THOMPSON v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP et al
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER denying 18 Motion for Disbursement of Funds. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 11/5/2018. (tf, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
WILLEMARA THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
1:17-cv-01692-NLH-AMD
MEMORANDUM
OPINION & ORDER
WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP,
WAL-MART STORES EAST, INC.,
and WAL-MART STORES, INC.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
MARC I. SIMON
SIMON & SIMON PC
8408 ATLANTIC AVENUE
MARGATE, NJ 08402
On behalf of Plaintiff
PATRICK J. MCDONNELL
TAISHA KRISTINA TOLLIVER
MCDONNELL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
METROPOLITAN BUSINESS CENTER
860 FIRST AVENUE
SUITE 5B
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406
On behalf of Defendants
HILLMAN, District Judge
WHEREAS, pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s counsel’s
“Motion for Disbursement of Funds”; and
WHEREAS, Plaintiff’s counsel represents that on May 15,
2018, Plaintiff agreed to settle her case, but despite numerous
attempts to distribute the settlement check pursuant to their
fee agreement, his client refuses to sign off on how the funds
will be distributed; and
WHEREAS, Plaintiff’s counsel asks the Court to order the
distribution of funds as provided for in the parties’ agreement;
and
WHEREAS, on March 27, 2018, the magistrate judge entered an
Order administratively terminating the action, and directing
that within 60 days the parties file all papers necessary to
dismiss the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 or,
if settlement could not be consummated, request that the action
be reopened (Docket No. 16); and
WHEREAS, the magistrate judge’s Order further provided that
absent receipt from the parties of dismissal papers or a request
to reopen the action within the 60-day period, the Court would
dismiss the action, without further notice, with prejudice and
without costs (id.); and
WHEREAS, because the parties did not file dismissal papers
or request to reopen the action within the 60-day period, on May
30, 2018, this Court entered an Order of Dismissal (Docket No.
17), which ordered the matter dismissed with prejudice, without
costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2); and
WHEREAS, Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion was filed on August
23, 2018, which was almost three months after the Court
2
dismissed the action with prejudice; and
WHEREAS, when the action was closed, the Court did not
retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement
agreement or to hear any other requests relating to the matter,
see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S.
375, 378 (1994) (finding as a general rule that a federal
district court does not retain jurisdiction to enforce a
settlement agreement unless the court, typically as part of its
order of dismissal, orders the parties to comply with the terms
of the settlement agreement or incorporates terms of a
settlement agreement explicitly retaining jurisdiction into one
of its orders); Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 141-42
(3d Cir. 1993) (holding that “unless a settlement is part of the
record, incorporated into an order of the district court, or the
district court has manifested an intent to retain jurisdiction,
it has no power beyond the Rules of Civil Procedure to exercise
jurisdiction over a petition to enforce a settlement”);
Washington Hospital v. White, 889 F.2d 1294, 1298-99 (3d Cir.
1989) (stating “a district court does not have continuing
jurisdiction over disputes about its orders merely because it
had jurisdiction over the original dispute”); and
WHEREAS, the Court therefore does not have subject matter
3
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion; 1
Accordingly,
IT IS on this
5th
day of
November , 2018
ORDERED that the “First MOTION for Disbursement of Funds”
[18] be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 2
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
At Camden, New Jersey
1
The Court questions whether Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion
would be properly before this Court even if it had been filed
while the Court still maintained subject matter jurisdiction
over the action. Plaintiff’s counsel’s dispute with his client
over their fee agreement appears to be a separate and
independent claim between them, which is unrelated to the
subject matter of Plaintiff’s tort claim against Defendant. See
A.W. by B.W. v. Mount Holly Township Board of Education, 180
A.3d 343, 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018) (explaining that
attorney-client fee disputes are characterized as actions for
breach of contract which can be brought in court, but in 1978,
the N.J. Supreme Court adopted Rule 1:20A establishing Fee
Arbitration Committees to afford a “swift, fair and inexpensive
method of resolving fee disputes between attorneys and their
clients through compulsory arbitration” when a client requests
it (citations omitted)). Regardless of the nature of
Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion, however, it is clearly filed after
this Court’s subject matter had been extinguished.
2
The Court properly exercises jurisdiction to determine the
scope of its subject matter jurisdiction. Employers Ins. of
Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 905 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir.
1990).
4
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