ST. JOHN v. KRIMMEL et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 7/5/17. (jbk, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
KEVIN JOSEPH ST. JOHN,
Plaintiff,
v.
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Civil Action
No. 17-cv-00539 (JBS-AMD)
OFFICER JOHN KRIMMEL; ET AL.,
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Kevin Joseph St. John, Plaintiff Pro Se
232 Market Street, Apt. B
Gloucester, NJ 08030
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
1.
Plaintiff Kevin Joseph St. John seeks to bring a civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer
John Krimmel, Officer Thomas Havers, Officer Stephen Pratt, Sgt.
David Dolson, and Camden County Correctional Facility Staff
Members (collectively referred to as “CCCF personnel”) for
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint,
Docket Entry 1.
2.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review
complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4.
The present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts
to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review
under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff’s
Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not
enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional
violation has occurred.
5.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim1, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
2
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
6.
With respect to factual allegations giving rise to his
claims, Plaintiff states: “inmates including myself were not
given any other option to have suitable sleeping or general
accommodation so were required to sleep on floor of cell when
three or more inmate were placed in two man cells. I had to
sleep on floor under bunks or next to toilets in cells that were
not cleaned or maintained. On many occasions there was urine and
toilet paper on floor where I slept. I was stepped on by the
inmates. Could not get clean linens after haven [sic] to place
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them on floor to sleep and they would be wet.” Complaint §
III(C).
7.
Plaintiff states he was detained at the Camden County
Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) between January and December
2009, as well as during various detentions between 2010 and
2016. Id. § III(B).
8.
With respect to requested relief, Plaintiff seeks “the
maximum financial companation [sic] allowed by law.” Id. § V.
9.
Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a
civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed
because the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual
support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation
has occurred.
10.
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily
in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
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conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.
11.
The Complaint alleges that CCCF Personnel, Officer
John Krimmel, Officer Thomas Havers, Officer Stephen Pratt, Sgt.
David Dolson and Camden County Correctional Facility Staff
members are liable for these conditions, and constitutional
violation. However, this case must be dismissed without
prejudice as to CCCF Personnel because the Complaint does “[not]
allege[] any personal involvement by [these defendants] in any
constitutional violation – a fatal flaw, since ‘liability in a §
1983 suit cannot be predicated solely on the operation of
respondeat superior.’” Baker v. Flagg, 439 F. App’x 82, 84 (3d
Cir. 2011) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207
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(3d Cir. 1988)). “[Plaintiff’s] complaint contains no
allegations regarding [these individual defendants]. ‘Because
vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.’ Thus, [plaintiff] failed to state a claim against
[the individual defendants].” Bob v. Kuo, 387 F. App’x 134, 136
(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676). Given that
the Complaint does not, in the first instance, sufficiently
allege a violation of overcrowding, Plaintiff has not asserted a
colorable constitutional claim to which any CCCF Personnel’s
individual liability could attach. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Overcrowding Claim against the CCCF Personnel defendants must be
dismissed without prejudice.
12.
Moreover, to the extent the complaint seeks relief for
conditions Plaintiff encountered during periods of confinement
ending prior to January 26, 2015, those claims are barred by the
statute of limitations and must be dismissed with prejudice,
meaning that Plaintiff cannot recover for those claims because
they have been brought too late.2 Civil rights claims under
§ 1983 are governed by New Jersey's limitations period for
personal injury and must be brought within two years of the
2
Plaintiff filed this complaint on January 26, 2017.
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claim’s accrual. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985);
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010).
“Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff
knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is
based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480
(3d Cir. 2014).
13.
Plaintiff alleges the events giving rise to his claims
occurred during numerous detentions between 2009 and 2016.
Complaint § III. The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement at CCJ, namely the overcrowding, would have been
immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of his detention;
therefore, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims
arising from his incarcerations between 2009 and 2014 expired
well before this complaint was filed in 2017. Plaintiff
therefore cannot recover for these claims.3
14.
As Plaintiff may be able to amend his Complaint to
address the deficiencies noted by the Court, the Court shall
3
Although the Court may toll, or extend, the statute of
limitations in the interests of justice, certain circumstances
must be present before it can do so. Tolling is not warranted in
this case because the state has not “actively misled” Plaintiff
as to the existence of his cause of action, there are no
extraordinary circumstances that prevented Plaintiff from filing
his claim, and there is nothing to indicate Plaintiff filed his
claim on time but in the wrong forum. See Omar v. Blackman, 590
F. App’x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014).
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grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 30 days of
the date of this order.4
15.
In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he
should include specific facts, such as the dates and length of
confinement(s), whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
and any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement. Conclusory statements are not enough.
16.
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint
is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
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The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
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17.
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The
Court will reopen the matter in the event Plaintiff files an
amended complaint within the time allotted by the Court.
18.
An appropriate order follows.
July 5, 2017
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge
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