MARTZ v. CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS et al

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/23/17. (jbk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MICHAEL LEE MARTZ,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action
No. 17-cv-01336(JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN
FREEHOLDERS; SCOTT MCCRAY AND
EIGHT OTHER UNKNOWN
FREEHOLDERS; WARDENS TAYLOR
AND OWENS OF THE CAMDEN
COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY;
C.C.C.F,

OPINION

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
Michael Lee Martz, Plaintiff Pro Se
4325694
C.C.C.F.
330 Federal Street
Camden, NJ 08102
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Michael Lee Martz seeks to bring a civil rights
complaint pursuant to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Scott McCray
and the other Camden County Freeholders (collectively
“Freeholders”), and Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”)
Wardens Taylor and Owens for allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement in CCCF. Complaint, Docket Entry 1. At
this time, the Court must review the complaint to determine
whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
concludes that the complaint will proceed in part.
II. BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations are taken from the
complaint and are accepted for purposes of this screening only.
The Court has made no findings as to the truth of Plaintiff’s
allegations.
Plaintiff alleges he endured unconstitutional conditions of
confinement in CCCF during two periods of pretrial detention:
July 5, 2015 to December 2015 and either January or February
2016. Complaint ¶ 6. During these times, Plaintiff was housed in
a two-person cell with three other people. Id. ¶ 6(a). He states
the cell toilet was unsanitary, and he was forced to sleep on
the floor. Id. ¶ 6(b). He also states there was inadequate
ventilation, unsanitary food and food preparation, and
inadequate access to the courts “either by restricted use of
legal library or understaffing of the public defender’s office.”
Id. ¶ 6(d)-(f). He alleges all defendants “allowed and did
nothing to stop” the unconstitutional conditions, id. ¶ 6, and
that they “knew or should have known” about the living
conditions, id. ¶ 4(b)-(c). He seeks relief in the form of
monetary compensation. He has also filed a motion asking the
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Court to order CCCF to provide him with 10 hours per week of
unrestricted law library time. Motion for Library Time, Docket
Entry 1-3 at 3.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996)
(“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental
employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The
PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject
to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915,
1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e because Plaintiff is a prisoner
proceeding in forma pauperis and is seeking redress from
government officials about the conditions of his confinement.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
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v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte
screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, they “still must allege
sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala
v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).
B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the
United
States
or
other
person
within
the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress ....

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28 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under §
1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and,
second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by
a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d
Cir. 2011); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d
Cir. 1994).
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges he experienced unconstitutional
conditions of confinement during his detention at CCCF, and the
complaint could also be construed as raising a First Amendment
access to the courts claim. He additionally asks the Court to
order CCCF to provide him with 10 hours of law library time per
week.
A. Conditions of Pretrial Confinement
Plaintiff alleges he experienced constitutional conditions
of confinement at CCCF due to overcrowding. “[U]nder the Due
Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). The mere fact that an
individual is lodged temporarily in a cell with more persons
than its intended design does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. See Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F. App'x
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554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking does not
constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man, one cell
principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.’” (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 542). Overcrowding
leading to conditions that “cause inmates to endure such genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time” and
that “become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to
them” does constitute unconstitutional punishment, however.
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
The claims against CCCF must be dismissed with prejudice
because it is not a “state actor” within the meaning of § 1983.
See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App'x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir.
1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp.
537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a
“person” under § 1983). Construing the complaint liberally and
giving Plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences, he
has sufficiently stated a claim for unconstitutional conditions
of confinement against CCCF wardens Owens and Taylor.
Specifically, he alleges that the overcrowded conditions led to
nutritionally deficient food, unsanitary toilets, and inadequate
access to public defenders. Considering the totality of the
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circumstances alleged by Plaintiff, the Court finds that he has
sufficiently pled that he experienced unconstitutionally
punitive conditions at CCCF. The claim shall therefore be
permitted to proceed against the wardens in their individual
capacities.1
Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts regarding the
personal liability of the Freeholders, however. As the governing
body of Camden County, the Freeholders cannot be held liable
under § 1983 based solely on the actions of other county
employees. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658, 690–91 (1978). It is also not enough to say they “should
have known” about the alleged conditions; Plaintiff must instead
plead facts showing that the Freeholders are “responsible for
either the affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence
in a well-settled custom.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845,
850 (3d Cir. 1990).2 In other words, Plaintiff must set forth

1

The claims against the wardens in their official capacities are
subject to the same analysis as the claims against the
Freeholders, as suits against county officials in their official
capacities are the same as suing the county itself, Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690
n.55 (1978)), and are dismissed without prejudice for the same
reason.
2 “Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.
Government custom can be demonstrated by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually
to constitute law.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 118 (3d
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facts supporting an inference that the Freeholders were the
“moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 689. Plaintiff does not identify an official
policy of the Freeholders that caused the constitutional
violation, nor does he sufficiently identify a “well-settled and
permanent” course of conduct by the Freeholders causing the
overcrowding. As Plaintiff may be able to plead facts that would
support a claim against the Freeholders, the claims are
dismissed without prejudice.
B. Access to the Courts
The complaint could also be reasonably construed as
attempting to raise a First Amendment denial of access to the
courts claim. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied access to the
law library and that the public defender’s office was
understaffed.
“To establish a cognizable [access to the courts] claim, a
prisoner must demonstrate that he has suffered an actual injury
to his ability to present a claim.” Henry v. Moore, 500 F. App'x
115, 117 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S.
403, 415 (2002)). Additionally, “the claim must relate to either
a direct or collateral challenge to the prisoner's sentence or
conditions of confinement [and] a prisoner must demonstrate that

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
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no other remedy will potentially compensate for the lost claim.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that the wardens’ policies limit inmates
to 45 minutes in the law library per week and restrict their
research to the inmates’ criminal cases and that the Freeholders
understaffed the public defender’s office. Complaint ¶ 6(f);
Motion for Library Time at 2. This is insufficient to allege an
access to the courts claim as Plaintiff has not identified a
non-frivolous claim he has lost or alleged that the policies
impacted his criminal case. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
351 (1996) (“[A]n inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury
simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal
assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.”). This
is claim is dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff may amend
this claim if he is able to allege facts that address the
deficiencies noted by the Court.3

3

In the event Plaintiff elects to move to amend his complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, he should note that
once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no
longer performs any function in the case and cannot be utilized
to cure defects in the amended complaint, unless the relevant
portion is specifically incorporated in the new complaint. 6
Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d
ed. 1990) (footnotes omitted). An amended complaint may adopt
some or all of the allegations in the original complaint, but
the identification of the particular allegations to be adopted
must be clear and explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer
course is to file an amended complaint that is complete in
itself. Id.
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C. Motion for Law Library Time
Plaintiff asks this Court to order CCCF to allow him 10
hours per week in the law library to research and prepare
filings for this case. Motion for Library Time at 2-3. The
motion is denied at this point in time as Plaintiff has not
sufficiently alleged inadequate access to the court.
“Prisoners have a right of access to the courts, not to a
law library or to legal assistance.” Mitchell v. Wydra, 377 F.
App'x 143, 144 (3d Cir. 2010). “[P]rison law libraries and legal
assistance programs are not ends in themselves, but only the
means for ensuring a reasonably adequate opportunity to present
claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the
courts.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Here there is insufficient
information to conclude Plaintiff does not have adequate access
to the Court.
Although the jail must permit Plaintiff to have access to
research relevant to this civil rights proceeding, nothing in
the complaint or motion sufficiently alleges he has suffered an
injury. Plaintiff states only that he has “heard” that inmates
are restricted to researching their criminal cases. Motion for
Library Time at 2-3. He does not indicate from whom he heard
this, nor does he allege that he was personally prohibited from
using the library to prepare his civil rights complaint. Id. As
Plaintiff has successfully filed this complaint and it has
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survived screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, there is no basis for
the Court to conclude Plaintiff does not have adequate access to
legal materials. Any injury is purely speculative. If in the
course of these proceedings Plaintiff believes he is not being
afforded adequate access to the library, he may move for relief
at that time if he can demonstrate an actual injury.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the complaint shall proceed

on the due process claims against wardens Owens and Taylor. The
remainder of the claims are dismissed without prejudice. The
motion for library time is denied without prejudice. An
appropriate order follows.

March 23, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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