LEVINS et al v. HEALTHCARE REVENUE RECOVERY GROUP, LLC et al

Filing 147

OPINION. Signed by Judge Christine P. O'Hearn on 1/26/2023. (amv)

Case 1:17-cv-00928-CPO-EAP Document 147 Filed 01/26/23 Page 1 of 10 PageID: 2607

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ELAINE LEVINS and WILLIAM
LEVINS, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HEALTHCARE REVENUE RECOVERY
GROUP, LLC, d/b/a ARS ACCOUNT
RESOLUTION SERVICES,
Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
Phillip D. Stern
Yongmoon Kim
KIM LAW FIRM LLC
411 Hackensack Avenue
Suite 701
Hackensack, NJ 07601
On behalf of Plaintiffs.
Christian M. Scheuerman
Jonathan Stuckel
MARKS, O’NEILL, O’BRIEN, DOHERTY
535 Route 38 East
Suite 501
Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
On behalf of Defendant.

No. 1:17-cv-928
OPINION

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O’HEARN, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court by way of a Motion for Class Certification, (ECF No.
115), filed by Plaintiffs Elaine Levins and William Levins (“Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated, and Defendant Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC’s
(“Defendant” or “HRRG”) Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 125). The Court did not
hear oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 78.1. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that
it lacks Article III standing and thus the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. As such, the pending motions are DENIED as moot.
I.

Background

This case concerns alleged violations of the “true name” requirement of the Fair Debt
Collection Practice Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 9, ¶¶ 11–
18). While attempting to collect a medical debt from Plaintiffs, HRRG left a series of voicemail
messages on Plaintiffs’ telephone in which it identified itself as “ARS.” (Am. Compl., ECF No.
9, ¶¶ 31, 35–36). Plaintiffs allege this violates the “true name” requirement under the FDCPA,
while Defendant maintains it permissibly referred to itself as “ARS.” In the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs seek statutory damages only for the alleged violation of the FDCPA. (ECF
No. 9, ¶ 69).
Yet, while this 2017 case was ongoing, the legal landscape for Article III standing
changed in 2021 after TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, where the Supreme Court determined that
plaintiffs must show more than a statutory violation to establish Article III standing. 141 S. Ct.
2190, 2204–05 (2021). Instead, a plaintiff must plead harm that “is sufficiently concrete to
qualify as an injury in fact.” Id. at 2204. While TransUnion dealt with the Fair Credit Reporting
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Act, in the years since TransUnion, courts, including this Court, have applied the heightened
standing requirement outlined in TransUnion to FDCPA claims. See Daye v. GC Servs. Ltd.
P’ship, No. 21-7981, 2022 WL 4449381, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2022) (listing cases).
In light of TransUnion, and the Court’s ongoing duty “to assess whether standing exists
‘throughout the case . . . not merely at the time the complaint is filed,’” Daye, 2022 WL 4449381
at *2 (quoting Schumacher v. SC Data Ctr., Inc., 912 F.3d 1104, 1105 (8th Cir. 2019)), the Court
is now tasked with evaluating Plaintiffs’ standing under the heightened scrutiny outlined in
TransUnion.
II.

Procedural History

On February 12, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action Complaint alleging
violations of the FDCPA. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on April 12,
2017. (ECF No. 9). Thereafter, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint,
which this Court granted on September 26, 2017. (ECF Nos. 10, 14); see Levins v. Healthcare
Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, No. 17-928, 2017 WL 4269467 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2017) (Kugler, J.).

Thereafter, the Third Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part this Court’s prior Order. (ECF
No. 18); see Levins v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 902 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2018). The
Third Circuit held that Plaintiffs had stated a prima facie claim under FDCPA § 1692e(14), but
had failed to state a claim under § 1692d(6) or § 1692e(10). (ECF No. 18); Levins, 902 F.3d at
284.
On January 24, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal
of the sole remaining claim: § 1692e(14), (ECF No. 50), which this Court denied finding that
Plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence that HRRG’s use of “ARS” did not satisfy the
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FDCPA’s “true name” requirement. (ECF No. 59); Levins v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp.,
LLC, No. 17-928, 2020 WL 3169356 (D.N.J. June 15, 2020) (Kugler, J.). Following the Order
denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the parties began class discovery. (ECF
Nos. 64, 66, 79, 89, 98).
Plaintiffs filed for class certification on June 6, 2022. (ECF No. 115). Defendant opposed
the class certification, (ECF No. 126), and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No.
125), arguing that Plaintiffs did not have Article III standing and that regardless, new evidence
produced by Defendant alters this Court’s prior analysis in denying summary judgment. (ECF
No. 125 at 3). Plaintiffs opposed Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 139).
III.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, this Court may only exercise jurisdiction to
resolve “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “Thus, federal courts can
entertain actions only if they present live disputes, ones in which both sides have a personal
stake.” Hartnett v. Pa. State Educ. Ass'n, 963 F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 2020). As the party
invoking federal jurisdiction at the start of litigation, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
Article III standing. Id. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show (1) “that he [or she] suffered
an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent;” (2) “that the injury was
likely caused by the defendant;” and (3) “that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial
relief.” TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2203 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992)). “If ‘the plaintiff does not claim to have suffered an injury that the defendant caused and
the court can remedy, there is no case or controversy for the federal court to resolve.’”

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TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2203 (quoting Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs., Inc., 926 F.3d 329,
333 (7th Cir. 2019)).
In TransUnion, the Supreme Court addressed “the Article III requirement that the
plaintiff’s injury in fact be ‘concrete’—that is, ‘real, and not abstract.’” Id. at 2204 (quoting
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)). There, a
class of consumers brought a class action against the credit reporting agency TransUnion LLC
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) alleging that the agency failed to use reasonable
measures to ensure the accuracy of their credit files and instead maintained alerts in those files
incorrectly designating the consumers as “terrorists, drug traffickers, or serious criminals.” Id. at
2009. The class included both members whose erroneously flagged credit reports had been
disclosed to third party creditors, and members whose misleading alerts in their credit files had
not been disclosed to third parties. Id. at 2210. After a jury returned a verdict for all class
members, the Supreme Court reversed on standing grounds with respect to those plaintiffs whose
reports had not been disclosed because, despite the statutory violation, these plaintiffs had not
suffered a concrete injury. Id. The Court stated: “Only those plaintiffs who have been concretely
harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation may sue that private defendant over that violation in
federal court.” Id. at 2205 (emphasis in original).
When a plaintiff fails to establish Article III standing, the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, Finkelman v. Nat'l Football League, 810 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2016), and dismissal is
required, Goodmann v. People's Bank, 209 F. App'x 111, 113 (3d Cir. 2006); Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1). Where the named plaintiff fails to establish Article III standing, the putative class
action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 195.
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Additionally, courts may “dismiss a suit sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any
stage in the proceeding.” Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir.
2010); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (h)(3).
IV.

Plaintiffs Lack Article III Standing

Plaintiffs maintain they have standing for three primary reasons. (Pla. Brs., ECF Nos. 139
at 29–38,140 at 6–13). First, Plaintiffs argue that this Court “is bound by the Third Circuit’s
decision that it had subject matter jurisdiction in this case.” (Pla. Summ. J. Br., ECF No. 139 at
29–30). Second, Plaintiffs argue because TransUnion addresses a different statute, it did not
change the law for FDCPA claims. (Pla. Cert. Reply Br., ECF No. 140 at 6). Finally, relying on
Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 342, Plaintiffs continue to assert that a statutory violation—without any
additional harm—can be sufficient to constitute injury in fact. (Pla. Cert. Reply Br., ECF No.
140 at 7–10). The Court will address each argument in turn.
First, that the Third Circuit stated that this Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
when deciding the Motion to Dismiss in 2018, see Levins, 902 F.3d at 279 n.2, does not alleviate
this Court of its obligation to evaluate standing now in light of TransUnion. Indeed, and as
previously discussed, “[u]nder this Court’s continuing obligation to assess its subject matter
jurisdiction, we can dismiss a suit sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any stage
in the proceeding.” Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., 592 F.3d at 420 (quoting Carlsberg Res. Corp.
v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1256 (3d Cir. 1977)). Though the Court is aware
of the length of this case’s litigation, several courts have reevaluated standing under the
TransUnion heightened standard in FDCPA cases at various stages of litigation. See RodriguezOcasio v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 19-13447, 2022 WL 16838591, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2022)
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(dismissing FDCPA class action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction following a motion for
class certification because the plaintiff did not assert concrete injuries as required by
TransUnion); Schultz v. Midland Credit Mgmt., No. 16-4415, 2022 WL 3013082, at *1 (D.N.J.
July 29, 2022) (granting summary judgment and dismissing FDCPA class action for lack of
standing under TransUnion after class had already been certified).
Second, despite Plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary, since TransUnion, courts, including
this Court, have repeatedly applied the heightened standing requirement outlined in TransUnion
to FDCPA claims. See Ward v. Nat’l Patient Acct. Servs. Sols., Inc., 9 F.4th 357, 363 (6th Cir.
2021) (applying TransUnion standing analysis to an alleged violation of the “true name”
requirement under the FDCPA and finding that the plaintiff had not alleged a concrete injury);
Wadsworth v. Kross, Lieberman & Stone, Inc., 12 F.4th 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2021) (applying
TransUnion standing requirement to FDCPA claims). In fact, this Court recently recognized:
“This district’s case law is illustrative—and, upon review, appears nearly unanimous: with one
exception, 1 the Court is not aware of a single post-TransUnion FDCPA case from New Jersey
federal courts to have considered the present question and resolved it in favor of Article III
standing.” Duncan v. Sacor Fin., Inc., No. 222-2742, 2022 WL 16722236, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 19,
2022), R. & R. adopted, No. 22-02742, 2022 WL 16716085 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2022) (collecting

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“The exception is Ozturk v. Amsher Collection Servs., No. 21-18317, 2022 WL 1602192
(D.N.J. May 20, 2022), which relied exclusively on pre-TransUnion authority in writing that
courts in this district examining section 1692e favor finding concrete injury under the FDCPA
where violations of the statute have been alleged.” Duncan, 2022 WL 16722236 at *9 (internal
quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). Likewise, Plaintiffs, here, almost exclusively
rely on pre-TransUnion authority in arguing that they have standing. (Pla. Summ. J. Br., ECF
No. 139 at 33–34).
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cases applying TransUnion to the FDCPA). For this reason, too, Plaintiffs’ argument that the
FDCPA is not the type of statute which TransUnion would find offensive to Article III standing,
(Pla. Cert. Reply Br., ECF No. 140 at 11), fails as TransUnion has been uniformly applied to
FDCPA claims by various courts.
Third, while Plaintiffs are correct that after Spokeo but before TransUnion, FDCPA
violations—even those without any additional harm— where sufficient to establish standing,
e.g., Rock v. Greenspoon Marder, LLP, No. 09-3522, 2021 WL 248859, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 26,
2021) (explaining Plaintiff’s allegation that various components of debt collection letter were
misleading amounted to concrete harm), the landscape changed after TransUnion. There, the
Supreme Court clarified that Spokeo “rejected the proposition that a plaintiff automatically
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and
purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.” 141 S. Ct. at 2205 (internal
quotations omitted).
Since TransUnion, in analyzing standing, the Court must now decide “whether the
alleged injury bears a close relationship to a traditionally recognized harm, and second, whether
a plaintiff has pled more than mere injury-in-law.” Rohl v. Prof. Fin. Co., Inc., No. 21-17507,
2022 WL 1748244, at *3 (D.N.J. May 31, 2022). However, in the Complaint, Plaintiffs only
allege that Defendant’s use of a name other than its true name violated the FDCPA and seek
statutory damages only for the alleged violation. (ECF No. 9, ¶¶ 68–69). As underscored in
TransUnion, a statutory violation alone is insufficient to establish standing. Thus, even assuming
Plaintiffs could establish a violation of the law, the Plaintiffs in this case, like those in

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TransUnion, simply have alleged no concrete harm sufficient to confer standing—a statutory
violation alone does not cut it.
Even now, Plaintiffs have not alleged a “traditionally recognized harm” analogue.
However, following TransUnion, the Sixth Circuit analyzed standing in a case alleging the same
violation of the FDCPA—the “true name” requirement—and determined that neither
“confusion” by the defendant’s use of a different name or the plaintiff having incurred legal fees
in pursuing the lawsuit were concrete injuries for Article III purposes. See Ward, 9 F.4th at 362–
63. Indeed, “TransUnion has been applied numerous times to FDCPA actions, like this one, to
dismiss cases alleging incorrect, misleading, or missing information. The common thread in
these cases is that ‘informational injury that causes no adverse effects cannot satisfy Article III.’”
Jackson v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 21-12342, 2023 WL 157517, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2023) (citation
omitted) (collecting cases); see also Valentine v. Unifund CCR, LLC, No. 20-5024, 2023 WL
22423, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2023) (collecting cases); Foley v. Medicredit, Inc., No. 21-19764,
2022 WL 3020129, at *4 (D.N.J. July 29, 2022) (explaining “merely receiving a letter from a
debt collector that was confusing or misleading . . . does not demonstrate a harm closely related
to traditional harms such as those necessary to plead a cause of action such as fraudulent or
negligent misrepresentation” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Plaintiffs, here,
have simply alleged a bare statutory violation, which, without more, is plainly insufficient to
establish Article III standing.
Having concluded that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action, the
pending motions will be denied as moot, and Plaintiffs’ Complaint is dismissed without
prejudice. Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 119 (3d Cir. 2019) (discussing that a case
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should be dismissed without prejudice where the plaintiff lacks Article III standing and the
district court has no subject matter jurisdiction to reach the merits of the claims); see also
Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 195 (“Absent [Article III] standing on the part of the named plaintiffs,
we must dismiss a putative class action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. As such, the pending motions are DENIED as moot. An appropriate Order
accompanies this Opinion.

CHRISTINE P. O’HEARN
United States District Judge

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