ADAMS v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Filing
3
OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 5/31/17. (jbk, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LAMEEN S. ADAMS,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,
Civil Action
No. 17-cv-01793 (JBS-AMD)
OPINION
Defendant.
APPEARANCES
Lameen S. Adams, Plaintiff Pro Se
10 Washington Avenue
PO Box 951
Chesilhurst, NJ 08089
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
1.
Plaintiff Lameen S. Adams seeks to bring a civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden
County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket
Entry 1.
2.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review
complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (1)
dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against
CCJ; and (2) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure
to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
Claims Against CCCF: Dismissed With Prejudice
4.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 19831 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) a person deprived him of a federal
right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted
under color of state or territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
5.
Generally, for purposes of actions under § 1983,
“[t]he term ‘persons’ includes local and state officers acting
under color of state law.” Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99
1
Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).2 To
say that a person was “acting under color of state law” means
that the defendant in a § 1983 action “exercised power [that the
defendant] possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation
omitted). Generally, then, “a public employee acts under color
of state law while acting in his official capacity or while
exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id.
at 50.
6.
Because the Complaint has not sufficiently alleged
that a “person” deprived Plaintiff of a federal right, the
Complaint does not meet the standards necessary to set forth a
prima facie case under § 1983. In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages from CCCF for allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. The CCCF, however, is not a “person”
within the meaning of § 1983; therefore, the claims against it
must be dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660
F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v.
2
“Person” is not strictly limited to individuals who are state
and local government employees, however. For example,
municipalities and other local government units, such as
counties, also are considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983.
See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
690-91 (1978).
3
Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern
State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989)
(correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983). Given
that the claims against the CCCF must be dismissed with
prejudice, the claims may not proceed and Plaintiff may not name
the CCCFJ as a defendant.
7.
Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to name a
person or persons who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, however. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
Complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
Conditions Of Confinement Claims:
Claims Prior to 2015 Dismissed With Prejudice
Claims After 2015 Dismissed Without Prejudice
8.
Second, for the reasons set forth below, the Court
will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to
state a claim for claims that arise after 2015 and dismiss the
Complaint with prejudice for claims that arise before 2015. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
9.
The present Complaint does not allege sufficient facts
to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review
under § 1915. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff’s
Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not
4
enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional
violation has occurred.
10.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim3, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay
3
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000));
Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).
5
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
11.
A complaint must plead sufficient facts to support a
reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has
occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
12.
However, with respect to the alleged facts giving rise
to Plaintiff’s claims, the present Complaint states in its
entirety: “I slept on the floor while incarcerated. All the
times I were there.” Complaint § III(C).
13.
Plaintiff alleges this occurred: January 11, 2008,
March 19, 2010, July 31, 2015, and November 9, 2015. Id. §
III(B).
14.
Plaintiff further alleges, “I broke out in boils bumps
the nurses gave me meds while I was in there. Now I have hair
follicle infections that I can’t get rid of.” Id. § IV.
15.
With respect to requested relief, Plaintiff seeks “the
Court fix the way the jail systems treats, you, like your animal
pet. $10,000 for my pain and suffering or whatever the courts
finds appropriate.” Id. § V.4
4
Given Plaintiff’s reference to “the Court fix the way the jail
system treats you” (Complaint § V), the Court advises Plaintiff
that he is one of thousands of members of a certified class in a
case on this Court's docket captioned Dittimus-Bey, et al. v.
Taylor, et al., Civil Action No. 1:05-cv-0063-JBS, United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey. The class
plaintiffs are all persons confined at the Camden County
Correctional Facility (“CCCF”), as either pretrial detainees or
6
16.
Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a
civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed
because the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual
support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation
has occurred.
17.
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily
in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
convicted prisoners, at any time from January 6, 2005 until the
present time. The Dittimus-Bey class of plaintiffs seeks
injunctive and declaratory relief concerning allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the CCCF involving
overcrowding. The Dittimus-Bey class action does not involve
money damages for individuals. There is a proposed final
settlement of Dittimus-Bey, which this Court preliminarily
approved on February 22, 2017. That February 22 preliminary
approval describes the proposed settlement in detail. Various
measures undertaken pursuant to the Court-approved Second and
Third Consent Decrees have reduced the CCCF jail population to
fewer prisoners than the intended design capacity for the jail,
thereby greatly reducing or eliminating triple and quadruple
bunking in two-person cells; these details are further explained
in the proposed Sixth and Final Consent Decree, which would
continue those requirements under Court supervision for two more
years. According to the Notice Of Class Action Settlement
approved in the Dittimus-Bey case on February 22, 2017, any
class member can object to the proposed settlement by filing an
objection in the Dittimus-Bey case before April 24, 2017. A
final hearing is set for May 23, 2017, at which time the Court
will consider any objections to the settlement. If the DittimusBey settlement is finally approved after the May 23, 2017
hearing, Plaintiff and other class members will be barred from
seeking injunctive or declaratory relief for the period of time
from January 6, 2005 until the date of final approval, but the
settlement does not bar any individual class member from seeking
money damages in an individual case.
7
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”). Some relevant factors are the length of the
confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved
in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement,
any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of
confinement, etc.
18.
Further, to the extent the complaint seeks relief for
conditions Plaintiff encountered during periods of confinement
ending prior to March 17, 2015, those claims are barred by the
statute of limitations and must be dismissed with prejudice,
8
meaning that Plaintiff cannot recover for those claims because
they have been brought too late. Plaintiff filed his complaint
on March 17, 2017. Civil rights claims under § 1983 are governed
by New Jersey's limitations period for personal injury and must
be brought within two years of the claim’s accrual. See Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police,
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under federal law, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y
Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014).
19.
Plaintiff alleges the event giving rise to his claims
occurred during four separate detentions: January 11, 2008,
March 19, 2010, July 31, 2015 and November 9, 2015. The 2008 and
2010 detentions occurred more than two years prior to the filing
of Plaintiff’s complaint. The allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement at CCCF, namely the overcrowding,
would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of
his detention; therefore the statute of limitations for
Plaintiff’s claims arising from his 2008 and 2010 detentions
expired well before this complaint was filed in 2017. Plaintiff
therefore cannot recover for these claims.5
5
Although the Court may toll, or extend, the statute of
limitations in the interests of justice, certain circumstances
must be present before it can do so. Tolling is not warranted in
this case because the state has not “actively misled” Plaintiff
9
20.
Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to
particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that end,
the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint
within 30 days of the date of this order.6
21.
Plaintiff is further advised that any amended
complaint must plead specific facts regarding the conditions of
confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint,
Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable
inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order
to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
22.
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint
is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
as to the existence of his cause of action, there are no
extraordinary circumstances that prevented Plaintiff from filing
his claim, and there is nothing to indicate Plaintiff filed his
claim on time but in the wrong forum. See Omar v. Blackman, 590
F. App’x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014).
6 The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
10
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
23.
In the event Plaintiff does elect to file an amended
complaint, he should focus only on the facts of his confinement
from July 31, 2015 and November 9, 2015. Because Plaintiff’s
earlier claims are barred by the statute of limitations and must
be dismissed with prejudice, Plaintiff may not assert those
claims in an amended complaint.
24.
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a)
dismissed with prejudice as to the CCCF; (b) dismissed with
prejudice as to the claims arising from January 11, 2008 and
March 19, 2010 as they are barred by the statute of limitations;
and (c) the remainder of the complaint is dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim.
25.
An appropriate order follows.
May 31, 2017
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
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