TOOMER v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 6/8/17. (jbk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TANIEA TOOMER,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 17-cv-0197(JBS-AMD)

v.
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,

OPINION

Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
Taniea Toomer, Plaintiff Pro Se
3227 Carroll Court
Camden, NJ 08104
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
1.

Plaintiff Taniea Toomer seeks to bring a civil rights

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Camden County
Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) for allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
2.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review

complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from

a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (1)

dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against
CCCF; and (2) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for
failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
DISCUSSION
A. Claims Against CCCF: Dismissed With Prejudice
4.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 19831 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) a person deprived him of a federal
right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted
under color of state or territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
5.

Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983,

“[t]he term ‘persons’ includes local and state officers acting

1

Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2

under color of state law.” Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).2 To
say that a person was “acting under color of state law” means
that the defendant in a § 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation
omitted). Generally, then, “a public employee acts under color
of state law while acting in his official capacity or while
exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id.
at 50.
6.

Because the Complaint has not sufficiently alleged

that a “person” deprived Plaintiff of a federal right, the
Complaint does not meet the standards necessary to set forth a
prima facie case under § 1983. In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages from CCCF for allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. The CCCF, however, is not a “person”
within the meaning of § 1983; therefore, the claims against it
must be dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660
F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity

2

“Person” is not strictly limited to individuals who are state
and local government employees, however. For example,
municipalities and other local government units, such as
counties, also are considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
3

subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v.
Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern
State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989)
(correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983). Given
that the claims against the CCCF must be dismissed with
prejudice, the claims may not proceed and Plaintiff may not name
the CCCF as a defendant.
7.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to name a

person or persons who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
Complaint within 60 days after the date this Opinion and Order
are entered on the docket.
B. Conditions Of Confinement Claims: Dismissed Without
Prejudice
i. Overcrowded Conditions Of Confinement
8.

Plaintiff alleges that “[d]uring my period of

incarceration at Camden County there were various dates . . .
from 11-30-15 [to] 12-9-15 . . . I had to sleep on the floor.
There wasn’t enough room to sleep on the bed. There was a time I
had to sleep under the eating table that was placed inside the
cell” (hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff’s “Overcrowding
Claim”). Complaint § III(C).

4

9.

As explained below, the Court will dismiss the

Overcrowding Claim without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii). The Complaint does not
allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a
constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this
Court’s review under § 1915. The Court will accept as true for
screening purposes only the statements in Plaintiff’s Complaint,
but there is not enough factual support for the Court to infer
that an unconstitutional overcrowding violation has occurred.
10.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim3, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308

3

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
5

n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
11.

A complaint must plead sufficient facts to support a

reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has
occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
12.

However, with respect to the alleged facts giving rise

to Plaintiff’s claims, the Complaint states: “Most of my stay in
7-day holding[,] there were 4 – 5 females in one room . . . I
had to sleep on the floor” on these dates: “11-30-15 – 12-9-15.”
Complaint § III(B), § III(C); Docket Entry 1 at 5.
13.

The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff suffered

“problems of breathing” and being “short of breath[]” from
“asthma” during these events. Docket Entry 1 at 5; Complaint §
IV.
14.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory relief for “pain and

suffering.” Id. § V.

6

15.

Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed
because the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual
support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation
of overcrowding has occurred.
16.

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily

in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Hubbard II”) (noting due process
analysis requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them”) (citing Union Cnty. Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d
7

984, 992 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 542)). Some
relevant factors are the length of the confinement(s), whether
plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner, any
specific individuals who were involved in creating or failing to
remedy the conditions of confinement, any other relevant facts
regarding the conditions of confinement, etc.
17.

Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to

particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end,
the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint
within 60 days after the date this Opinion and Order are entered
on the docket.4
18.

Plaintiff is further advised that any amended

complaint must plead specific facts regarding the overcrowded
conditions of confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an
amended complaint, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to
support a reasonable inference that a constitutional violation
has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under §
1915.

4

The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
8

19.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint

is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court in this Opinion and
accompanying Order.

ii. Inadequate Medical Care
20.

Plaintiff contends that she “wasn’t able to see a

doctor about my problems with breathing during this time” and
was “short of breath[]” (referred to hereinafter as “Medical
Care Claim”). Complaint at 5 and § IV.
21.

Given that such allegations are insufficient to plead

unconstitutional conditions of confinement as to the adequacy of
medical care, the Court will dismiss the Medical Care Claim
without prejudice.
9

22.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

applies to pretrial detainees’ claims of inadequate medical
care. Bocchino v. City of Atlantic City, 179 F. Supp.3d 387, 403
(D.N.J. 2016). “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment in this context
incorporates the protections of the Eighth Amendment” (Holder v.
Merline, No. 05-1024, 2005 WL 1522130, at *3 (D.N.J. June 27,
2005) (citing Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042,
1067 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992)), and
most cases have stated that, at a minimum, the Eighth
Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” standard will suffice. In
other words, substantive due process rights are violated only
when the behavior of the government official is so egregious and
outrageous that it “shocks the conscience.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K.
v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 579 (3d
Cir. 2004) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
846-47 (1998)).
23.

Applying this principle in the context of a claim for

violation of the right to adequate medical care, a pretrial
detainee must allege the following two elements to set forth a
cognizable cause of action: (1) a serious medical need; and (2)
behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes
deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318
F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
10

24.

To satisfy the first prong of the Estelle inquiry, an

inmate must demonstrate that her medical needs are serious. The
Third Circuit has defined a serious medical need as: (1) “one
that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment”;
(2) “one that is so obvious that a lay person would recognize
the necessity for a doctor's attention”; or (3) one for which
“the denial of treatment would result in the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain” or “a life-long handicap or permanent
loss.” Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). When evaluating
this first element under Estelle, courts consider factors such
as “the severity of the medical problems, the potential for harm
if the medical care is denied or delayed and whether any such
harm actually resulted from the lack of medical attention.”
Maldonado v. Terhune, 28 F. Supp.2d 284, 289 (D.N.J. 1998).
25.

The second element of the Estelle test is subjective

and “requires an inmate to show that prison officials acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.” Holder,
2005 WL 1522130, at *4 (citing Natale, 318 F.3d at 582) (finding
deliberate indifference requires proof that the official knew of
and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety).
Conduct that constitutes negligence does not rise to the level
of deliberate indifference; rather, deliberate indifference is a
“reckless disregard of a known risk of harm.” Holder, 2005 WL
11

1522130, at *4 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836
(1994)). Courts have found deliberate indifference “in
situations where there was ‘objective evidence that [a]
plaintiff had serious need for medical care,’ and prison
officials ignored that evidence[,] Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d
798, 815 n. 14 (3d Cir. 2000) [and] in situations where
‘necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical
reasons.’ Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834
F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)[,] [cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006
(1988)].” Natale, 318 F.3d at 582.
26.

Here, Plaintiff’s non-specific assertions regarding

“problems of breathing” and being “short of breath[]” (Complaint
at 5 and § IV) are insufficient to meet this pleading standard.
Plaintiff offers no facts to satisfy either of the two prongs
required for her Medical Care Claim. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106;
Natale, 318 F.3d at 582.
27.

First, the Complaint is silent with respect to facts

relevant to establishing Estelle’s “serious condition” element,
demonstrating that Plaintiff’s supposed “asthma” (Complaint §
IV): “(1) has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment”; (2) “was so obvious that a lay person would
recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention”; or (3) was a
condition for which “the denial of treatment would result in the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or “a life-long
12

handicap or permanent loss.” Atkinson, 316 F.3d at 272-73. The
Complaint omits facts required to demonstrate “serious
condition,” such as: the nature, symptoms, and severity of
Plaintiff’s asthma; Plaintiff’s medical history as to frequency,
duration and treatment of her asthma; and health complications
(if any) suffered by Plaintiff as a result of allegedly denied
medical care. (The foregoing examples of facts demonstrating
“serious condition” are merely illustrative but not exhaustive
or exclusive.) In short, Plaintiff does not allege that she has
ever actually been diagnosed with asthma, or that her supposed
suffering from this condition was so obvious that a lay person
would recognize the necessity of medical care. Accordingly,
Plaintiff has not satisfied Estelle’s “serious condition”
element for a Fourteenth Amendment claim.
28.

Second, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting

deliberate indifference by any defendant to satisfy Estelle’s
subjective prong, under which Plaintiff must demonstrate that
prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference to h[er]
serious medical need[s].” Holder, 2005 WL 1522130, at *4 (citing
Natale, 318 F.3d at 582). For example, Plaintiff here sets forth
no allegations as to whether any defendant deliberately ignored
her non-specific “problems of breathing” (Complaint at 5)
without justification or with the intent to punish Plaintiff.
See, e.g., Mattern v. City of Sea Isle, 131 F. Supp.3d 305, 316
13

(D.N.J. 2015) (citing Nicini, 212 F.3d at 815 n.14) (“[T]he
Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference in situations
where there was ‘objective evidence that [a] plaintiff had
serious need for medical care,’ and prison officials ignored
that evidence”). Furthermore, the Complaint does not set forth
any contentions that are necessary to describe how individual
defendants were personally involved with and deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s purportedly serious medical needs.
Plaintiff’s bare allegation that she “was told to fill out a
grievance . . . about my problems of breathing . . . and someone
would get back to me but it never happened” (Complaint at 5) is
insufficient, without more, to establish “deliberate
indifference” for a Fourteenth Amendment claim under Estelle.
See Parkell v. Markell, 662 F. App’x 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2015)
(plaintiff “had no constitutionally protected liberty interest
in receiving a particular result through the prison grievance
process”).
29.

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Medical

Care Claim has failed to state a cause of action under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Such claim will be dismissed without
prejudice and with leave to amend the Complaint, within 60 days
after the date this Opinion and Order are entered on the docket,
to meet the pleading deficiencies noted above, if Plaintiff
elects to pursue this claim with respect to deliberate
14

indifference to a serious asthmatic condition. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court in this Opinion and
accompanying Order.

iii. Plumbing Conditions
30.

Plaintiff contends that “for about 2 days the toilets

were stopped up and the water had to be turned off[.] [W]e
couldn’t wash our hands or faces and there was a bucket placed
in the room for us to use to go to the bathroom. [T]oilet paper
and feces was at sometime [sic] coming out of the toilet . . .
After the toilets were overflowing the smell was terrible
causing us to wrap part of our blanket and towels over our
faces” (referred to hereinafter as “Plumbing Conditions Claim”).
Complaint § III(C). For the reasons set forth below, the
Plumbing Conditions Claim shall be dismissed without prejudice
for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
31.

A failure of prison officials to provide minimally

civil conditions of confinement to pre-trial detainees violates
their right not to be punished without due process of law.
Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1997);
Monmouth Cnty., 834 F.2d at 345-46, n. 31; Estelle, 429 U.S. at

15

104; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.5 Pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, prison officials must satisfy
“basic human needs -- e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, and reasonable safety.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,
32 (1993). See also Mora v. Camden Cnty., No. 09-4183, 2010 WL
2560680, at *8 (D.N.J. June 21, 2010) (applying Helling to
pretrial detainee). However, “a detainee seeking to show
unconstitutional conditions of confinement must clear a ‘high
bar’ by demonstrating ‘extreme deprivations.’” Cartegena v.
Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 12-4409, 2012 WL 5199217, at *3
(D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2012) (citing Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d
1278, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004)).
32.

When pretrial detainees complain about the conditions

of their confinement, courts are to consider, in accordance with
the Fourteenth Amendment, whether the conditions “amount to
punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with
law.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2005)

55

“[T]he Due Process rights of a pre-trial detainee are at least
as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a
convicted prisoner” (Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 173), and so the
Eighth Amendment sets the floor for the standard applicable to
pre-trial detainees’ claims. Bell, 441 U.S. at 544. Accord
Hubbard I, 399 F.3d at 165-67 (the Eighth Amendment standard
only acts as a floor for due process inquiries into medical and
non-medical conditions of pretrial detainees). Pretrial
detainees retain at least those constitutional rights enjoyed by
convicted prisoners with respect to the conditions of their
confinement. Bell, 441 U.S. at 545; Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d
150, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2005); Natale, 318 F.3d at 581-82.
16

(“Hubbard I”). In making such a determination, courts consider:
(a) whether any legitimate purposes are served by the conditions
at issue, and (b) whether those conditions are rationally
related to those purposes. Hubbard II, 538 F.3d at 232 (quoting
DiBuono, 713 F.2d at 992). Courts must inquire as to whether the
conditions “‘cause [detainees] to endure [such] genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that
the adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the
purposes assigned to them.’” Hubbard I, 399 F.3d at 159-60
(citations omitted).
33.

The objective component of this unconstitutional

punishment analysis examines whether “the deprivation [was]
sufficiently serious” and the subjective component asks whether
“the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind[.]” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39, n.20), cert. denied, Phelps v.
Stevenson, 552 U.S. 1180 (2008).
34.

With regard to the objective prong, “the Constitution

does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
“To the extent that conditions are harsh, they are part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society.” Id.
35.

Here, allegations about the Plumbing Conditions do not

satisfy either prong of this constitutional analysis.
17

36.

As to the objective prong, denial of the “minimal

civilized measure of life's necessities” (Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
347), which would include basic sanitary conditions, can be
sufficient to state an actionable constitutional deprivation.
However, as explained below, allegations of “about 2 days” of
“stopped up” toilets and “water turned off” (Complaint § III(C))
do not allege the sort of extreme deprivation and hardship
sufficient to constitute an unconstitutional condition of
confinement.
37.

Courts’ “inquiry into whether given conditions

constitute ‘punishment’ must consider the totality of
circumstances within an institution.” Hubbard I, 399 F.3d at
160. Here, considering that totality as set forth in the
Complaint, Plaintiff does not set forth an egregious deprivation
of Plaintiff’s basic human needs.
38.

For example, the Complaint is silent regarding:

whether “the toilets” (Complaint § III(C)) at issue were the
units inside Plaintiff’s cell at CCCF or were part of the public
facility for the CCCF prison population generally; whether
alternate restroom facilities were made available to Plaintiff
to account for the non-operational units of which she complains;
whether alternative provisions other than sinkwater were made
for detainees to wash their hands before meals; and the reason
for the non-functioning nature of the toilets referred to in the
18

Complaint (e.g., plumbing maintenance work schedule, plumbing
malfunction, intentional wrongdoing by any inmates, etc.). Such
considerations are part of the “totality of circumstances” to be
considered for the objective prong of this analysis. Hubbard I,
399 F.3d at 160. If, for example, water was turned off in the
facility for maintenance purposes, “courts will generally not
interfere with prison administrative matters and will afford
significant deference to judgments of prison officials regarding
prison regulation and administration. See, e.g., Jones v. N.
Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977)
(‘Because the realities of running a penal institution are
complex and difficult, we have also recognized the wide-ranging
deference to be accorded the decisions of prison
administrators’).” Passmore v. Ianello, 528 F. App’x 144, 149
(3d Cir. 2013).
39.

In addition, “about 2 days” (Complaint § III(C)) is

not an inordinate or unreasonable amount of time for purposes of
the objective prong of the Fourteenth Amendment constitutional
analysis.
40.

The length of exposure to allegedly unsanitary

conditions or deprivations is one consideration in evaluating
the objective prong of a claim of unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. As the Supreme Court has emphasized: “[T]he length
of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the
19

confinement meets constitutional standards. A filthy,
overcrowded cell . . . might be tolerable for a few days and
intolerably cruel for weeks or months.” Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978). Thus, the duration of the alleged
Plumbing Conditions is relevant to examination of the totality
of circumstances, but the Complaint does not suggest that
Plaintiff was subjected to genuine privations and hardships over
an extended period of time.
41.

A duration of “about 2 days” (Complaint § III(C)) of

the Plumbing Conditions is not a lengthy, ongoing, or consistent
condition of confinement. Plaintiff’s allegation of
approximately 48 hours of toilet and water access issues does
not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.
42.

Courts’ emphasis on conditions’ time duration as

critical to the constitutional analysis is instructive here,
including rejection of claims in cases alleging
unconstitutionally unsanitary conditions that not only lasted
longer but were also substantially worse than those of which
Plaintiff complains here. See, e.g., Brown v. Hamilton Twp.
Police Dep’t Mercer Cnty., N.J., 547 F. App’x 96, 97 (3d Cir.
2013) (holding that, although failure by police “for a few
hours” to provide adequate sanitary conditions “may have
resulted in discomfort,” it was “not sufficiently serious” to
violate arrestee’s constitutional rights); Adderly v. Ferrier,
20

419 F. App’x 135, 139 (3d Cir. 2011) (deprivation of clothing,
toiletries, legal mail, pillow, mattress, and shower for seven
days was harsh but not a deprivation of the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities); McCray v. Wittig, No. 14-0824,
2014 WL 1607355, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2014) (holding that
“[b]ecause Plaintiff was confined in the holding cell under
deplorable conditions for only two days . . . without bedding,
cleaning supplies, articles of personal hygiene or adequate food
. . ., and he did not suffer any physical injury, his
allegations do not show that he was unconstitutionally punished,
i.e., the facts alleged in the Complaint do not show that
Plaintiff endured privation and hardship over an extended period
of time”) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 537); Johnson v. Lewis, 217
F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001)
(four-day period of toilet deprivation could constitute
substantial deprivation); Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1004
(5th Cir. 1998) (inmate being placed in a cell that was “just
filthy with blood on the walls and excretion on the floors and
bread loaf on the floor” for three days did not meet the
objective component of the Eighth Amendment); Smith v. Copeland,
87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that an inmate’s
confinement in a cell for four days with an overflowing toilet,
during which time he was “made to endure the stench of [his] own
feces and urine,” did not rise to the level of a constitutional
21

violation); Lafaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1987) (no
handicap accessible toilet for handicapped inmate for eight
months constituted substantial deprivation); George v. Faber,
No. 09-962, 2010 WL 2740299, at *4 (D. Del. July 12, 2010)
(dismissing conditions of confinement claim as frivolous where,
inter alia, plaintiff had “no running water [and] no toilet
(just a hole in the ground)” and a “cell with no toilet paper
and lack of water” from “September 2009 until February 2010”);
Qawi v. Howard, No. 98-220-GMS, 2000 WL 1010281, at *2 (D. Del.
July 7, 2000) (“Under certain circumstances, the denial of
access to toilet facilities may give rise to a[]
[constitutional] violation. However, such violations have
generally been found only when the duration of the deprivation
is sufficiently long, or when the deprivation is an ongoing
condition of confinement rather than the result of an isolated
incident . . . These cases, however, generally involve
challenges to the regular operating conditions of the prison—
i.e., situations where under the everyday rules regarding access
to toilets, inmates are frequently forced to urinate and
defecate in their cells, often requiring them to eat and sleep
in unsanitary conditions”) (emphasis in original).
43.

The Plumbing Conditions in this case “[may] no doubt

[have been] unpleasant, [but they] d[id] not pose an obvious
health risk and consequently d[id] not deprive [Plaintiff] the
22

minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.” Carson v.
Main, No. 14-cv-7454, 2015 WL 18500193, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 15,
2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process
claim where neighboring cells shared plumbing pipes and required
residents to flush their own toilet to dispose of the
neighboring cell’s waste). See also Junne v. Atlantic City Med.
Ctr., No. 07-5262, 2008 WL 343557, at *10 (D.N.J. Feb. 4, 2008)
(dismissing plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim where
plaintiff alleged that the jail’s lack of a private bathroom and
his “need to use the toilet in the presence of a total stranger
caused substantial embarrassment,” because “plaintiff’s
embarrassment ensuing from having another person in the cell
while plaintiff uses the toilet cannot qualify as a violation of
plaintiff’s constitutional rights”). Thus, the Plumbing
Conditions Claim fails to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment’s
objective prong.
44.

As to the subjective prong of the constitutional

analysis, Plaintiff does not particularly identify any specific
defendant who was aware of the Plumbing Conditions (and when)
and who failed to reasonably respond, with the deliberate intent
to harm Plaintiff. Thus, the Plumbing Conditions Claim fails to
meet the subjective prong as well.
45.

In sum, Plaintiff’s claim of “about 2 days” of

Plumbing Conditions inconvenience (Complaint § III(C)) does not
23

offer facts that are necessary to show that she was subjected to
a genuine deprivation for an extended period. “There is, of
course, a de minimus level of imposition with which the
Constitution is not concerned.” Bell, 441 U.S. 539 n. 21. “[T]he
fact that detention interferes with the detainee’s
understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible and
with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not
convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into
punishment.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 536. In this case, Plaintiff does
not contend that the non-operational toilet was intended as
punishment, that she suffered adversely from it, that there was
any significant health risk posed by the conditions she endured,
that Plaintiff developed physical injuries as a result of the
condition, or that a particular defendant demonstrated a
sufficiently culpable state of mind with respect to the Plumbing
Conditions. Viewing these facts and the totality of the
circumstances in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the
Complaint fails to set forth sufficient factual matter to show
that the Plumbing Conditions Claim is facially plausible.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210.
46.

Accordingly, the Plumbing Conditions Claim will be

dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff shall have leave to amend
the Complaint within 60 days after the date this Opinion and
Order are entered on the docket, to meet the pleading
24

deficiencies noted above, if Plaintiff elects to pursue this
claim with respect to particular defendants’ deliberate
indifference to an extreme deprivation that inflicted a
substantial hardship on Plaintiff for an extended period of
time. The amended complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that
have been dismissed with prejudice by the Court in this Opinion
and accompanying Order.

C. Solitary Confinement Claim: Dismissed Without Prejudice
47.

Plaintiff states that she “became angry and

overwhelmed and was placed in a body suit[,] stripped of my
clothing and shoe strings and placed in a cell all by myself . .
. [E]xperiencing these kinds of conditions made me depressed and
anxious, as well as suicidal not knowing what else to expect[.]
I completely lost my mind . . . [A]t some point [I] had to
remain in a cell by myself because I was overwhelmed and became
depressed” (hereinafter referred to as “Isolation Claim”).
Complaint at 5 and § IV.
48.

The Court will accept as true for screening purposes

only the statements in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
49.

This Court construes Plaintiff’s Isolation Claim to

contend that being placed in a cell by herself violated her
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.

25

50.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of

the Constitution of the United States provides: “nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A person is entitled
to Due Process of law when a government action deprives her of
life, liberty, or property. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal
and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). To analyze Plaintiff's
Due Process claim, the first step is to decide whether she was
deprived of a liberty or property interest protected by Due
Process. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972). If not, it
is not necessary to consider what process is due. Morrisey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). As averred, Plaintiff would be
entitled to Due Process only if she had a protected liberty
interest in avoiding “being placed in a cell by myself.”
Complaint at 5.
51.

Liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause

may arise under the Constitution itself or may be created by
state statutes or regulations. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
483-84 (1995); Asquith v. Dep’t of Corr., 186 F.3d 407, 409 (3d
Cir. 1999).

26

a. Constitutional liberty interest analysis: “Punishment”
and “no legitimate governmental goal”
52.

In Bell, 441 U.S. at 538, the Supreme Court stated

that in evaluating the constitutionality of prison conditions
implicating pretrial detainees’ liberty interests, courts must
decide whether a particular condition is imposed for the purpose
of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other
legitimate government purpose. Conditions or restrictions of
pretrial detention that are reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective do not, without more, amount to
punishment: “[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of conditions
or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the
protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of
law, we think the proper inquiry is whether those conditions
amount to punishment of the detainee . . . [A] detainee may not
be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with
due process of law.” Id. at 535, 537, 539. See also Fuentes v.
Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 821 (2000).
53.

There is no liberty interest in avoiding segregated

confinement arising by force of the Due Process Clause itself.
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-67 & n.4 (1983). “[T]he Due
Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions
of confinement having a substantial adverse impact.” Sandin, at

27

478. “[P]retrial detainees do not have a liberty interest in
being confined in the general prison population.” Stevenson v.
Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 2007).
54.

Moreover, Plaintiff has not, in any event, set forth

the required facts from which this Court could infer that CCCF
officials placed her “in a cell by [her]self” (Complaint at 5)
as a means of “punishing” (as opposed to controlling or
protecting) her. She also offers no facts demonstrating that the
solitary detention lacked legitimate nonpunitive objectives. To
the contrary, Plaintiff’s reference to her feelings of
“depress[ion][,] anxi[ety][,] and [being] overwhelmed,” during
which she “completely lost my mind” (Complaint at 5, § IV)
suggest that the solitary detention may have had protective or
medical objectives aimed at her best interests.
55.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has no constitutional liberty

interest, arising exclusively from the Due Process Clause, in
being free from detention “in a cell all by myself.” Complaint
at 5. Furthermore, if, as this Court construes Plaintiff’s
Isolation Claim to suggest, CCCF personnel placed her in a
solitary cell for purposes of addressing her mental health
issues or preventing Plaintiff from hurting herself or others as
a result of her “depress[ion][,] anxi[ety] [and] [feelings of
being] overwhelmed” (Complaint at 5, § IV), such purposes would
have had legitimate justification. “[T]he Due Process Clause
28

does not in itself subject . . . treatment by prison authorities
to judicial oversight.” Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242
(1976); Bell, 441 U.S. at 547 (courts should accord deference to
prison officials in determining whether restrictions imposed
upon a pretrial detainee are reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective). See also Hancock v. Unknown United
States Marshal, 587 F.2d 377, 378-79 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding
that solitary confinement is not necessarily unconstitutional
especially when based solely on the prisoner’s medical
condition).

b. State-created liberty interest analysis: Atypical and
significant hardship
56.

To allege that she possessed a state-created liberty

interest, Plaintiff must offer facts showing that her placement
in segregated confinement imposed an “atypical and significant
hardship” in relation to the “ordinary incidents of prison
life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. However, “confinement in
administrative or punitive segregation will rarely be
sufficient, without more, to establish the kind of ‘atypical’
deprivation of prison life necessary to implicate a liberty
interest.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002).
57.

“In deciding whether a protected liberty interest

exists under Sandin, [a court] consider[s] the duration of the

29

... confinement and the conditions of that confinement in
relation to other prison conditions.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d
523, 532 (3d Cir. 2003). Segregated detention is not
unconstitutional per se, as long as the conditions of
confinement “are not foul, inhuman or totally without
penological justification.” Alvarez v. Cnty. of Cumberland, No.
07-346, 2009 WL 750200, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2009) (quoting
Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal
citations omitted)).
58.

Here, the Complaint does not indicate: the time

duration of the solitary detention, the physical conditions of
Plaintiff’s cell, Plaintiff’s means of personal hygiene during
that solitary detention, opportunities for physical exercise or
recreation, the frequency of her social interaction with other
detainees and/or her environmental stimulation during that time,
or the purported purpose for which she was confined to a
solitary cell. Plaintiff has not offered any facts to
demonstrate “foul [or] inhuman conditions of confinement”
(Young, 960 F.2d at 364) during the period of isolated
detention. The Complaint fails to suggest that the difference in
the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement in a solitary cell
amount to an “atypical and significant hardship” as compared to
conditions she experienced in the general detainee population at
CCCF.
30

59.

Plaintiff therefore has not alleged a protected,

state-created liberty interest.6
60.

Given that Plaintiff had no protected liberty interest

to avoid segregated confinement, she had no Fourteenth Amendment
right to Due Process of law, which could have been violated by
such confinement. This Court, therefore, is constrained to
dismiss the Isolation Claim without prejudice for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Conclusion
61.

Plaintiff’s Overcrowding Claim, Medical Care Claim,

Plumbing Conditions Claim, and Isolation Claim will be dismissed
without prejudice, with leave to amend the complaint, within 60
days after the date this Opinion and Order are entered on the
docket, to meet the claims’ deficiencies as noted herein,
including: (a) sufficient factual detail for the Court to infer
that, inter alia, Plaintiff was subjected to genuine privations
over an extended period of time, that she suffered from a
serious condition, that she endured atypical hardships, that a

6

Plaintiff’s contention regarding being “stripped of my clothing
[and] placed in a body suit” (Complaint at 5) does not alter
this result. “[S]ince detention facilities are fraught with
serious security dangers, it is established that routine or
random strip searches of detained persons do not violate the
Fourth Amendment.” Aruanno v. Allen, No. 09-1250, 2011 WL
21611351, at *7 (D.N.J. May 31, 2011) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at
560).
31

particular defendant was deliberately indifferent to substantial
risks to Plaintiff’s health and safety, and that such
defendant’s deliberate indifference caused Plaintiff harm; (b)
names of the specific party(ies) whom Plaintiff claims are
allegedly liable under each particular claim; and (c) the
date(s) on which the relevant events occurred. Mala, 704 F.3d at
245; Pliler, 542 U.S. at 231. The amended complaint may not
adopt or repeat any claims that have been dismissed with
prejudice by the Court in this Opinion and its accompanying
Order.
62.

For the reasons stated herein, the Complaint is: (a)

dismissed with prejudice as to the CCCF and (b) dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
63.

An appropriate order follows.

June 8, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

32