Natale, 318 F.3d at 582).
22.
Here, Plaintiff’s cursory criticisms of his medical
care during incarceration -- “the [MRSA] wound was barely
cleaned” [and] I was given a few bandaids, gauze, and tape”
(Complaint §§ III(C), IV) -- are insufficient to establish a
Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim. While MRSA
may constitute a serious medical need based upon the severity of
one’s infection, Plaintiff does not specify the duration of his
infection, when the infection arose, the manner in which his
condition purportedly “worsen[ed]” (id. at § III(C)), the
particular living condition at CCCF in which the infection was
supposedly contracted, or the specific medical care he contends
that CCCF denied to him. Even more significant than the
Complaint’s omissions, however, is Plaintiff’s acknowledgment
that CCCF did “call [him] down to medical” in response to his
“[written] slips to the medical dept” (id.) and that the jail
did give him treatment, including prescription medication. (Id.
§§ III, IV.) These facts negate any reasonable inference of
“deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff’s medical condition.
Accordingly, the Inadequate Medical Care Claim is dismissed
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without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
3.
23.
Uncleanly Conditions Claim: Dismissed Without
Prejudice
Plaintiff vaguely alleges “unsanitary conditions being
a health hazard” at CCCF. (Complaint § III(C) (referred to as
Plaintiff’s “Uncleanly Conditions Claim”).)
24.
The Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to
satisfy either the objective or subjective components of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process analysis pertinent to the
Uncleanly Conditions Claim, as explained below.
25.
A failure of prison officials to provide minimally
civil conditions of confinement to pre-trial detainees violates
their right not to be punished without due process of law.
Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1997).
Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
prison officials must satisfy “basic human needs -- e.g., food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.” Helling
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). When a pretrial detainee
complains about the conditions of his confinement, courts are to
consider, in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment, whether
the conditions “amount to punishment prior to an adjudication of
guilt in accordance with law.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150,
158 (3d Cir. 2005). Courts must inquire as to whether the
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conditions “‘cause [detainees] to endure [such] genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that
the adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the
purposes assigned to them.’” Id. at 159-60 (citations omitted).
26.
The objective component of this unconstitutional
punishment analysis examines whether “the deprivation [was]
sufficiently serious,” and the subjective component asks whether
“the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind[.]” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39, n.20), cert. denied, Phelps v.
Stevenson, 552 U.S. 1180 (2008).
27.
Here, Plaintiff’s Uncleanly Conditions Claim does not
satisfy either the objective or subjective components of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process analysis.
28.
As to the test’s objective prong, Plaintiff does not
offer any facts demonstrating that he was subjected to genuine
privation and hardship over an extended period of time. While
unsanitary living conditions may give rise to a conditions of
confinement claim, the Complaint here expresses nothing but
Plaintiff's displeasure with less than perfect jail conditions.
29.
As to the constitutional test’s subjective prong,
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing, or from which this
Court could infer, that any CCCF personnel were aware of, and
disregarded, a substantial risk to his health and safety from
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uncleanly conditions. Plaintiff’s generalized displeasure with
conditions is not actionable; there are no facts indicating any
jail personnel acted with a culpable state of mind. Plaintiff
has not offered facts plausibly suggesting that “unsanitary”
(Complaint § III(C)) conditions were imposed by CCCF as
“punishment.”
30.
Accordingly, the Uncleanly Conditions Claim is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.
31.
Claims Against The Individual Defendants:
Dismissed Without Prejudice
Plaintiff contends that the Individual Defendants saw
the purportedly unconstitutional conditions complained of in the
Complaint, but he does not allege any personal action or
involvement by any of the Individual Defendants in causing those
conditions. (Complaint § III(C).)
32.
The Complaint’s failure to “allege[] any personal
involvement by [the Individual Defendants] in any constitutional
violation [is] a fatal flaw, since ‘liability in a § 1983 suit
cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat
superior.’” Baker v. Flagg, 439 F. App’x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.
1988)). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has
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violated the Constitution.” Bob v. Kuo, 387 F. App’x 134, 136
(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
(2009)). Here, though, Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement
claims do not set forth constitutionally cognizable claims in
the first place, as explained earlier in this Opinion.
Furthermore, the Complaint does not set forth any particular
allegations against the Individual Defendants at all. (Complaint
§ III(C).)
33.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual
Defendants are dismissed without prejudice.
34.
As to Plaintiff’s three conditions of confinement
claims (i.e., Overcrowding, Inadequate Medical Care, and
Uncleanly Conditions) and claims against the Individual
Defendants, he may be able to amend the Complaint to
particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that
were excessive in relation to their purposes, that exhibited
deliberate indifference by prison personnel to a serious medical
need, and/or that posed a substantial risk to his health and
safety. To that end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to
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amend the Complaint within 30 days after the date that this
Opinion and Order are entered on the docket.3
35.
Plaintiff is further advised that any amended
complaint must plead specific facts regarding the overcrowded
conditions of confinement, inadequate medical care, and unclean
living conditions. In the event Plaintiff files an amended
complaint, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a
reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has
occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.4
36.
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint
is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
3
The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
4 To the extent the Complaint seeks relief for conditions Plaintiff
encountered prior to December 21, 2014, those claims are barred by
the statute of limitations. Civil rights claims under § 1983 are
governed by New Jersey’s limitations period for personal injury
and must be brought within two years of the claim’s accrual. See
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. New Jersey
State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under federal
law, a cause of action accrues ‘when the plaintiff knew or should
have known of the injury upon which the action is based.’ ”
Montanez v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009)).
Therefore, in the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended
complaint, he should limit his complaint to events and conditions
during confinements from which he was released after December 21,
2014.
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Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
37.
The Court further advises Plaintiff that he was one of
thousands of members of a certified class in the case on this
Court's docket entitled, Dittimus-Bey v. Camden County
Correctional Facility, Civil No. 05-cv-0063 (JBS), which was a
class action case. The class plaintiffs were all persons
confined at the Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”), as
either pretrial detainees or convicted prisoners, at any time
from January 6, 2005 until June 30, 2017. The class of
plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief about
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the CCCF involving
overcrowding. That class action did not involve money damages
for individuals. A proposed final settlement of that case, which
describes the settlement in detail, was preliminarily approved
on February 22, 2017. Various measures undertaken in several
Consent Decrees under court approval reduced the jail population
to fewer prisoners than the intended design capacity for the
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jail. This greatly reduced or eliminated triple and quadruple
bunking in two-person cells, as explained in the Sixth and
Amended Final Consent Decree, which continues those requirements
under court supervision. According to the Notice to all class
members that was approved in the Dittimus-Bey case on February
22, 2017, any class member could object to the proposed
settlement by filing an objection in the Dittimus-Bey case
before April 24, 2017. A court hearing occurred on May 23, 2017,
at which objections were to be considered. This Court finally
approved the Dittimus-Bey settlement on June 30, 2017, and that
settlement bars Plaintiff and other class members from seeking
injunctive or declaratory relief for the period of time from
January 6, 2005 through June 30, 2017, but the settlement did
not bar any individual class member from seeking money damages
in an individual case. In other words, the Final Consent Decree
in Dittimus-Bey did not adjudicate or deal with any individual
money damage claims. Indeed, claims for money damages were not
sought in Dittimus-Bey and inmates were free to pursue
individual claims for monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
filing an individual complaint.
38.
Plaintiff, a class member in Dittimus-Bey, is bound by
that case’s final judgment in which class members are deemed to
release claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against
Camden County and its officers and employees through the final
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judgment date of June 30, 2017. This means that Plaintiff, like
all class members, can no longer obtain injunctive relief beyond
that authorized in the Consent Decree for jail conditions during
the class period. But that litigation did not involve individual
inmates’ or detainees’ claims or class claims for money damages,
which must be sought and proved on an individual claim basis.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above:
(1) the Complaint’s claims against CCCF are dismissed with
prejudice;
(2)
the Complaint’s conditions of confinement claims as to
(a) overcrowding, (b) inadequate medical care, and (c) unclean
living space are dismissed without prejudice for failure to
state a claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); and
(3)
the Complaint’s claims against the Individual
Defendants are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state
a claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
An appropriate order follows.
April 23, 2018
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge
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