BARTEE v. PORTO et al

Filing 11

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 3/30/17. (js)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

(Doc. No. 5)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RAYMOND L. BARTEE, JR.,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 17-685 (RBK/JS)
v.
JOHN C. PORTO, et al.,

OPINION

Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant John C. Porto (“Defendant”)’s Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. No. 5). Plaintiff Raymond Bartee claims that Defendants conspired to deprive
him of due process and equal protection in a criminal proceeding. Plaintiff therefore brings section
1983 claims against Defendants. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss
is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
Plaintiff’s complaint appears to stem from a criminal trial that began in January 2016 in
New Jersey Superior Court in Cape May County. Compl. at 2-3 (Doc. No. 1-3). Plaintiff
specifically alleges that Defendant Porto (the Judge for the criminal trial), Stephen B. Patrick
(Defendant’s public defender), and “Hoernarman,” whom Plaintiff later clarified to be “Hoerner”
(the prosecutor), conspired to deprive him of his rights by allowing the trial to go forward. Id.;
Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 6 (Doc. No. 6). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive him of
his due process and equal protection rights through use of “racist threats, intimidation, and
coercion.” Compl. at 2. Plaintiff specifically notes that Defendants allowed the trial to proceed
1. On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must
“accept all factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff.” Phillips v. Cty. Of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, for
purposes of this motion, the Court adopts and accepts as true the facts as pled in the Complaint.

and selected jurors despite the fact that there was no “injured party” making a claim against him.
Id. Plaintiff also complains that he was deprived of documents in parse-syntax grammar.2
Plaintiff filed his complaint in New Jersey Superior Court on or around January 9, 2017.
Compl. Defendant Porto removed the case to this Court on February 1, 2017. Notice of Removal
(Doc. No. 1). Defendant then filed the instant motion to dismiss on February 22, 2017.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss an action for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, “courts
accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff
may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233)). In other words, a complaint is sufficient if it contains
enough factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). It is not for courts to decide at this point whether the moving party will succeed on the
merits, but “whether they should be afforded an opportunity to offer evidence in support of their
claims.” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 2002). Yet, while
“detailed factual allegations” are unnecessary, a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’
of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration
in original) (citations omitted).
To make this determination, a court conducts a three-part analysis. Santiago v.

2. The Court observes that Plaintiff’s complaint includes 10 pages in “parse-syntax” grammar
with an accompanying key to identify correct words used in place of wrong words. The Court
declines to use Plaintiff’s preferred grammatical conventions in the instant opinion.
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Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must “tak[e] note of the
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second, the
court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). Finally, “where there
are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680).
This plausibility determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint cannot
survive where a court can infer only that a claim is merely possible rather than plausible. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant Porto moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint against him on the basis of
absolute judicial immunity. Def.’s Br. at 3-6 (Doc. No. 5-3). Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks
monetary relief from a judicial officer, the doctrine of judicial immunity is implicated. Judicial
immunity rests on the principle that “[a] judicial officer in the performance of his duties has
absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for judicial acts.” Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d
302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006). Further, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action
he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be
subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (citing
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (citation omitted)).
Plaintiff argues that Defendant Porto is not entitled to judicial immunity because he
lacked authority and jurisdiction over Plaintiff. Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 8. Plaintiff contends that
Defendant lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiff did not commit a crime. Id. Defendant Porto
responds that “the claimed innocence of the accused is not an argument against jurisdiction.”
Def.’s Reply Br. at 1-2 (Doc. No. 7).
The Court agrees with Defendant. All of Plaintiff’s allegations relate to Defendant’s
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actions in his capacity as a Superior Court Judge. Judge Porto was performing his duties as a
judicial officer when he presided over Plaintiff’s criminal trial. Plaintiff may believe that Porto
was acting without jurisdiction, but Plaintiff’s subjective belief does not override objective
reality. Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, Defendant Porto will be dismissed from this action with prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant John C. Porto’s motion to dismiss is
GRANTED. John C. Porto shall be TERMINATED from the case.

Dated: 03/30/2017

s/ Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge

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