ALI v. UNIVERSITY CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE. RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 6/27/18.(dd)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
AL-WAHID ALI,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 17-1285 (RBK)
:
v.
:
:
UNIVERSITY CORRECTIONAL
:
HEALTH CARE, et al.,
:
OPINION
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________________ :
ROBERT B. KUGLER, U.S.D.J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Al-Wahid Ali, a former inmate of South Woods State Prion, filed a civil rights
complaint alleging that several healthcare providers and prison officials denied him proper medical
care for his Hepatitis C and accompanying afflictions in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Currently pending before this Court is Defendant E. Marin’s motion for summary judgment. For
the following reasons, Defendant Marin’s motion is denied without prejudice.
II.
BACKGROUND
The Court recites the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. With respect to the
claims against Defendant Marin, Plaintiff alleges that on August 26, 2016,1 Officer Marin, Officer
Watermaysk, and other unnamed corrections officers informed Plaintiff that he needed to go to the
Extended Care Unit (“ECU”) for his prescribed dialysis treatment. (See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 40). In
response, Plaintiff requested to be provided with a wheelchair to be transported to ECU. (See id.).
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Marin denied him the use of a wheelchair, which caused him to
An incident report and disciplinary hearing report attached to Defendant Marin’s motion indicate
that the incident occurred on August 25, 2016, at approximately 7:20 a.m. (See ECF No. 18, Exs.
B & C).
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begin crawling from his jail cell to the officers’ podium to request a wheelchair. (See id. at ¶¶ 4041). After Plaintiff was denied this request, he was thrown back in his jail cell and did not receive
his prescribed dialysis treatment that day. (See id. at ¶ 41).
Following the incident, Plaintiff was charged with prohibited act .256, refusing to obey an
order of any staff member, for failing to surrender a wheelchair that had temporarily been issued
to him. (See ECF No. 18, Ex. A, at p. 1). A disciplinary hearing was held on August 31, 2016 and
the hearing officer found Plaintiff guilty of the offense. (See ECF No. 18, Ex. B, at pp. 1-3). The
disciplinary hearing officer relied on a preliminary incident report authored by Sergeant Inman
stating that Plaintiff failed to surrender a wheelchair that medical had issued to him despite orders
from Nurse Tsakiris and Sergeant Inman directing him to do so. (See ECF No. 18, Ex. C, at p. 1).
The disciplinary hearing officer also relied on an order from Dr. Dias dated the day after the
incident stating “[Plaintiff] is medically cleared and able to walk at this time. There is no medical
issue requiring a wheelchair.” (See id. at p. 4).
Plaintiff appealed the disciplinary hearing officer’s determination, arguing that his MRI
records were not presented as evidence in his defense. (See ECF No. 18, Ex. D). On September
2, 2016, the administrator found that the disciplinary hearing officer’s decision was based on
substantial evidence and upheld the decision and sanctions. (See ECF No. 18, Ex. E).
On February 23, 2017, Plaintiff filed a § 1983 civil rights complaint in this Court. (See
ECF No. 1). On August 30, 2017, this Court permitted Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims
against Defendants Tsakiris, Marin, Watermasysk, Flowers, and Powers2 to proceed and granted
Plaintiff’s motion for pro bono counsel. (See ECF Nos. 5-6). On November 17, 2017, Defendant
Marin filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint based on collateral estoppel, qualified
2
Defendants Tsakiris, Watermasysk, Flowers, and Powers have not been served with the
complaint.
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immunity, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See ECF No. 18).
Plaintiff, through his appointed counsel, filed opposition to Defendant Marin’s motion to dismiss
on February 2, 2018. (See ECF No. 24). On May 29, 2018, this Court converted Defendant
Marin’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(d). (See ECF No. 26).
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the moving party “shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is “material” to the dispute if it could alter the
outcome, and a dispute of a material fact is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank
of Az. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)) (“Where the record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for
trial.’”). In deciding whether there is any genuine issue for trial, the court is not to weigh evidence
or decide issues of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Because fact and credibility determinations
are for the jury, the non-moving party’s evidence is to be believed and ambiguities construed in its
favor. Id. at 255; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
Although the movant bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, the non-movant likewise must present more than mere allegations or denials to
successfully oppose summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The non-moving party must
at least present probative evidence from which the jury might return a verdict in his favor. Id. at
257. Where the non-moving party fails to “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
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an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial,” the movant is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986).
IV. DISCUSSION
A.
Collateral Estoppel
Defendant Marin moves for summary judgement against Plaintiff, arguing that the Court
should apply collateral estoppel with respect to the factual findings made by the disciplinary
hearing officer in the disciplinary proceeding against Plaintiff. (See ECF No. 18, at pp. 4-6).
Specifically, Defendant Marin contends that the hearing officer’s findings regarding Dr. Dias’s
opinion of Plaintiff’s need for a wheelchair entitle Defendant Marin to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.3 (See ECF No. 18, at pp. 6-8).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents a party from relitigating
issues that were adjudicated in a prior lawsuit. See In re Docteroff, 133 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir.
1997). Collateral estoppel exists to promote judicial consistency, encourage reliance on court
decisions, and protect defendants from being forced to relitigate the same issues in multiple
lawsuits. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (“Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual
Defendant Marin also argues in his reply brief that Plaintiff’s claim should be barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because it calls into question the guilty finding reached at
Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing. (See ECF No. 25 at pp. 2-3). Heck bars civil rights claims that
seek damages for actions that would render the fact or length of a prisoner’s confinement invalid,
unless the prisoner can prove that the conviction, sentence, or prison disciplinary sanction that
resulted from those actions has been reversed, invalidated, or called into question by a grant of
federal habeas corpus relief (in other words, terminated favorably to the plaintiff). See Heck, 512
U.S. at 486-87; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997). Defendant Marin’s argument
is without merit as the Third Circuit has recognized that Heck’s favorable termination rule does
not apply when a prisoner’s § 1983 claims implicate only the conditions, and not the fact or
duration, of his confinement. See Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 149 (3d Cir. 2002).
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purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party
or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.”).
In general, federal courts accord preclusive effect to the adjudications of both state and
federal administrative tribunals, so long as two requirements are met. First, the administrative
agency must have acted in a judicial capacity and resolved disputed issues of fact properly before
it which the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate. See United States v. Utah Construction
Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966); Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186, 192 (3d
Cir. 1993). Second, pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the federal
court must look to the law of the adjudicating state to determine if a state court would accord the
judgment of the administrative tribunal preclusive effect. See Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d
352, 357 (3d Cir. 1999).
Because the disciplinary proceeding in this case took place in New Jersey, the Court must
determine whether a New Jersey state court would accord preclusive effect to the disciplinary
hearing officer’s determination. Under New Jersey law, a party seeking to invoke the doctrine of
collateral estoppel must demonstrate that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue
decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the proceeding; (3) the court
in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue
was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a
party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding. Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 720
A.2d 645, 654 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (citing In re Dawson, 641 A.2d 1026, 1034-35
(N.J. 1994)). Applying these factors to the present matter, the Court finds that collateral estoppel
does not apply to the disciplinary hearing officer’s findings.
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1. Identity of the Issues
In deciding the identity of issues, the court “should consider whether there is substantial
overlap of evidence or argument in the second proceeding; whether the evidence involves
application of the same rule of law; whether discovery in the first proceeding could have
encompassed discovery in the second; and whether the claims asserted in the two actions are
closely related.” First Union Nat'l Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 921 A.2d 417, 424 (N.J.
2007); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 comment c (1982); Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 155 (1979) (the identity of issues requirement is fulfilled where the issues in
the current case are “in substance the same” as those previously resolved); Suppan v. Dadonna,
203 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Identity of the issue is established by showing that the same
general legal rules govern both cases and that the facts of both cases are indistinguishable as
measured by those rules.”).
Here, collateral estoppel is inapplicable because the issue decided in the disciplinary
hearing is not identical to the issue raised by Plaintiff in his § 1983 case. Defendant Marin seeks
to preclude Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on the disciplinary
hearing officer’s factual finding that Dr. Dias medically cleared Plaintiff to walk the day after the
incident. This issue, however, is not identical to the issue raised in Plaintiff’s complaint which is
whether Defendant Marin, an officer that was not involved in the underlying disciplinary
infraction, was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs the day prior to the
issuance of Dr. Dias’s order.
The constitutional issue raised in Plaintiff’s complaint involves the consideration of facts,
evidence, and legal rules that are distinct from the issue determined in the disciplinary hearing.
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A prisoner can establish that his medical need is serious when it “has been diagnosed by a
physician as requiring treatment” or is so obvious that a layperson would recognize the need for
professional medical care. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d
Cir. 1987). Deliberate indifference is established when the record would allow the factfinder to
conclude that a prison official was subjectively aware of the risk of substantial harm to an inmate
but failed to respond. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). The issue of deliberate
indifference in Plaintiff’s § 1983 case will require the discovery and examination of additional
evidence not considered in the disciplinary hearing, including Defendant Marin’s knowledge and
actions, Plaintiff’s complete medical records, testimony from Plaintiff’s treating nurses and
physicians, and opinions from other medical professionals.
Additionally, the claims asserted in the disciplinary hearing and in Plaintiff’s § 1983 action
are not closely related. Plaintiff’s complaint raises allegations that multiple corrections officers
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment rights, whereas the disciplinary hearing only addressed whether Plaintiff was guilty
of violating orders given by Nurse Tsakiris and Sergeant Inman. These two claims involve the
application of entirely distinct legal standards and the evaluation of different factual information.
For instance, the focus of the disciplinary hearing was on Plaintiff’s conduct in relation to the
orders given by prison staff members. Unlike in the disciplinary hearing, the challenged conduct
in Plaintiff’s § 1983 action is that of other corrections officers, including Defendant Marin.
Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is inapplicable to the present case.
2. Essentiality of the Issue
Collateral estoppel is also inapplicable to this matter because the disciplinary hearing
officer’s determination that Plaintiff was medically cleared to walk was not essential to the final
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judgment in the disciplinary hearing. “Under the generally accepted meaning of the term, a fact
may be deemed essential to a judgment where, without that fact, the judgment would lack factual
support sufficient to sustain it.” Raytech Corp. v. White, 54 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 1995). Courts
inquire into “whether the issue ‘was critical to the judgment or merely dicta’” when determining
whether the issue sought to be precluded was essential to the prior judgment. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 288 F.3d 519, 525 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting O'Leary v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1062 (3d Cir. 1991)).
The disciplinary hearing officer’s factual finding regarding Plaintiff’s need for a
wheelchair was not essential to the determination that Plaintiff violated orders from Nurse Tsakiris
and Sergeant Inman. Plaintiff’s failure to obey the staff members’ orders, regardless of whether
the wheelchair was necessary, constituted sufficient grounds for Plaintiff to be disciplined. Thus,
without the order from Dr. Dias, the disciplinary hearing officer’s decision would remain factually
supported as all evidence of Plaintiff’s insubordination is fully documented in the preliminary
incident report authored by Sergeant Inman.
3. Fairness Considerations
Moreover, equitable considerations of fairness also preclude the application of collateral
estoppel in this particular case. Even where the five criteria are met, the court retains discretion to
grant or deny issue preclusion. See See Azurak v. Corporate Property Investors, 790 A.2d. 956,
961 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“[A]pplication of the collateral estoppel doctrine is
discretionary and must be applied equitably, not mechanically.”) (internal citations omitted); State
v. Schlanger, 496 A.2d. 746, 749 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (“The extent of use through
collateral estoppel or by other methods of issue preclusion rests squarely within the discretion of
the civil tribunal.”). Specifically, courts are to ensure that preclusion is fair:
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Fundamental to the application of estoppel is an assessment of
considerations such as finality and repose; prevention of needless
litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary
burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusion
and uncertainty; and basic fairness. Indeed, such broader notions
about fairness and finality echo in the variety of considerations that
equity applies in estoppel-like circumstances.
Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67, 85 (N.J. 2012) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
It is unclear from the record what procedural and evidentiary safeguards were afforded to
Plaintiff in his disciplinary hearing. See Rusher v. Arnold, 550 F.2d 896, 900 (3d Cir. 1977)
(discussing the numerous procedural and evidentiary protections that are not afforded to prisoners
in disciplinary hearings); City of Hackensack v. Winner, 410 A.2d. 1146, 1171 (N.J. 1980) (noting
that administrative agencies “act in quasi-judicial capacities; they need not apply rules of evidence
and their findings, unless challenged, may not necessarily rest on competent evidence; and
discovery, including the right of a party to subpoena witnesses and material, may not have been
available so that a party may not have had the ability to present all relevant material matter”).
Additionally, it does not appear from the record that the disciplinary hearing officer reviewed any
evidence other than the order from Dr. Dias to make the determination that Plaintiff did not require
a wheelchair. Indeed, in his administrative appeal, Plaintiff asserted that he did not have an
opportunity to present his full medical records to the disciplinary hearing officer. (See ECF No.
18, Ex. D). Given the unique circumstances of this case, the disciplinary hearing officer’s factual
finding will not have preclusive effect in Plaintiff’s § 1983 action. See Edmundson, 4 F.3d at 193
(“[W]e do not think that an administrative agency consisting of lay persons has the expertise to
issue binding pronouncements in the area of federal constitutional law.”); see also Colon v.
Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 869 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that given the procedural laxity involved, “[w]e
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think there is a substantial question as to whether, under New York law, collateral estoppel should
ever apply to fact issues determined in a prison disciplinary hearing”).
While the Court recognizes that Dr. Dias’s order is admissible evidence in Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 action, the order alone is not sufficient to warrant the entry of summary judgment at this
time. Given the early stage of the proceedings, it is possible that additional facts may come forth
during discovery that could create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of
Plaintiff’s serious medical need. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion without
prejudice. See Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 568 (3d Cir. 2015) (“If discovery is incomplete,
a district court is rarely justified in granting summary judgment[.]”); Scholar Intelligent Sols., Inc.
v. N.J. Eye Center, P.A., No. 13-0642, 2013 WL 2455959, at *2 (D.N.J. June 5, 2013) (summary
judgment motion filed before discovery deemed premature).
B.
Qualified Immunity
Defendant Marin next argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit because
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation. (See
ECF No. 18 at pp. 14-15). To determine whether a defendant may be protected by qualified
immunity, a two-step analysis is necessary. First, the court must consider whether, “taken in the
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, [the] facts alleged show the officer's conduct
violated a constitutional right.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 786 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Second, if the Court determines that the alleged facts
do support a finding of a constitutional rights violation, the court must next “ask whether the right
was clearly established.” Id. This means that “there must be sufficient precedent at the time of
[the defendant's] action, factually similar to the plaintiff's allegations, to put [the] defendant on
notice that his or her conduct is constitutionally prohibited.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366
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(3d Cir. 2012) (citing McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 572 (3d Cir. 2001)) (modifications in
original).
Here, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that he was denied access to proper and continued
medical treatment when Defendant Marin deprived Plaintiff of the means of transport to receive
his dialysis treatment. It is well established that deliberate indifference to the serious medical
needs of a prisoner can rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). Accordingly, it is reasonable that a corrections officer would be aware
that denying an inmate the right to access a required dialysis treatment constitutes a violation of
the inmate’s right to proper medical care. The Court concludes that Defendant Marin was on
notice that his conduct was unlawful, and therefore, he may not avail himself of the protection of
qualified immunity.
C.
Failure to State a Claim
Defendant Marin also argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See ECF No. 18 at p. 17). As previously
discussed in the Court’s screening opinion dated August 30, 2017, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a
claim against Defendant Marin for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. (See ECF
No. 5).
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V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Marin’s motion for summary judgment is denied
without prejudice. An appropriate order will be entered.
DATED: June 27 , 2018
s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
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