IVANOVS et al v. BAYADA HOME HEALTH CARE, INC.
Filing
353
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 8/17/2023. (dmr)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SONYA IVANOVS and KATIE
HOFFMAN, ON BEHALF OF
THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHER
SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES,
1:17-cv-01742-NLH-AMD
OPINION
Plaintiffs,
v.
BAYADA HOME HEALTH CARE,
INC.,
Defendant.
Appearances:
MICHAEL JOHN PALITZ
SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
800 3RD AVE.
SUITE 2800
New York, N.Y. 10022
On behalf of Plaintiffs
MICHAEL D. HOMANS
HOMANS PECK, LLC
1500 JOHN F. KENNEDY BLVD.
STE. 520
PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19102
On behalf of Defendant
HILLMAN, District Judge
Pending before the Court is Defendant BAYADA Home Health
Care, Inc.’s (“BAYADA”) motion to certify a question for
interlocutory appeal.
(ECF 342).
below, the motion will be denied.
For the reasons expressed
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I. Background
Plaintiff Katie Hoffman 1 brought this action on behalf of
herself and a collective of BAYADA client services managers
(“CSMs”) claiming that BAYADA has unlawfully misclassified CSMs
as exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., despite CSMs’
performance of predominantly non-exempt duties, (ECF 1 at ¶¶ 24, 11).
A jury trial was conducted from January 19, 2023 to
February 6, 2023, which the Court bifurcated between liability
and damages, with the liability phase further split first with
four interrogatories focused on liability as to seven Testifying
Plaintiffs and then, depending on the jury’s response, an
additional instruction and two additional interrogatories
related to whether the Testifying Plaintiffs adequately
represented the remainder of the collective.
The jury never reached the latter two interrogatories
focused on representativeness, concluding that Ivanovs failed to
demonstrate that she worked more than forty hours in any given
week during the applicable period but failing to reach a verdict
Sonya Ivanovs was the second named Plaintiff in this action.
(ECF 1 at ¶¶ 12-14). Following trial, a jury concluded that
Ivanovs failed to meet her threshold burden of showing that she
worked more than forty hours in any given week, (ECF 311), and
judgement was entered against her, (ECF 327). Ivanovs filed a
notice of appeal, (ECF 335), which was dismissed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b), (ECF 338).
1
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as to the remaining liability interrogatories centered on FLSA
exemptions.
(ECF 311).
The Court declared a mistrial, (Trial
Tr. 1890:3-6), and provided the parties twenty-eight days to
renew motions for judgment as a matter of law, which had
originally been submitted prior to jury deliberation, (ECF 302).
BAYADA renewed its motions, arguing in favor of the
applicability of the fluctuating workweek method of damages
calculation and that Testifying Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
that they represented the remainder of the collective.
328; ECF 329).
(ECF
The Court denied both motions in a May 25, 2023
opinion and order, (ECF 339; ECF 340), and a new trial is
presently scheduled to begin on October 16, 2023, (ECF 349).
BAYADA filed the pending motion on June 5, 2023, (ECF 342),
seeking to certify the following question for appeal:
Whether – despite the absence of any statistical,
scientific or other reliable evidence of a valid,
representative sample – the trial testimony of a
small, hand-picked subset of Plaintiffs about their
individual day-to-day work experiences in disparate
offices may, under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
Due Process Clause, be deemed “representative” of and
extrapolated to a national collective class of workers
in other offices to justify denial of a Defendant’s
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law?
(ECF 342-1 at 1).
Plaintiffs filed an opposition, (ECF 347), to which BAYADA
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replied, (ECF 350).
II. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
The Court exercises original jurisdiction over this action
as Plaintiffs’ claims are based on alleged violations of the
FLSA, a federal statute.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
B. Certification for Interlocutory Appeal
When a district judge enters an otherwise unappealable
order and is of the opinion that the order involves a
controlling question of law for which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal “may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,”
they may state so in an order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Therefore,
a party may pursue an interlocutory appeal “only when (1) the
order involves a controlling question of law, (2) as to which
there is a substantial ground for a difference of opinion, and
(3) the final resolution of the appeal has the potential to
materially advance the determination of the litigation.”
Juice
Ent., LLC v. Live Nation Ent., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 309, 311
(D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2018) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Tristani
ex rel. Karnes v. Richman, 652 F.3d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 2011)).
All three requirements must be met before an issue may be
certified for appeal, Weske v. Samsung Elecs., Am., Inc., 934 F.
Supp. 2d 698, 709 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013) (citing In re Schering–
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Plough Corp., No. 8–397, 2010 WL 2546054, at *4 (D.N.J. June 21,
2010)), and the movant bears the burden on demonstrating that
each prong of the analysis is met, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham
Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 633 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2014).
Deferral of appellate review until entry of final judgment
“is a basic tenet of federal law,” Juice Ent., LLC, 353 F. Supp.
3d at 311-12 (quoting Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 101 F.3d
863, 865 (2d Cir. 1996)), and certification therefore “should
only rarely be allowed as it deviates from the strong policy
against piecemeal litigation,” Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F.
Supp. 3d at 633 (quoting Huber v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., No.
07–2400, 2009 WL 2998160, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2009)).
A
court’s certification decision is “wholly discretionary,” and a
court may deny certification even when each of the three prongs
is met.
See Juice Ent., LLC, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 312 (quoting P.
Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d
355, 358 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2001)); Weske, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 709
(same); see also United States v. Riddick, 669 F. App’x 613, 613
n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d
1203, 1208 (3d Cir. 1979), and finding that an order denying a
request to certify questions for appeal was unreviewable).
III. Analysis
The Court concludes here that BAYADA has not met its burden
in satisfying all three requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
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Each prong of the analysis is addressed in turn.
A. Controlling Question of Law
A “controlling question” refers to one that is “serious to
the conduct of the litigation, either practically or legally”
and “must encompass at the very least every order which, if
erroneous, would be reversible error on final appeal.”
Juice
Ent., LLC, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 312 (quoting Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir. 1974)); Durr Mech. Constr.,
Inc. v. PSEG Fossil, LLC, No. 18-10675, 2021 WL 1040510, at *2
(D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2021) (same).
BAYADA contends that Plaintiffs presented no statistical,
expert, or other evidence as to the non-testifying members of
the collective at trial and that to permit the collective to
continue would essentially constitute the Court ruling that
there is no burden-of-proof standard for representative FLSA
cases and representative plaintiffs can be selected to prove a
case for an entire collective without any identified basis or
rationale.
(ECF 342-1 at 8-9).
The Court generally disagrees
with BAYADA’s characterizations but concurs to the extent that
BAYADA asserts that the Court’s ruling as to the sufficiency of
evidence required to sustain a collective action – if incorrect
– would be reversible on appeal.
(Id. at 9).
However, the Court’s agreement on that score should not
obscure the true nature of BAYADA’s reference to a lack of “any
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statistical, scientific or other reliable evidence of a valid,
representative sample.” (Id. at 1).
At its core, BAYADA’s
argument necessarily begs the question “what evidence was
presented at trial?”
But mixed questions of law and fact are
generally inappropriate for interlocutory appellate review, see
In re Schering-Plough Corp., 2010 WL 2546054, at *4, and the
proposed question – at least facially – concerns the sufficiency
of evidence, see Roberts v. Cnty. of Essex, No. 15-7061, 2023 WL
2966771, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2023) (finding that an argument
pertained to the sufficiency of evidence, which was “very far
from being purely legal, and an interlocutory appeal [wa]s not a
prudent exercise of discretion”); Krishanthi v. Rajaratnam, No.
09–CV–05395, 2011 WL 1885707, at *3 (D.N.J. May 18, 2011)
(“Here, Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the facts
alleged, and the application of the legal standard to the facts
at issue; thus, Defendants’ argument by necessity involves an
interplay of facts and law, and such matters are within the
discretion of this Court.”).
Having presented a question of
mixed law and fact centering on the sufficiency of evidence,
Defendant has failed to meet the first prong of the test for
interlocutory appeal.
B. Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion
The Court further concludes that even if it could be fairly
said that BAYADA presents an argument a step beyond mere
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sufficiency of evidence and toward the mechanics of FLSA
collective actions, it still fails the second prong of the
analysis.
In assessing the second prong, the Court looks to
whether a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists as
to the Court’s order – in other words whether “there is a
genuine doubt or conflicting precedent as to the correct legal
standard.”
See Juice Ent., LLC, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 313 (quoting
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism v. City of Long Branch, No. CV
00-3366, 2012 WL 13034284, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 27, 2012)).
A
party’s disagreement with a court’s application of the relevant
legal standard does not suffice.
See Interfaith Cmty. Org. Inc.
v. PPG Indus., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 295, 319 (D.N.J. Mar. 26,
2010).
Here, BAYADA reviews the guidance provided in Fischer v.
Federal Express Corp., 42 F.4th 366 (3d Cir. 2022), concerning
the differences between collective and class actions – which the
Court relied on in part in crafting trial procedure; argues in
favor of a required “statistical sampling or some other form of
reliable evidence to connect the experiences of the testifying
Plaintiffs to those of the remaining class members”; asserts
that the Court’s decision not to dismiss non-testifying members
of the collective is contrary to the guidance of Fischer; and
seeks to distinguish Stillman v. Staples, Inc., No. 07–849, 2009
WL 1437817 (D.N.J. May 15, 2009), cited by the Court in its May
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25, 2023 opinion.
(ECF 342-1 at 10-14).
BAYADA’s arguments
echo those made in its underlying motions for judgment as a
matter of law and the Court agrees with Plaintiffs, (ECF 347 at
10-12), that BAYADA essentially disagrees with the Court’s
application of relevant authorities.
BAYADA’s citation to out-of-circuit decisions, (ECF 342-1
at 14-15), and general statements as to the rarity of
collective-action trials and the benefits of appellate guidance,
(id. at 2, 2 n.1), do not compel a different result.
The cited
decisions are not binding on this Court for the purpose of the
present analysis.
See Ebert v. Twp. of Hamilton, No. 15-7331,
2020 WL 948774, at * 3 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2020); see also Cosimano
v. Twp. of Union, No. 10-5710, 2017 WL 4790381, at *2 (D.N.J.
Oct. 23, 2017) (“[T]he substantial ground for difference of
opinion must be within the Third Circuit.”).
Further, while a
novel or complex issue may warrant an interlocutory order, see
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d at 634-35, an issue’s
general rarity or lack of appellate guidance do not require one,
see Smith v. Conseco Life Ins. Co., No. 2:13–cv–5253, 2014 WL
5361746, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2014).
“The lack of definitive
guidance from the Third Circuit . . . may create room for
speculation on how they might resolve the matter, but absent any
authority to suggest that the Court erred here, the speculation
does not rise to a substantial ground for a difference of
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opinion.”
Id.
The Court thus does not find that BAYADA has met
its burden as to the second prong of the analysis.
C. Material Advancement of the Determination of Litigation
Even if the Court was to conclude that a substantial ground
for difference of opinion existed, it finds that BAYADA’s motion
would fail on the third prong of the analysis – material
advancement of the ultimate determination of the litigation.
“[C]ertification ‘materially advances the ultimate termination
of the litigation where the interlocutory appeal eliminates: (1)
the need for trial; (2) complex issues that would complicate
trial; or (3) issues that would make discovery more costly or
burdensome.’”
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d at 635
(quoting Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. Peterson’s Nelnet, LLC,
No. 11–0011, 2013 WL 663301, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2013)).
Certification is more likely to materially advance the
litigation early in the case as opposed to later when discovery
may be complete and a trial date may be set.
See id.
BAYADA asserts that certification here would potentially
terminate the claims of non-testifying members of the collective
or, with a decision in Plaintiffs’ favor, simplify the issues to
be decided at retrial.
(ECF 342-1 at 15-16).
The Court is not
so convinced.
The decision in Ruffin v. Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC, No.
11–01069, 2014 WL 4610421 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2014), is persuasive
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here.
The defendants in Ruffin sought an interlocutory appeal
following denial of their motion to decertify a FLSA collective
action.
2014 WL 4610421, at *1.
The motion for certification
was denied, with the court concluding that interlocutory appeal
would not materially advance the litigation due in part to the
fact that individual members of the collective would have been
free to individually refile their claims and the ease and cost
of discovery would have been the same, if not greater, if the
collective was decertified on appeal.
Id. at *3.
The Ruffin court’s reasoning arguably holds truer here as
the parties have proceeded well past the certification stage and
on to trial.
See Prystowsky v. TGC Stores, Inc., No. 07–0072,
2011 WL 3516174, at *6 n.7 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2011) (“Delay can be
a strong ground for denying appeal if the certification is
sought from a court’s ruling made after discovery and shortly
before the matter is ready for trial.” (citing Hulmes v. Honda
Motor Co., Ltd., 936 F. Supp. 195, 212 (D.N.J. July 22, 1996)
and Kapossy v. McGraw–Hill, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (D.N.J.
Oct. 4, 1996)).
Retrial – scheduled to take place in two months
– will be necessary no matter the result of an interlocutory
appeal.
BAYADA claims that appellate review would simplify the
issues to be retried, but the Court’s experiences from the
initial trial compel it to find otherwise.
BAYADA’s contention is that Plaintiffs presented
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insufficient evidence concerning non-testifying collective
members.
With discovery complete, an appellate finding for
BAYADA would potentially result in it not calling non-testifying
members as part of its case at retrial and remove an instruction
and two interrogatories from the jury.
But that result does not
simplify the overall course of litigation or end the prospect of
future litigation for those parties.
Non-testifying members,
though dismissed from this action, would presumably seek
recourse in future separate actions.
Therefore, the Court
concludes that whatever benefits immediate review may offer,
they do not outweigh the delay caused by certifying a question
for appellate review just months prior to trial.
See
Prystowsky, 2011 WL 3516174, at *6 n.7; see also Y.W. v.
Roberts, No. 2:14-01642, 2018 WL 5784995, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 5,
2018) (concluding that a proposed question, if certified, would
not materially advance the ultimate determination of litigation
“since trial would still be required to resolve . . . factual
issues”).
BAYADA’s motion will therefore be denied.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, BAYADA’s motion to certify a
question for interlocutory appeal, (ECF 342), will be denied.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Date: August 17, 2023
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
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