MARTZ v. CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS et al
Filing
75
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 12/31/2019. (rtm, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MICHAEL LEE MARTZ,
HONORABLE NOEL L. HILLMAN
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action
No. 17-cv-01336(NLH-AMD)
CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN
FREEHOLDERS, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Roshan D. Shah, Esquire
Scarinci & Hollenback, LLC
1100 Valley Brook Avenue
P.O. Box 790
Lyndhurst, NJ 07071-0790
Attorneys for Plaintiff Michael Lee Martz
Christopher A. Orlando, Esquire
Howard L. Goldberg, Esquire
County Counsel
520 Market Street
Camden, NJ 08102-1375
Counsel for Defendants Camden County Board of Chosen
Freeholders, Karen Taylor & David S. Owens, Jr.
HILLMAN, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for
summary judgment (“the Motion”) of defendants Camden County
Board of Chosen Freeholders, Karen Taylor, and David S. Owens,
Jr. (collectively, “Defendants”).
(DE 60 and DE 70.)
Counsel
for plaintiff Michael Lee Martz (“Plaintiff”) filed a response
in opposition to the Motion (DE 69), to which Defendants filed a
reply.
(DE 74.)
The Motion is being considered on the papers
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b).
For the reasons set forth
below, the Motion will be granted as to Counts I and II of the
Second Amended Complaint, and Count III shall be dismissed
without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
A.
PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff’s allegations arise from his confinement at
Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) between July 2015
and December 2015, and again in January-February 2016.
6.)
(DE 1 at
He alleges that he was subjected to overcrowded conditions
while detained at CCCF.
(Id. at 8.)
He claims that CCCF’s
overcrowding led to inferior sleeping conditions on a cement
floor (“Sleeping Allegation”), unsanitary toilet conditions
(“Toilet Allegation”), unsanitary food preparation (“Food
Preparation Allegation”), nutritionally deficient food (“Food
Quality Allegation”), and poor air ventilation and quality (“Air
Allegation”).
B.
(Id. at 2 and 8.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed this suit on February 27, 2017.
(“Complaint”).)
(DE 1
In a March 23, 2017 Opinion and Order, this
Court screened the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
2
proceeded Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment conditions of
confinement claims against Wardens Taylor and Owens, and
dismissed the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims in the Complaint.
(DE 3; DE 4.)
This Court appointed pro bono counsel for Plaintiff on
November 27, 2017.
(DE 19.)
On May 22, 2018, the Court granted
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend/correct the Complaint.
(DE 33; DE 35.)
Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”) on June 1, 2018, asserting claims for: (1) due process
violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, due to overcrowded conditions
of confinement at CCCF (“Due Process Claim”); and (2) violations
of New Jersey’s Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2, due
to overcrowded CCCF conditions (“NJCRA Claim”).
(DE 36 at 4-5.)
On February 6, 2019, Plaintiff obtained leave to file a
Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), which he did on February 16,
2019.
(DE 49; DE 50; DE 51.)
After re-asserting the Due
Process Claim and NJCRA Claim, the SAC added a claim under the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 10:5-1, et seq.
Plaintiff based that claim on Camden County’s
failure to accommodate his “extremely limited functionality of
his leg” while detained at CCCF (“NJLAD Claim”).
(DE 51 at 5-6
(“CCCF failed to provide Martz with any accommodation for his
disability and, instead, went out of its way to exacerbate it by
3
placing him in a cell with three or more persons, forcing him to
sleep on the floor with his disabled leg twisted in an unnatural
and uncomfortable position”).)
Defendants filed an Answer on March 26, 2019.
(DE 54.)
On January 30, 2019, Defendants deposed Plaintiff.
4 at 1-38 (“Plaintiff’s Deposition”).)
May 1, 2019.
(DE 60-
Fact discovery ended on
(DE 53.)
On August 5, 2019, Defendants moved for summary judgment.
(DE 60; DE 70.)
On September 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed a
response in opposition.
(DE 69 (“Response”).)
On November 13,
2019, Defendants filed a reply in further support of the Motion.
(DE 74 (“Reply”).)
DISCUSSION
Defendants’ Motion seeks summary judgment on three grounds:
(1) Plaintiff’s failure to adduce evidence from which a
reasonable fact finder could find unconstitutional conditions of
confinement at CCCF as to unsanitary toilet conditions, poor
ventilation, and food quality and preparation.
Defendants argue
that Plaintiff relies only on his own “conclusory assertions”
about unconstitutional conditions of confinement and fails to
provide evidence of deliberate indifference on the part of
Taylor and Owens (DE 60-2 at 20-23); (2) Taylor’s and Owens’s
entitlement to qualified immunity, based on Plaintiff’s failure
4
to “offer proofs or even allegations of personal involvement in
any constitutional deprivations allegedly suffered by Plaintiff”
(id. at 23); and (3) Plaintiff’s failure to offer any “evidence
of how CCCF failed to provide him with accommodations” under the
NJLAD or to provide “any evidence that CCCF went out of its way
to exacerbate his disability.”
(Id. at 25.)
Plaintiff’s Response argues that: he has a qualifying
“disability” under the NJLAD because of his degenerative knee
condition; and CCCF took “adverse action” against him on the
basis of that disability because it placed him in an overcrowded
cell in which he had to sleep on the floor.
(DE 69 at 7-11.)
Plaintiff’s Response also “concedes [that] his Fourteenth
Amendment claim cannot survive,” and he asks the Court to
“dismiss that claim with prejudice, including the NJCRA parallel
in Count II.”
(DE 69 at 12-13 (Plaintiff “ha[s] no objection to
the remaining counts [other than the NJLAD Claim] and defendants
being dismissed”).)
Defendants’ Reply asks this Court to decline supplemental
jurisdiction over the NJLAD Claim and seeks dismissal of the
NJLAD Claim with prejudice, in the event the Court exercises
supplemental jurisdiction.
(DE 74 at 5-9.)
This Court finds that, for reasons discussed in Part IV(B)
– IV(D) infra: (1) Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
5
on Counts I and II of the SAC by virtue of the lack of a genuine
dispute of material fact as to Plaintiff’s Due Process Claim and
NJCRA Claim; (2) given that summary judgment is proper, there
being no proof of a constitutional violation, the Court need not
address Defendants’ assertion of a qualified immunity defense;
and (3) the Court declines to continue supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s NJLAD Claim and will dismiss Count III of the
SAC without prejudice.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the materials of
record “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by
evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in
the nonmoving party's favor.
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A fact is “material” if, under the
governing substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect
the outcome of the suit.
Id.
In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material
fact, the court must view the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party by extending any reasonable favorable inference to
6
that party; in other words, “the nonmoving party's evidence ‘is
to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn
in [that party's] favor.’”
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552
(1999) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255).
The threshold
inquiry is whether there are “any genuine factual issues that
properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they
may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”
Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250; Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining
Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 329–30 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Initially, the moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[A] party seeking summary judgment
always bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact”) (citation omitted).
A
plaintiff opposing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment has
the burden of coming forward with evidence, not mere
allegations, that would raise a genuine dispute of material fact
and suffice to enable a reasonable jury, giving all favorable
inferences to the plaintiff as the party opposing summary
7
judgment, to find in plaintiff’s favor at trial.
Although entitled to the benefit of all justifiable
inferences from the evidence, “the nonmoving party may not, in
the face of a showing of a lack of a genuine issue, withstand
summary judgment by resting on mere allegations or denials in
the pleadings; rather, that party must set forth ‘specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,’ else summary
judgment, ‘if appropriate,’ will be entered.”
United States v.
Premises Known as 717 South Woodward Street, Allentown, Pa., 2
F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e))
(citations omitted).
Where, as in this case, the nonmoving
party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party
may be entitled to summary judgment by observing that there is
an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s case.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325; see
also Rahman v. Taylor, No. 10-0367, 2013 WL 1192352, at *2-3
(D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2013).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) “mandates the
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Rule 56(c)(1)(A) further provides that, to create a genuine
8
issue of material fact, the nonmovant must do so by:
citing to particular parts of materials in
the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations (including those made for
purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
A party opposing summary judgment
must do more than just rest upon mere allegations, general
denials, or vague statements.
Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d
228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).
B.
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
AS TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAIM, AND DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON COUNT I OF THE SAC
1.
The Record In This Case As To Conditions At CCCF
The evidentiary record here consists of Defendants’
exhibits to their Motion (DE 60-4 – 60-7 1), Plaintiff’s exhibits
to his Response (DE 69-3 at 3-133 2), and his Declaration in
1
Defendants’ Motion attached the following exhibits in support:
Plaintiff’s Deposition (DE 60-4) (Ex. A); July 2015 Cellmate
History report for Plaintiff (DE 60-5) (Ex. B); Sixth and Final
Consent Decree in Dittimus-Bey v. Taylor, No. 05-0063 (D.N.J.
2017) (DE 60-6) (Ex. C); and the May 23, 2017 Fairness Hearing
transcript in Dittimus-Bey v. Taylor, No. 05-0063 (D.N.J.) (DE
60-7) (Ex. D).
2
Plaintiff’s Opposition attached the following exhibits: CCCF
Remand Information Sheet for Plaintiff (DE 69-3 at 4) (Ex. A);
Plaintiff’s Deposition (DE 69-3 at 6-26) (Ex. B); June 3, 2009
Kennedy Health System medical records for Plaintiff (DE 69-3 at
28-30) (Ex. C); February 23, 2016 CCCF Intake Profile / Needs
Assessment for Plaintiff (DE 69-3 at 32) (Ex. D); July 16, 2015
CCCF request to CFG Health Systems, LLC for Plaintiff’s medical
9
opposition to the Motion. (DE 71-1.)
Defendants’ document production suggests that Plaintiff was
initially detained at CCCF in July 2015.
Plaintiff’s SAC alleges the same.
(DE 60-5 at 2.)
(DE 51 at 2.)
This fact
makes Plaintiff a member of the certified class in the matter of
Dittimus-Bey. 3
(See DE 60-6 at ¶10.)
In Dittimus-Bey, the
plaintiffs had alleged several conditions of unhealthy, unsafe,
and unsanitary environment as a direct result of severe
overcrowding and understaffing at CCCF.
(See DE 60-6 at ¶20.)
In this case, Defendants appear to acknowledge that Plaintiff
may have been housed in overcrowded conditions during his
detention at CCCF, but they argue “[t]hat fact alone is not
enough to establish conditions sufficiently serious to
constitute unconstitutional punishment.”
(DE 60-2 at 20.)
Construing this fact in favor of Plaintiff, the non-moving
records (DE 69-3 at 34) (Ex. E); August 14, 2015 CFG Health
Systems, LLC Release of Information Authorization form (DE 69-3
at 36) (Ex. F); July 2015 Cellmate History report for Plaintiff
(DE 69-3 at 38) (Ex. G); February 2016 Cellmate History report
for Plaintiff (DE 69-3 at 40) (Ex. H); July 22, 2015 Sick Call
Slip for Plaintiff (DE 69-3 at 42) (Ex. I); Transcript of May 3,
2019 deposition of Rebecca Franceschini (DE 69-3 at 44-97) (Ex.
J); Transcript of January 30, 2019 deposition of Warden Karen
Taylor (DE 69-3 at 99-115) (Ex. K); and CCCF Inmate Handbook (DE
69-3 at 117-133) (Ex. L).
3
The Dittimus-Bey class action was for injunctive relief only
and therefore does not bar Plaintiff’s claim for damages in this
matter.
10
party, the Court will presume that Plaintiff was housed in
overcrowded conditions at some point during the period of his
July 2015 – December 2015 and January-February 2016 CCCF
detentions.
2.
Governing Law As To Conditions Of Confinement
A pretrial detainee is protected from conditions
constituting punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.
(1971).
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment governs Plaintiff’s
Sleeping Allegation, Toilet Allegation, Food Preparation
Allegation, Food Quality Allegation, and Air Allegation as a
pre-trial detainee.
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a
cell with more persons than its intended design does not, on its
own, rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
See
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) (holding doublecelling by itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v.
Mulvihill, 488 F. App’x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere doublebunking does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one
man, one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment’”) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 542)).
More is
needed to demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a
pretrial detainee, “shock the conscience,” and thus violate due
11
process rights.
See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d
Cir. 2008) (noting that due process analysis requires courts to
consider whether the totality of the conditions “cause[s]
inmates to endure such genuine privations and hardship over an
extended period of time, that the adverse conditions become
excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them”).
3.
Plaintiff Has Not Shown Constitutional
Deprivation
Plaintiff concedes that there is no federal constitutional
claim in the SAC. (DE 69 at 12-13.)
Therefore, summary judgment
is granted to Defendants as to the Due Process Claim.
However, even without that concession, Plaintiff has not
adduced evidence to defeat the summary judgment standard of
review on the Due Process Claim.
With respect to Plaintiff’s Sleeping Allegation, discovery
demonstrated the following with respect to his CCCF cell
arrangements: (a) July 5 – July 9, 2015: Plaintiff was housed in
cell 77 with two other inmates (DE 60-5); (b) July 9, 2015 –
July 10, 2015: Plaintiff was housed with one other inmate in
special needs unit 2 South A block (id.; DE 60-4 at 14); (c)
July 10 -
August 7, 2015: Plaintiff was housed with two other
inmates in the cell (DE 60-5); (d) August 7 – October 21, 2015:
Plaintiff was housed with three other inmates in the cell (id.);
(e) October 22 – November 2, 2015: Plaintiff was housed with two
12
other inmates in the cell (id.); and (f) November 2 – December
7, 2015: Plaintiff was housed with three other inmates in the
cell. (Id.)
With respect to his Toilet Allegation, Plaintiff denied
seeking medical care due to the allegedly unsanitary toilet
conditions.
He testified at his deposition that “[i]t was just
a physical repulsion or psychological repulsion of ... somebody
peeing right next to you and you wake up to it.”
(DE 60-4 at
17.)
With respect to his Food Preparation Allegation, Plaintiff
testified at deposition that while at CCCF he had “seen a mouse
turd on my tray,” but he “had never worked in the kitchen. I’ve
heard word of mouth regarding what infestation [was] in the
kitchen facility there.”
(DE 60-4 at 18.)
He testified that he
saw the vermin residue on his food tray “only one time” during
“the first span of time that I was in the [CCCF] facility.”
(Ibid. (“It was within probably the first half of my five
months”).)
With respect to his Food Quality Allegation, Plaintiff’s
contention arises from his impression that CCCF food “portions
were very small ... just like a kid’s meal.”
(DE 60-4 at 18.)
Aside from allegedly small portion sizes, his Food Quality
Allegation arises from only two other issues: CCCF never posted
13
a menu guide for detainees; and CCCF stopped providing desserts
and overnight snack packs at some point during Plaintiff’s
detention at the facility.
times no dessert”).)
(Id. at 18 (“There were numerous
When asked whether he ever sought
treatment from CCCF’s medical unit for malnutrition or any foodrelated or lack-of-food illness, Plaintiff answered: “No, sir.”
(Id. at 18-19.)
With respect to his Air Allegation, Plaintiff’s contention
arises from both a smell that came from his cell’s vent as well
as the cell’s general odor.
(DE 60-4 at 17.)
He explained that
“guys didn’t want to sleep with their heads under the bunk ...
[T]he other choice would be by the door, which is the toilet.”
(Id.)
Therefore, “either I’d have to breathe that [vent] air or
the [air by] the urinary area ... [Y]our head would be by the
door next to the toilet.”
(Id.)
He stated that he “never
sought medical attention for my breathing, [and] I never got
short of breath, but the smell [was] repulsive, body odor and
stuff.”
(Id.)
Neither Plaintiff’s SAC (see DE 51) nor his discovery
responses (see DE 69-3 and DE 71-1) and summary judgment
submissions (see DE 69 and DE 74) on these five Allegations
state a claim of constitutional magnitude to defeat summary
judgment.
14
As to the Sleeping Allegation, “the Constitution does not
mandate comfortable prisons.”
Carson, 488 F. App’x at 560
(quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349).
Plaintiff has adduced no
evidence that the conditions he experienced while incarcerated
in a purportedly overcrowded cell were so severe that they
“shock the conscience.”
See Hubbard, 538 F.3d at 233.
Being a
detainee in an overcrowded unit does not, standing alone, rise
to the level of a due process violation.
“To the extent that
such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of
the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society.”
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendants’
failure to ensure he slept on a bottom bunk shocks the
conscience.
The record shows that CCCF made cell assignment
determinations based on a variety of considerations, including
the “safety [and] security] of the inmate[,] their custody
level, their charges, their disciplinary. Many factors.”
69-3 at 78.)
(DE
“[T]he [detention facility] must be able to take
steps to maintain security and order at the institution ...
Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution’s
interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more,
constitute unconstitutional punishment.”
Bell, 441 U.S. at 540.
See also Marnin v. Pinto, 463 F.2d 583, 584 (3d Cir. 1972)
15
(“blanket statements alleging bad food and miserable living
conditions in the prison” were “naked statements [that do not]
ordinarily merit Federal court intervention”); Stewart v.
Wright, No. 96-1486, 1996 WL 665978, at *1 (7th Cir. Nov. 14,
1996) (“[I]t is well settled that conditions which are temporary
and do not result in physical harm are not [constitutionally]
actionable”); Holloway v. Gunnell, 685 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir.
1982) (“[A] sentence in prison is not a guarantee that one will
be safe from life's occasional inconveniences”).
As to the Toilet Allegation, Plaintiff has neither
suggested nor shown that he was “forced to live in squalor” by
virtue of sleeping proximity to toilet facilities.
v. Guyton, 663 F. App’x 203, 205 (3d Cir. 2016).
See Ridgeway
In fact,
Plaintiff expressly disclaimed any health concerns or health
problems arising from the toilet situation.
His Toilet
Allegation, therefore, falls far short of those that courts have
held satisfy the requirement of an “objectively, sufficiently
serious” injury.
See ibid.
Although this Court “do[es] not
doubt that the problem with the toilet was unpleasant, we must
conclude, under the totality of the circumstances, that
[Plaintiff’s Toilet Allegation] fail[s] to allege the
objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’ conditions of confinement
necessary for a viable claim.”
See id. at 205-06.
16
As to the Food Preparation Allegation, “isolated instances
of contaminated or spoiled food, while certainly unpleasant, are
not unconstitutional.”
720 (D.N.J. 2013).
Duran v. Merline, 923 F. Supp. 2d 702,
While unsanitary living conditions may give
rise to a conditions of confinement claim, Plaintiff here has
shown nothing but his displeasure with less than perfect jail
conditions.
Plaintiff has not shown -- in fact, he denies --
that the supposed rodent condition potentially jeopardized his
health or caused any injuries.
He has not demonstrated that the
supposed kitchen conditions were imposed as “punishment.”
See
Duran, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 720; Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150,
158 (3d Cir. 2005).
Moreover, courts have, in fact, “routinely recognized that
‘[k]eeping vermin under control in jails, prisons and other
large institutions is a monumental task, and that failure to do
so, without any suggestion that it reflects deliberate and
reckless conduct in the criminal law sense, is not a
constitutional violation.”
See, e.g., Holloway v. Cappelli, No.
13-3378, 2014 WL 2861210, at *5 (D.N.J. June 24, 2014) (citing
Chavis v. Fairman, 51 F.3d 275, *4 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal
citations omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff has not shown that any
Defendants either ignored the alleged vermin at CCCF or denied
Plaintiff medical treatment for any health injuries arising from
17
the supposed rodents.
As such, Plaintiff’s displeasure with the
situation is not actionable. See ibid.
As to the Food Quality Allegation, “[s]o long as the
[prison] food is nutritionally adequate, the mere fact that it
is unvaried or cold does not give rise to a constitutional
violation.”
Duran, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 720 (citing Nickles v.
Taylor, Nos. 09-313, 09-557, 09-952, 2010 WL 1949447, at *5
(D.N.J. May 14, 2010) (“A single or occasional incident
involving spoiled food is insufficient to show that Plaintiff
has been denied life's necessities”).
Occasional incidents
during incarceration involving inferior food (or meals that
Plaintiff did not otherwise enjoy or find sufficient 4) are
insufficient to show that Plaintiff has been denied life's
necessities.
As to the Air Allegation, the Constitution affords a right
to adequate ventilation.
See Wilson v. Cook Cty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 878 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
Inadequate
ventilation and air flow are unconstitutional if they “undermine
4
See DE 69-3 at 104 (Warden Taylor testified at deposition,
inter alia: that inmates complained “that they don’t like the
food, but [not about] the quality”; that she never received a
complaint about rodent droppings in food; that CCCF contacted a
pest control company when the facility received inmate
complaints about vermin in the kitchen; and inmate complaints
about seeing kitchen rodents ceased after CCCF used a pest
control company to eradicate the vermin).
18
the health of inmates and the sanitation of the penitentiary.’
Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 784 (9th Cir. 1985).”
Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996).
Here,
Plaintiff has not shown that the vent and cell odors were
sufficiently serious.
See Gause, 339 F. App’x at 134.
While
ventilation at CCCF may have been unpleasant, Plaintiff has not
made any showing that it was unconstitutional.
After careful review of the record and the parties’
submissions on the Motion, and viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, this Court finds that entry of
summary judgment on the Due Process Claim is appropriate.
The
evidence of record does not raise a question of material fact as
to Count I’s merits that cannot be resolved upon summary
judgment.
Even affording Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, he
has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
confinement at CCCF deprived him of any basic human needs.
For
all of these reasons, Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s Due Process Claim.
C.
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL
FACT AS TO THE NJCRA CLAIM, AND DEFENDANTS ARE
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON COUNT II
Summary judgment is granted to Defendants as to the NJCRA
Claim, given Plaintiff’s concession that there is no federal
constitutional claim in the SAC.
19
(DE 69 at 12-13.)
However, even without that concession, Plaintiff has not
adduced evidence to defeat the summary judgment standard of
review.
1.
Governing Law As To NJCRA Claim
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2 states, in pertinent part:
Any person who has been deprived of any
substantive due process or equal protection
rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or any substantive rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or laws of this State, or whose
exercise or enjoyment of those substantive
rights, privileges, or immunities has been
interfered with or attempted to be
interfered with, by threats, intimidation or
coercion by a person acting under color of
law, may bring a civil action for damages
and for injunctive or other appropriate
relief.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2(c).
“The NJCRA allows a party who has
been deprived of any substantive due process, equal protection
rights, privileges or immunities secured under either the
Federal or State Constitutions to bring a civil action for
damages and injunctive relief.”
McPeek v. Deputy Atty. Gen. of
State, No. A–2181–07T3, 2008 WL 5273081, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Dec. 22, 2008) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6–1, –
2(c)).
The NJCRA was modeled after the federal civil rights act,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, to provide a state remedy for civil rights
20
violations.
Slinger v. New Jersey, No. 07-5561, 2008 WL
4126181, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2008).
“The substantive
language of the N.J.C.R.A. closely mirrors the language of 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
The purpose of the N.J.C.R.A. is virtually
identical to the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and both protect
against the same set of harms.”
Duncan v. Pocquat, No. 07-1570,
2009 WL 10728565, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 2009).
For this
reason, “courts in New Jersey have consistently looked at claims
under the NJCRA through the lens of § 1983” and “have repeatedly
construed the NJCRA in terms nearly identical to its federal
counterpart.”
Velez v. Fuentes, No. CV156939MASLHG, 2016 WL
4107689, at *5 (D.N.J. July 29, 2016) (citing Samoles v. Lacey
Twp., No. 12–3066, 2014 WL 2602251, at *15 (D.N.J. June 11,
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
“This district has
repeatedly interpreted NJCRA analogously to § 1983.” Pettit v.
New Jersey, No. 09-3735, 2011 WL 1325614, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 30,
2011). 5
5
See also Estate of Martin v. U.S. Marshals Serv. Agents, 649 F.
App’x 239, 245 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that “it appears
undisputed that Plaintiffs’ claims under the New Jersey
Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act trigger the
same legal elements and principles as ... [the] federal causes
of action [under Section 1983]”); Trafton, 799 F. Supp. 2d 444
(a court “will analyze ... NJCRA claims through the lens of §
1983”); Armstrong v. Sherman, No. 09-716, 2010 WL 2483911, at *5
(D.N.J. June 4, 2010).
21
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.”
Velez,
2016 WL 4107689, at *2 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988) (emphasis added)).
2.
The NJCRA Claim Fails As A Matter Of Law
For the reasons explained supra in Section IV(B) of this
Opinion, Plaintiff has not raised a genuine dispute of material
fact as to purported violation of his constitutional rights
arising from overcrowded confinement at CCCF.
He therefore has
not stated a claim under § 1983. See Velez, 2016 WL 4107689, at
*2.
law.
Accordingly, his NJCRA Claim similarly fails as a matter of
See Slinger, 2008 WL 4126181, at *7; Duncan, 2009 WL
10728565, at *2; Velez, 2016 WL 4107689, at *5; Pettit, 2011 WL
1325614, at *3; Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d
417, 444 (D.N.J. 2011).
For all of these reasons, Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on Count II of the SAC.
D. This Court Declines To Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction
As To The NJLAD Claim
While conceding that his Due Process Claim and NJCRA Claim
“cannot survive” (DE 69 at 12), Plaintiff maintains that
22
Defendants’ Motion should be denied as to the NJLAD Claim. 6 (Id.
at 13.)
This Court need not and does not reach the merits of
the Motion as to the NJLAD Claim because the Court declines to
continue supplemental jurisdiction over Count III of the SAC.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “in any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.”
A district court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if:
6
The NJLAD provides in relevant part that “[a]ll persons shall
have the opportunity ... to obtain all the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public
accommodation ... without discrimination because of ...
disability.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5–4. The courts of this
district have regularly held that correctional facilities are
places of public accommodation within the meaning of the NJLAD.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Cnty. of Salem, No. 09–4718, 2010 WL
3081070, *11 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2010) (collecting cases); see also
Chisolm v. McManimon, 97 F. Supp. 2d 615, 621–22 (D.N.J. 2000),
rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 275 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2001)
(predicting that the New Jersey Supreme Court would find that
jails and prisons are “places of public accommodation”). “New
Jersey courts generally interpret the [NJ]LAD by reliance upon
[the construction of] analogous federal antidiscrimination
statutes.” Chisolm, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 621. To prevail, a
plaintiff must establish that he “(1) has a disability, (2) is a
qualified individual, and (3) has suffered an adverse action
because of that disability.” D.G. v. Somerset Hills Sch. Dist.,
559 F. Supp. 2d 484, 503 (D.N.J. 2008)).
23
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2)
the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims
over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances,
there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
The law on supplemental jurisdiction has been long
established:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of
judicial power ... [is a] power [that does
not] need not be exercised in every case in
which it is found to exist. It has
consistently been recognized that pendent
jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion,
not of plaintiff's right. Its justification
lies in considerations of judicial economy,
convenience and fairness to litigants; if
these are not present a federal court should
hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state
claims, even though bound to apply state law
to them. Needless decisions of state law
should be avoided both as a matter of comity
and to promote justice between the parties,
by procuring for them a surer-footed reading
of applicable law. Certainly, if the
federal claims are dismissed before trial,
even though not insubstantial in a
jurisdictional sense, the state claims
should be dismissed as well. Similarly, if
it appears that the state issues
substantially predominate, whether in terms
of proof, of the scope of the issues raised,
or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy
sought, the state claims may be dismissed
without prejudice and left for resolution to
state tribunals.
24
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726–27
(1966).
Ultimately, a “district court’s decision whether to
exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing every
claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely
discretionary.”
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S.
635, 639 (2009) (citing Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522
U.S. 156, 173 (1997)) (“Depending on a host of factors, then —
including the circumstances of the particular case, the nature
of the state law claims, the character of the governing state
law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims —
district courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over
supplemental state law claims.”)).
In this case, three factors compel the Court to decline to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NJLAD
Claim:
(1)
The only remaining claims in Plaintiff’s SAC are for
violations of the NJLAD, which the New Jersey Legislature
enacted in an effort to “eradicat[e] ... the cancer of
discrimination.’”
Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445,
451 (N.J. 1993).
See also Thurston v. Cherry Hill Triplex, 941
F. Supp. 2d 520, 534 (D.N.J
2008) (“The NJLAD was enacted with
the express purpose of protecting civil rights ...”);
25
Tomahawk Lake Resort, 754 A.2d 1237, 1243 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2000) (“Among its other objectives, the [NJ]LAD is intended
to insure that handicapped persons will have full and equal
access to society, limited only by physical limitations they
cannot overcome”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Even though this Court is “bound to apply state law” to
plaintiffs’ NJLAD claims, the Supreme Court in Gibbs directed 50
years ago that “needless decisions of state law should be
avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice
between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed
reading of applicable law.”
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726–27.
Applying that principle in this case, the determinations of
the scope of NJLAD and what conduct constitutes a violation of
NJLAD are better suited to be adjudicated by the New Jersey
courts.
See, e.g., Collins v. Cty. of Gloucester, No. 06-2589,
2009 WL 2168704, at *2 (D.N.J. July 17, 2009) (after the federal
claims were dismissed, declining to continue exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims, and
observing “a state court, who by virtue of that judge’s
expertise and principles of comity is in a better position to
decide the questions of state law raised by” the plaintiff's
claims); Kalick v. Northwest Airlines Corp., No. 08-2972, 2009
WL 2448522, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2009) (following the reasoning
26
of Collins, 2009 WL 2168704, and declining to continue
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state
law claims); Carluccio v. Parsons Inspection & Maint. Corp., No.
06-4354, 2007 WL 1231758, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2007)
(declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act
claim and not considering its merits); see also Trump Hotels &
Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 487
(3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he question of whether the proposed funding
scheme for the Westside Connector violates the New Jersey
Constitution is a complex issue of state law which is better
left to the New Jersey courts to determine”) (citing Doe v.
Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction, in part, “out of respect for
the right of a state court system to construe that state’s own
constitution”)).
(2)
Even though discovery in this case has concluded and
the dispositive motion deadline has passed (DE 48; DE 53), the
action is still currently “before trial.” See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at
726 (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before
trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense,
the state claims should be dismissed as well”).
27
(3)
Claim.
Defendants have demanded a jury trial as to the NJLAD
(See DE 54 at 7.)
Plaintiff also prefers to have a New
Jersey state court hear his case.
(See DE 1 at 9.)
Those
considerations, along with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) and United States
Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent, all support the
conclusion that this Court should decline to continue exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over this matter.
An appropriate order will be entered dismissing Count III
of the SAC without prejudice.
Plaintiff may, if he chooses, try
to pursue his NJLAD Claim in state court.
See Artis v. Dist. of
Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018) (the federal supplemental
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, pauses the clock on a
statute of limitations until thirty days after a state-law claim
is dismissed by a federal court).
E. WHETHER CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS MUST BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE THEY ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In addition to the grounds discussed in Sections IV(B) and
IV(C) of this Opinion, Defendants also request that this Court
grant summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
(DE
60-2 at 23.)
Qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability as long as their conduct “‘does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’”
28
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d
248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010).
The qualified immunity test is two-
pronged: whether the pleadings allege that constitutional
violation occurred, and whether “reasonable officials could
fairly have known that their alleged conduct was illegal.”
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 (2001); Larsen v. Senate of
the Commonwealth of Pa., 154 F.3d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1998).
Given that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a basis for a
constitutional violation, there is no need to address whether a
reasonable official would know his conduct was unlawful.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above; the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment will be granted as to the Due Process Clam and
the NJCRA Claim in Counts I and II of the SAC; and the Court
will decline to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the NJLAD Claim.
An accompanying Order will be entered.
December 31, 2019
Date
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN
U.S. District Judge
At Camden, New Jersey
29
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