BETHUNE v. OWENS

Filing 27

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 8/12/2019. (dmr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANTWON A. BETHUNE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action
No. 17-cv-0977 (NLH)

DAVID OWENS, as WARDEN AT
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,

OPINION

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Antwon A. Bethune, Plaintiff Pro Se
#235430C, Northern State Prison
65 Frontage Road
Newark, NJ 07114
Stephanie C. Madden, Esquire
Office of Camden County Counsel
520 Market Street, 14th Floor
Camden, NJ 08102
Attorney for Defendant David Owens
HILLMAN, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for summary
judgment

(“the

Motion”)

of

defendant

(“Defendant” or “Owens”). (D.E. 23.)

Warden

David

Owens

Plaintiff Antwon A. Bethune

(“Plaintiff”) filed an affidavit in response to the Motion (D.E.
24), to which Defendant filed a reply. (D.E. 25.)

The Motion is

being considered on the papers pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b).
For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment
will be granted.
1

BACKGROUND
A.

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff

was

a

pretrial

detainee

at

the

Camden

County

Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) from September 11, 2015 through
April 28, 2017. (D.E.

23-1 at 10; D.E. 23-2 at ¶3.) 1

1 at 5; D.E.

He is proceeding pro se with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
complaint (“the Complaint”) against Defendant as CCCF’s warden
regarding

the

conditions

of

confinement

during

Plaintiff’s

incarceration. (D.E. 1.)
Plaintiff

contends

that

Defendant

was

“deliberately

indifferent to my rights by continuing to house me in overcrowded
housing units where I [was] forced to sleep on the floor.” (D.E.
1 at 4.)

Plaintiff alleges that he “put grievances in [to CCCF

personnel], [but] receiv[ed] no responses back[,] with the highly
overcrowded conditions going on for years.” (Id. at 5.)

He

contends that the allegedly overcrowded conditions “subjected me
to unsanitary conditions which breed multiple different kinds of
staff [sic] infections [and] incite violence in a[n] already unsafe
environment.” (Id. at 5-6.)
Plaintiff

states

that

the

alleged

confinement

conditions

caused him to suffer “back pain, sore muscles, muscle spasms [and]
effects [on] my sleep.” (Id. at 6.)

1

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated in Northern State Prison.
(ECF No. 23-2 at ¶3.)
2

Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000 in compensatory damages, $500,000
in punitive damages, and $500,000 for “mental and physical damage.”
(Id. at 6-7.)

He also asks that he and “all future inmates housed

at CCCF never have to sleep on the floor.” (Id. at 6.)
B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On

March

6,

2017,

this

Court

granted

Plaintiff’s

IFP

Application and directed the Clerk of the Court to file the
Complaint.

(D.E.

2.)

After

screening

Plaintiff’s

Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, the Court ordered
that

the

Complaint’s

Fourteenth

Amendment

conditions

of

confinement claim against Defendant be allowed to proceed. (D.E.
3.)
Defendant filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint on May 21,
2018. (D.E. 18.)

On August 13, 2018, Magistrate Judge Ann Marie

Donio issued a scheduling order requiring that all pretrial factual
discovery be concluded by November 30, 2018. (D.E. 19.)

Defendant

served Plaintiff with his: (1) November 1, 2018 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26
Disclosures (D.E. 23-6 at 2-50); (2) November 1, 2018 document
requests

(D.E.

23-7

at

2-5);

and

interrogatories. (D.E. 23-7 at 6-13.)

(3)

November

1,

2018

Defendant’s Motion states

that Plaintiff had not, as of January 24, 2019, served Defendant
with any discovery responses or disclosures. (D.E. 23-1 at 6.)
Plaintiff’s February 27, 2019 response to the Motion appended his
responses to Defendant’s interrogatories and document requests.

3

(D.E. 24 at ¶3; D.E. 24 at 5-8.)

Such measures are untimely under

the Court’s August 13, 2018 scheduling order that established a
November 30, 2018 pretrial factual discovery deadline. (D.E.

19.)

Plaintiff’s February 27, 2019 response also appended document
requests directed to Defendant. (D.E. 24 at 9-10.) Those discovery
requests are also untimely under the scheduling order. (D.E. 19.)
On January 24, 2019, Defendant filed the motion for summary
judgment now pending before the Court. (D.E. 23.)

On February 27,

2019, Plaintiff filed an affidavit in opposition to the Motion.
(D.E. 24.)

On March 11, 2019, Defendant filed a reply. (D.E. 25.)

DISCUSSION
Defendant moves for summary judgment on three grounds: (1)
Plaintiff’s failure to adduce evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could find unconstitutional conditions of confinement
at CCCF (D.E. 23-1 at 8-12; D.E. 25 at 2-3); (2) the Complaint’s
mootness, in light of the Sixth and Amended Final Consent Decree
in the class action Dittimus-Bey, et al. v. Camden Cty. Corr.
Facility, et al., Docket No. 05-cv-0063 (D.N.J.) (“Dittimus-Bey”)
(D.E.

23-1

at

13-14;

D.E.

25

at

3-4);

and

(3)

Defendant’s

entitlement to qualified immunity, based on Plaintiff’s failure to
show that Defendant was aware of purported risk of serious harm or
that he individually participated or acquiesced in the alleged
wrongs. (D.E. 23-1 at 13-14; D.E. 25 at 4.)

4

This Court finds that: for reasons discussed in Part IV, the
mootness doctrine does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims for monetary
relief; but for reasons discussed in Part V, Defendant is entitled
to summary judgment by virtue of the lack of a genuine dispute of
material fact.

Given that summary judgment is proper, there being

no proof of a constitutional violation, the Court need not address
the qualified immunity defense.
WHETHER THE FINAL CONSENT DECREE IN DITTIMUS-BEY RENDERS
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT MOOT
In

addition

to

Defendant’s

meritorious

argument

that

Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence of Fourteenth Amendment
violations from CCCF conditions of confinement (see Section V(B)
of this Opinion below), Defendant also seeks summary judgment on
the ground that the Sixth and Final Amended Consent Decree in
Dittimus-Bey has rendered Plaintiff’s Complaint moot. (D.E. 23-1
at 13-14.)
The doctrine of “mootness” derives from the limitation upon
federal judicial power in Article III of the Constitution limiting
jurisdiction

to

actual

cases

and

controversies.

See

Genesis

Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013). Thus, federal
courts are limited to resolving “the legal rights of litigants in
actual controversies,” Id., quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll.
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia

5

S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).

Thus,

“[a]n action is rendered moot when an intervening circumstance
deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the
lawsuit at any point during the litigation.” MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (citations omitted).
The

test

for

Article

III

mootness

is

whether

it

has

become

“impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to
the prevailing party.” In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., 802 F.3d 547,
553 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (2013)).
Therefore, “[a]s long as the parties have a concrete interest,
however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not
moot.” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016).
It is true that Plaintiff does not contest the Dittimus–Bey
litigation and its effects on CCCF conditions, as characterized in
Defendant’s Brief In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.E.
23-1 at 13-14.)

For example, Camden County and CCCF officials

agreed to consent decrees in Dittimus–Bey to take measures to
improve the conditions at the CCCF, such as by retaining criminal
justice consultants to investigate and recommend solutions to the
CCCF’s overcrowding and staffing problems. (Id.) Those facts (id.)
show significant and systemic improvements as to both overcrowding
and

related

conditions

at

CCCF.

Plaintiff

is

not

presently

confined at CCCF, and the successful Dittimus–Bey class action
litigation has placed the challenged conditions at CCCF under

6

review, resulting in appreciable changes for those confined at
CCCF.

That these facts from Dittimus-Bey are uncontested here by

Plaintiff Bethune is merely further demonstration that summary
judgment is appropriate.
The Court is not persuaded, however, that the final consent
decree in Dittimus-Bey in and of itself moots Plaintiff’s case.
Plaintiff, a class member in Dittimus-Bey, is bound by the final
judgment in which class members are deemed to release claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief against Camden County and its
officers and employees.

This means that Mr. Bethune, like all

class members, could no longer obtain injunctive relief beyond
that authorized in the Consent Decree for jail conditions during
the class period. But that litigation did not involve individual
inmates’ or detainees’ claims or class claims for money damages,
which must be sought and proved on an individual claim basis.

In

other words, the Final Consent Decree in Dittimus-Bey did not
adjudicate or deal with any individual money damage claims.

That

Consent

that

Decree

does

not

extinguish

the

possibility

constitutional violations occurred to individuals during the class
period. Indeed,

claims

for

money

damages

were

not

sought

in

Dittimus-Bey and inmates were free to pursue individual claims for
monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by filing an individual
complaint, as Mr. Bethune has done.

Accordingly, to the extent

that Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for money damages is

7

mooted by the final Consent Decree in Dittimus-Bey, the mootness
argument lacks merit and is denied.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the materials of record

“show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
Where, as in this case, the nonmoving party bears the burden
of persuasion at trial, the moving party may be entitled to summary
judgment by observing that there is an absence of evidence to
support an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); see also Rahman v.
Taylor, 2013 WL 1192352, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2013). Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c) “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.
at 322.

A plaintiff opposing a defendant’s motion for summary

judgment has the burden of coming forward with evidence, not mere
allegations, that would raise a genuine dispute of material fact
and suffice to enable a reasonable jury, giving all favorable
inferences to the plaintiff as the party opposing summary judgment,

8

to find in plaintiff’s favor at trial.

Rule 56(c)(1)(A) further

provides that, to create a genuine issue of material fact, the
nonmovant must do so by:
citing to particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits
or
declarations,
stipulations
(including
those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
After

careful

review

of

the

record

and

the

parties’

submissions on the Motion, this Court finds that entry of summary
judgment is appropriate.
B.

PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO COME FORWARD WITH ANY EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING HIS CLAIM OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT
1.
The

The Record In This Case As To Conditions At CCCF

evidentiary

record

attached to the Motion.

here

consists

of

what

Defendant

Plaintiff has provided the Court with

only: pleadings that contain a mix of facts and legal conclusions
(D.E. 1; D.E. 24 at 1-4); and his untimely written discovery
responses and requests. (D.E. 24 at 5-10.)

The Complaint attaches

no affidavits, certifications, or exhibits, other than his inmate
account statement for purposes of his IFP application. (D.E. 1-2
at

4-5.)

Mere

pleadings

are

insufficient

judgment. Rahman, 2013 WL 1192352, at *3.

to

defeat

The ample time for

completing factual discovery has expired. (D.E. 20.)

9

summary

Defendant’s document production suggests that Plaintiff was
initially detained in CCCF on September 11, 2015. (D.E. 23-6 at
6.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges the same. (D.E. 1 at 5.)

This

fact makes Plaintiff a member of the certified class in the matter
of Dittimus-Bey. (D.E. 23-9 at ¶9.) In Dittimus-Bey, the plaintiffs
had

alleged

several

conditions

of

“unhealthy,

unsafe,

and

unsanitary environment . . . [a]s a direct result of severe
overcrowding and understaffing” at CCCF. (Dittimus-Bey v. Taylor,
No. 05-0063 (D.N.J. June 30, 2017) (D.E. 60 at 4 and 7).)

As noted

in the Dittimus-Bey Sixth and Amended Final Consent Decree, CCCF’s
population “reached a crisis point in early 2013” (D.E. 23-9
(Consent Decree) at ¶35), after which the daily population at CCCF
was closely monitored and managed over time to appropriate levels
for resolution of the Dittimus-Bey claims. (Id. at ¶¶36–37.)
In this case, Defendant does not appear to contest Plaintiff’s
claim (D.E. 1 at 4-6) that he was housed at CCCF in an overcrowded
cell.

Neither party has provided the Court with specific evidence

of Mr. Bethune’s particular cell assignments during his period of
detention.

Thus, the Court will assume, for purposes of this

Motion only, that Plaintiff was housed in overcrowded conditions
at some point during the period of his September 11, 2015 through
April 28, 2017 detention.

Population data suggests that, at

“crisis points” during Plaintiff’s detention, the average twoperson CCCF cell in fact contained three persons, one of whom had
to temporarily sleep on the floor mattress, while two occupied
10

bunk beds.

Nevertheless, the Dittimus-Bey Sixth and Final Amended

Consent Decree reflects the fact that the overcrowding issues were
being addressed during the time of Plaintiff’s incarceration at
the CCCF. (D.E. 23-9 at ¶¶33-37 and 44-60.)
Defendant asserts though that, based on the underlying facts
and on Plaintiff’s failure to provide evidence supporting his
contentions, Plaintiff fails to state a claim or raise a dispute
of material fact as to any Fourteenth Amendment violation. (D.E.
23-1 (Def. Br.) at 8-12.)

Defendant’s Motion relies on the

Fourteenth Amendment to argue that Plaintiff has not stated an
unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim. (D.E. 23-1 at 812.)

Defendant’s reply brief, though, contends that the Eighth,

not Fourteenth, Amendment governs this case. (D.E. 25 at 2-3.)
The

latter

protected
Fourteenth

contention
from

is

incorrect.

conditions

Amendment’s

Due

A

constituting
Process

pretrial

detainee

punishment

under

Clause,

not

the

is
the

Eighth

Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1971).

While the Eighth Amendment

proscribes cruel and unusual punishment for convicted inmates, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment proscribes any
punishment of pre-trial detainees.

Here, Plaintiff seeks relief

for the time he was incarcerated at CCCF “in relation to prehearing detention.” (D.E. 24 at 4.) Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment
governs his claims as a pre-trial detainee. See also D.E. 23-2 at
1 (referring to Plaintiff’s status as “a pre-trial detainee”).
11

2.

Governing Law As To Conditions Of Confinement Claim

The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a
cell with more persons than its intended design does not, on its
own, rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill, 488
F. App’x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking does not
constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man, one cell
principle

lurking

in

the

Due

Process

Clause

Amendment’”) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 542)).

of

the

Fifth

More is needed to

demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a pretrial detainee,
“shock the conscience,” and thus violate due process rights. See
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that
due process analysis requires courts to consider whether the
totality of the conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that the
adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes
assigned to them”).
3.

Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Or Raise A Disputed
Material Fact As To Conditions Of Confinement

Plaintiff has adduced no evidence that the conditions he
experienced while incarcerated in a purportedly overcrowded cell
were so severe that they “shock the conscience.” See Hubbard, 538
F.3d at 233.

Similarly, being a detainee in an overcrowded unit

does not, standing alone, rise to the level of a due process
violation.
12

No Showing Of An Unconstitutional Deprivation Of A Basic Human
Need:

Plaintiff’s vague and cursory allegations regarding “sore

muscles,” “back pain,” “muscle spasms,” and “highly overcrowded
conditions”

(D.E.

inconvenient
affidavit’s

and

1

at

5

and

6)

uncomfortable

contentions

about

essentially

complain

situation.

four

detainees

of

an

His

response

being

“crushed

together into a cell designed for [one]” (D.E. 24 at ¶ 6), its
reference to “a great deal of physical pain and mental anguish”
(id.

at

12),

and

its

allegations

of

“genuine

privations

and

hardships” from overcrowding (ibid.) fail to state a claim of
constitutional magnitude.

“[T]he Constitution does not mandate

comfortable prisons.” Carson, 488 F. App’x at 560 (quoting Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 349).

“To the extent that such conditions are harsh,

they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
Without more, the Court cannot say that a reasonable fact
finder could conclude that the conditions Plaintiff references
deprived him of any basic human needs.

Even affording Plaintiff

the benefit of the doubt as to his unsubstantiated allegations
about the measurements of CCCF cells and the size of their contents
(D.E. 24 at ¶12), he adduces no evidence that, for example: he was
sickened by the conditions he describes; the crowding in fact led
to any assault of him by another inmate; or he was significantly
sleep-deprived due to these conditions. See, e.g., Williams v.
Meisel, 2014 WL 4744561, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2014) (finding
13

that mold in showers did not amount to a constitutional violation
because the mold did not expose inmates to an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to future health).

“[S]leep[ing] on the floor for

great amounts of time” (D.E. 1 at 6) and “virtually impossible ...
unencumbered movement” (D.E. 24 at 7) fall short of conscienceshocking conduct.
Plaintiff

has

not

produced

evidence

that

the

restricted

movement conditions he describes (D.E. 24 at ¶¶11, 15) “were
created for an improper purpose or were excessive in relation to
that purpose.” See Carson, 2009 WL 3233482, at *3.
movement

in

detention

facilities

is

required

to

Limited
ensure

institutional security and internal order; Plaintiff offers no
evidence showing that such was not the case here. See O’Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987) (prison regulations
are permissible if they are reasonably related to legitimate
penological objectives); Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 516 (3d
Cir. 2002) (referring to the “legitimate penological interest in
maintaining order and security within the prison system”).
No Showing Of Physical Injury To Sustain Plaintiff’s Mental
And

Emotional

Damages

Claim:

Federal

law

limits

compensatory

damage claims 2 for conditions of confinement mental and emotional
injuries to only those cases where a physical injury has occurred.

2

Since Plaintiff is no longer confined at CCCF, injunctive
relief is unavailable to him. See Abdul–Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d
195, 197 (3d Cir. 1993) (a prisoner lacks standing to seek
injunctive and declaratory relief if he is no longer subject to
the alleged conditions).
14

Nickles v. Taylor, No. 2010 WL 1949447, at *1 (D.N.J. May 14, 2010)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)).

Section 803 (d)(e) of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act states, in relevant part: “No Federal civil
action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or
other

correctional

facility,

for

mental

or

emotional

injury

suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury ...” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
1997e(e)

makes

no

distinction

“The plain language of §

between

the

various

claims

encompassed within the phrase ‘federal civil action’ to which the
section applies.” Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir.
2000). See also Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir.
2002) (“Section 1997e(e) applies to all federal civil actions
including

claims

alleging

constitutional

violations”);

Doe

v.

Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 314 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (“we have since
recognized that § 1997e(e) prohibits compensatory damages for
mental

or

emotional

injury

absent

allegations

of

physical

injury”).
Here though, Plaintiff’s CCCF incarceration file does not
contain any records indicating any grievances or damages, medical
or otherwise, from alleged overcrowding. (See D.E. 23-8 at ¶4;
D.E. 23-6 at 6-50.)

He offers no evidence to substantiate his

contention that he “put grievances in, receiving no response back”
as to his supposed injuries. (D.E. 1 at 5.)

Even if the Court

were to consider Plaintiff’s untimely discovery responses (D.E. 24
at 5-8), he has not produced any evidence demonstrating that the
15

purported

“non-reversible ... toll on my mental health” (D.E. 1

at 6) in fact occurred and was caused by the challenged conditions
of confinement. 3
No
further

Demonstration
asserts

that

Of
the

Deliberate

Indifference:

Defendant

Dittimus-Bey

class-action

litigation

remediated overcrowding and conditions of confinement at CCCF.
(D.E.

23-1 at 13-14.)

Indeed, as a result of the Dittimus-Bey

litigation 4, there has been a significant lessening of the crowding
in CCCF and improvements in other prison conditions. (D.E.
(Consent Decree) at ¶¶36-37.)

23-8

When the Dittimus-Bey litigation

commenced in 2005, CCCF’s average daily population was 1,848
inmates; by May of 2010, the average monthly population reached an
all-time low of 1,232 inmates. (D.E.

23-9 at ¶¶33-34.)

Roughly

four months prior to Plaintiff’s release from CCCF in April 2017,
CCCF’s population as of December 9, 2016 was at 1,160 -- in a
facility designed for 1,267 persons. (D.E.

3

23-9 (Consent Decree)

Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate mental or emotional injuries
from CCCF overcrowding is what forecloses his recovery for
compensatory damages. However, Defendant’s contention that
“Plaintiff must prove damages to prove any constitutional
violation” (D.E. 25 at 3) is not correct. See, e.g., Allah, 226
F.3d at 252 (nominal and punitive damages for First Amendment
violation not barred because prisoners need not allege a
physical injury to recover; the deprivation of the
constitutional right is itself a cognizable injury, regardless
of any resulting mental or emotional injury).
4 Order Approving Amended Final Consent Decree, Dittimus-Bey v.
Taylor, No. 05-0063 (D.N.J. June 30, 2017); see also Dittimus-Bey
v. Taylor, 2013 WL 6022128 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2013); Dittimus-Bey v.
Taylor, 244 F.R.D. 284 (2007). The Court does not imply that
Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief in this case (ECF No. 1 at
6-7) are barred by the class action settlement of Dittimus-Bey,
since that case only involved claims for injunctive relief.
16

at ¶¶33-34, 36.) While it is conceivable that an individual inmate
could be subjected to unconstitutional conditions even at a jail
that is continuously monitored and operating within reasonable
capacity limits, Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence that he
has actually suffered such deprivation.
These undisputed facts refute any claim that Defendant or
other supervisors at CCCF were “deliberately indifferent” to the
alleged constitutional violations, which is the mental culpability
that must be proven to find liability under § 1983. See Jiminez v.
All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2007)
(describing the “deliberate indifference” standard).

There is no

evidence of conduct that would tend to show deliberate indifference
on the part of Defendant.
For all of these reasons, Defendant is entitled to summary
judgment

on

Plaintiff’s

overcrowded

conditions

of

confinement

Fourteenth Amendment claim.
C.

WHETHER CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT MUST BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE HE IS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In addition to the grounds discussed in Sections IV and V(B)

of this Opinion, Defendant also requests that this Court grant
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. (D.E.

23-1

at 12-13; D.E. 25 at 4 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535
(1979), Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007), and
Rode v. Dellaciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988).)
Qualified

immunity

protects

government

officials

from

liability as long as their conduct “‘does not violate clearly
17

established

statutory

or

constitutional

rights

of

which

a

reasonable person would have known.’” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248,
253 (3d Cir. 2010).
whether

the

The qualified immunity test is two-pronged:

pleadings

allege

that

constitutional

violation

occurred, and whether “reasonable officials could fairly have
known that their alleged conduct was illegal.” Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 121 (2001); Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of
Pa., 154 F.3d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1998).
Given that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a basis for a
constitutional violation, there is no need to address whether a
reasonable official would know his conduct was unlawful, due to no
proof of such illegality.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendant’s motion for
summary

judgment

is

granted.

An

accompanying

Order

entered.

August 12, 2019
Date

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN
U.S. District Judge

At Camden, New Jersey

18

will

be